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Legislative debates over bankruptcy and consumer credit are dominated by
the myth of the rational borrower. Congress recently enacted legislation
motivated by the perception that rational consumers act strategically when they
borrow money and file for bankruptcy. 2 The proponents of this so-called reform
complain that the nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rate has skyrocketed over the
last twenty years, even (indeed especially) during the flush economic times of
the mid-1990s (see Figure 1).3 These reform advocates argue that a decline in
the stigma associated with bankruptcy has increased the amount of strategic
behavior among borrowers.4 This purported crisis of "bankruptcy abuse" is the
justification for radically limiting access to (and increasing the cost of obtaining)
a bankruptcy discharge.5 Opponents of the recently enacted legislation see an
entirely different crisis-in the consumer credit markets, rather than in the
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1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S1813, S1813 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist)
(explaining that today people strategically plan their bankruptcies in order to "buy a house or...
whatever else they need and then file a bankruptcy form... [so] they can get the big ticket items
upfront, and for everything else they will use cash").
3. For data on nonbusiness bankruptcy filings over time, see, for example, www.abiworld.org
(analyzing filings by chapter, year, and district) and www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/
bankruptcystats.htm (containing statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts).
4. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1813, S1813 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist)
(contending that "[b]ankruptcy has become so common that it has lost the stigma it had even a short
generation ago" and because it's "just another method [or] tool just to get out of debt[,] [s]ome folks
have even been known to plan their bankruptcy").
5. See, e.g., id. at S1842 (statement of Sen. Frist) (arguing that because "bankruptcy is no
longer a last resort" and is instead being used as a "first stop," the governing principle for the future
of bankruptcy should be: "Those who have the means should repay their debts").
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bankruptcy filing rate per se.6 Under this view, there was no need to change the
bankruptcy laws; a more profitable avenue for reform would have been to
regulate the exploding market for consumer credit.
In this Article, we seek to show that the fault line between these two camps
rests on competing views about the information available to lenders and, more
importantly, on competing views about consumer rationality and consumer
opportunism. We argue that the division lies in two competing empirical claims
about the paradigmatic borrower and the paradigmatic lender and on competing
causal stories about the effects of related legal changes over the last twenty-five
years. Neither data story is conclusive, but one, we believe, is considerably more
plausible than the other.
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6. See, e.g., Letter from 92 Law Professors to Senators Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy 1-2
(Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/LawProfsLetter.pdf (arguing that
increased bankruptcy filings over the past 25 years are explained less by changes in bankruptcy law
than by changes in "the way that credit is marketed to consumers").
7. Id.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.5.2
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljfftables.pdf (covering years
1980 through 2004); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 17 (1979) (covering years 1970 through 1979).
The Myth of the Rational Borrower
On one side, law professors and economists 9 rely on macrodata to theorize
about consumer bankruptcy law and policy "from the top down."' They view
individual debtors as either honest, but unfortunate, or as opportunistic." The
honest-but-unfortunate debtor is a rational, law-abiding person who borrows
9. In posing this dichotomy, we are not unmindful that there are exceptions to this
generalization about economists. See, e.g., Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbolic
Discounting and Consumption, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS, EIGHTH WORLD CONGRESS 258, 279-80 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003)
(utilizing a hyperbolic discount model to characterize available evidence on credit card borrowing,
consumption-income co-movement, and liquid and illiquid asset accumulation); David Laibson et
al., A Debt Puzzle, in KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN
MACROECONOMICS: IN HONOR OF EDMUND S. PHELPS 228, 229 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003)
(explaining credit card borrowing using a standard life cycle model and arguing that the quasi-
hyperbolic discount function partially solves the debt puzzle); Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card
Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 264 (1997) (connecting
credit card default rates and bankruptcy filing statistics to trends in the general economy); Oren Bar-
Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76 (2004) (proposing a theory of credit
card borrowing based on behavioral bias in which consumers underestimate future borrowing and
under which credit card issuers exploit this bias); David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of
Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution or Both, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 347-48 (1999)
(relating the increased number of consumer bankruptcies to changes in the distribution of consumer
credit).
10. See, e.g., Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 609 (2000) (applying a principal-agent framework to
analyze consumer bankruptcy and reach conclusions about bankruptcy exemption levels,
reaffirmation agreements, chapter choice, and enforceability of bankruptcy waivers); Edith H. Jones
& Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 180 (attributing the rise in
consumer bankruptcies to declining social stigma and advocating means-testing to stem
opportunistic filings); Eric A. Posner, Should Debtors Be Forced Into Chapter 13?, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 965, 966 (1999) (examining means-testing restrictions on availability of chapter 7 "in light of
the goals of bankruptcy law" and concluding that it would "rationalize bankruptcy relief' and
reduce the cost of credit); Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, The Optimal Personal Bankruptcy
Procedure and Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 257 (2000) (proposing reform of U.S.
bankruptcy law to combine chapters 7 and 13, so that a debtors' obligations to repay would be based
on ability to pay, thus reducing potential for opportunism); Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 50-51 (1987) [hereinafter
White, Economic Analysis] (formulating and testing an economic model of consumer borrowing
and consumer bankruptcy to assess reasons for increased bankruptcy filings); Michelle J. White,
Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 229 (1998)
[hereinafter White, Why Don't More] (claiming that 15% of U.S. households would benefit from
filing bankruptcy but choose not to do so to preserve the option to file in the future); Michelle J.
White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal
Bankruptcy Law and A Proposal for Change, 65 U. CI. L. REV. 685, 686, 710 (1998) [hereinafter
White, Why It Pays] (constructing an economic model to demonstrate that consumers' strategic
behavior explains increases in bankruptcy filings and proposing changes to bankruptcy laws "that
would appropriately limit the attractiveness of the bankruptcy process"); Todd J. Zywicki,
Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 393, 406, 422 (2001) [hereinafter
Zywicki, Social Legislation] (arguing that increased bankruptcy rates are a natural result of a system
that "rewards short-term and irresponsible behavior" and places few restrictions on opportunistic
use); Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2016, 2021-22 (2003) (book review) [hereinafter Zywicki, Past, Present, and Future]
(detailing how American bankruptcy law has historically been shaped by competing interests of
academics, bankruptcy professionals, and creditors).
11. See, e.g., White, Why It Pays, supra note 10, at 693 (casting bankrupt households as
strategic planners exploiting potential financial benefits).
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after informed deliberation but defaults due to an unforeseen and unforeseeable
shock to her income. The opportunistic debtor borrows with an eye on the
Bankruptcy Code and files for bankruptcy when she has maximized her debt
and, consequently, the beneficial effect of the bankruptcy discharge. 12
The economists' Olympian perspective is exemplified by Richard Posner
and Gary Becker.' 3 In a world of rational (and strategic) borrowers any measure
that reduces the cost of the discharge increases the incentive for borrower
opportunism. Lenders, by contrast, face highly competitive markets 4 that
undermine efforts to pass on the costs of default and bankruptcy to high-risk
borrowers through price discrimination15-they lack the ability to determine in
advance which borrowers are honest and which opportunistic. As a result,
lenders either pass the burden of opportunism on to the marketplace as a whole
or ration credit in an effort to maintain underwriting standards. 16 Under this
view, the bankruptcy discharge is the cause of the skyrocketing filing rate, which
imposes a bankruptcy tax on the consumers of credit. The goal of bankruptcy
reform is, thus, a form of tax reduction. As Judge Posner recently said:
I conclude that the new Act, by increasing the rights of creditors in
bankruptcy (for remember that chapter 13 enables a creditor to obtain
repayment out of the debtor's post-bankruptcy income, not just out of
what may be his very limited nonexempt assets at the time of bankruptcy,
as under chapter 7), should reduce interest rates and thus make borrowers
better off. The most reckless borrowers-those most prone to file
repeated chapter 7 bankruptcies-will be made worse off. But there will
be fewer of these, precisely because they will be worse off than under the
existing system. If bankruptcy is more costly, there will be less of it.17
12. See id. (describing two types of households, one of which "plan[s] in advance to take
advantage of the possibility of bankruptcy").
13. See Posting of Gary Becker to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com
(Mar. 27, 2005, 02:03 PM) (proposing nondischargeable loans secured by human capital); Posting
of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com (Mar. 27, 2005,
02:20 PM) ("If bankruptcy is more costly, there will be less of it.").
14. See, e.g., William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of
the State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 21 (arguing that in a competitive lending
market, interest rates and loan terms will cover all of a lender's costs).
15. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 393 (1981) (noting that the interest rate a borrower is willing
to pay may act as a screening device that can impart information to the lender about the borrower's
riskiness but that "the interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans
by either: 1) sorting potential borrowers (adverse selection effect); or 2) affecting the actions of
borrowers (the incentive effect)").
16. This is the so-called "bankruptcy tax" that lobbyists claimed lenders would rebate in the
event Congress adopted the 2005 bankruptcy amendments. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1813,
S 1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (insisting that there is a "bankruptcy tax"
of "$400-a-year on every household in the country," which could amount to a "mortgage or a rent
payment" for many families).
17. Posner, supra note 13.
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On the other side, law professors and sociologists have worked together to
study the workings of consumer bankruptcy law "on the ground."' 8 They have
looked at microdata to develop finely grained information about who files for
bankruptcy and why. These scholars review bankruptcy petitions and interview
thousands of filers to develop a demographic picture of consumer bankruptcy.
They find that debtors come in all shapes and sizes, 19 but tell a consistent, albeit
anecdotal, story about their default. Debtors are pushed over the financial edge
by personal tragedy-events such as divorce, job loss, and uninsured medical
20expenses. While personal tragedy has always existed, increases in the
consumer bankruptcy filing rate have, they believe, been driven by the easy
availability and aggressive marketing of (often quite expensive) consumer
credit.2 ' Consumer credit places families closer to the financial precipice. When
the predictable (although unforeseen) shocks arise, it is no surprise that many
more families tumble into bankruptcy than they did several decades ago. These
scholars focus more on the marketing of consumer credit than on the motivation
for consumer borrowing. For them, the focus of policy should be on consumer
protection and on moderating lenders' incentives to extend increasing amounts
of consumer credit to risky borrowers.22
18. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 3 (1999) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE] (exploring the pathology of debtors and the consumer credit system); TERESA A.
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:
AMERICANS IN DEBT 2 (2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS] (addressing the question of why families face economic difficulties).
19. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at
27 ("The people who file for bankruptcy are a cross-section of society, and bankruptcy is a middle-
class phenomenon."); David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as
Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at W5-63, W5-70,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63vl.pdf (noting that there are millions of
debtors in the U.S. each year and that they are primarily middle class).
20. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 15-21.
21. See id. at 110 (reporting that the end of the twentieth century brought with it a doubling of
American credit card debt); Ausubel, supra note 9, at 260 (explaining the rise in modem credit card
profitability).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 16 (2000) (arguing that the view "that individuals must
experience a financial revelation that results in modification of their behavior only after suffering
the burden of severe debt" ignores the alternative possibility that "credit card companies or
financially complicit colleges should offer educational workshops of financial literacy programs
before debt problems arise"); SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra
note 18, at 140 ("Some people cannot manage credit, and its ready availability puts them at risk for
a heady ride of consumer consumption followed by mounting bills and financial juggling that
eventually comes tumbling down."); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-
INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 130 (2003)
(noting the rise in marketing by credit card companies to the present level of more than five billion
preapproved credit card offers per year, an average of over $350,000 of credit per family); Ausubel,
supra note 9, at 270 ("The social problem is not so much the rise in personal bankruptcies as the rise
in overextended consumers.... If changes in the law would be beneficial at all, we need changes
directed toward discouraging overextension from occurring in the first place .... "); Bar-Gill, supra
note 9, at 1434 ("In consumer contracts, highly sophisticated corporations will often exploit
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While the sociologists emphasize and study the ex post effects of financial
distress, the economists focus on the ex ante incentives created by bankruptcy
rules.23 Looking at borrowers from opposite sides of the bankruptcy divide, they
each make assumptions about motivation. The sociologists see debtors in grave
financial distress and assume honesty. They therefore seek to solve the root
causes-healthcare, labor markets, and predatory or subprime lending.
Economists, instead, see broken promises and assume opportunism. They worry
about how the bankruptcy discharge influences a debtor's borrowing behavior.
These commentators argue that the Bankruptcy Code encourages inefficient and
opportunistic ex ante decisionmaking,25 and point to increases in the bankruptcy
filing rate as a result of that opportunism.
The economic critique of consumer bankruptcy law has been tremendously
influential in Congress. On October 17, 2005, sweeping changes in consumer
bankruptcy law became effective, enacted as part of the inaptly named
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.26
Although the Act is lengthy and filled with both consumer and business focused
provisions, its most controversial provisions are those that impose a new "means
test" for chapter 7 liquidation proceedings. The means test is designed to limit
consumers' behavioral biases.... Therefore, legal intervention may well be required to protect
consumers and to increase social welfare."); Ronald J. Mann, Global Credit Card Use and Debt:
Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses 61 & n.194 (Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, Law and Econ.
Working Paper No. 049, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-509063 (recommending a ban
on marketing to minors due to their greater likelihood to use credit cards).
23. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 344
(1997) (arguing that the ex ante approach is optimal for corporate insolvency); Phillipe Aghion et
al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 852 (1994) (applying an economic
perspective to bankruptcy procedure); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy
Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1163 (1994) (arguing that the importance
of the ex ante effects of bankruptcy laws far outweigh the importance of ex post efficiency concerns
in business cases); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807, 1820 (1998) (arguing for greater ex ante efficiency by providing multiple bankruptcy
options for business debtors).
24. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1054 (2000) (noting that
"[t]he seminal insight that economics provides to the analysis of law is that people respond to
incentives"). Both factions make unrealistic assumptions about the ability ofjudges to engage in ex
post sorting between opportunistic and honest debtors. The empiricists tend to assume that judges
are good sorters. The economists tend to assume judicial incompetence. The effect of bankruptcy
law on ex ante incentives turns to some extent on the ability ofjudges to engage in such sorting, and
to an even larger extent on whether they are biased. Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy
Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 598-601 (2001).
25. One thing that should be noted about both "factions" is that they each make unrealistic,
stylized decisions about the ability of the judicial decision to distinguish opportunistic from honest
but unfortunate debtors. The empiricists tend to assume that judges are capable of weeding
opportunistic debtors from the system, without recognizing the costliness of that inquiry. The
economists tend to assume that no such sorting exists. The reality is somewhat more complex. See
Janger, supra note 24 (noting that judicial involvement is only appropriate in a small subset of
consumer bankruptcy cases).
26. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
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chapter 7 to those individual debtors whose income is presumed insufficient
(because it is below the state average) to repay their unsecured obligations over a
five-year period.2 7 Lawmakers28 and lobbyists 9 support the need for this radical
reworking of consumer bankruptcy law by pointing to increases in nonbusiness
bankruptcy filings since enactment of the 1978 Code. They argue, like true
incentive analysts, that this trend was the result of bankruptcy reforms-adopted
in 1978 to protect consumer debtors-which, they claim, instead created
improper incentives for individuals to file for bankruptcy.
30
The problem is that the theory about why people file for bankruptcy, and
the microdata about why people report that they have filed for bankruptcy, do
not connect. We ask, "Is there an ex ante story that can simultaneously explain
the pain that is observed in bankruptcy and the increase in bankruptcy filings?"
27. Id.
28. See supra notes 4-5, 16. See also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part II): Hearing on
H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 30 (2000) (statement of Rep. Marge Roukema, Chairwoman, H. Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions) ("Bankruptcy is fast becoming the first stop financial planning tool rather
than a last resort."); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
11 (2000) (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher, Member of Congress) ("Bankruptcies of convenience
are driving this increase. Bankruptcy was never meant to be used as a financial planning tool, but it
is becoming a first stop rather than a last resort .. "); George W. Gekas, Statement to the
Dickinson Law Review Bankruptcy Symposium, 102 DICK. L. REV. 859, 861 (1998) (arguing that
"bankruptcy has become viewed more as a financial planning tool, a government debt forgiveness
program, and a first choice rather than a last resort"); Press Release, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Hyde Announces Judiciary Legislative Schedule: Bankruptcy Reform,
Juvenile Justice & Civil Asset Forfeiture Top List (Feb. 24, 1999),
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/022499.htm ("Congress must confront the [bankruptcy] issue
directly and curb abusive and predatory practices of those who would game the system.").
29. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 8
(2000) (statement of George J. Wallace on behalf of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Coalition)
("Today, we have a chapter 7 bankruptcy remedy which is fundamentally flawed. At the same time,
we have a chapter 13 program which is supposed to encourage consumers to repay their debts, but
instead encourages them all too often to evade their responsibilities. In a well meaning attempt to
help those in debt trouble, a major 'reform' of bankruptcy was enacted in 1978 which generously
provides relief to those who need it-but also to those who do not deserve it."); id. at 123-24
(statement of Michael Moore on behalf of the National Retail Federation) ("I have an increasing
number of customers who file for bankruptcy within a short period of time after making a major
purchase.... Our laws must be tightened to prevent those who are deliberately using the
Bankruptcy Code as a tool to load up on merchandise on credit that they have no intention of ever
repaying. Finally, some consumers are using chapter 13 to reduce the contract price (and other
terms) of purchases they make from dealers who hold a security interest in the merchandise....
There should be a reasonable period during which this kind of abuse should not be tolerated.").
30. For criticism of means testing, see, for example, Leif M. Clark, The Responsible Borrower
Protection Bankruptcy Act: A Not-So-Responsible Effort at Protecting Borrowers, 28 U. MEM. L.
REV. 741 (1998); Gary Klein, Means Testing Bankruptcy: What Would It Mean?, 28 U. MEM. L.
REV. 711 (1998); Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse
or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33 (1998); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of
Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 193-203 (2005); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in
the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231 (2005).
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This Article examines data on the market for consumer credit and empirical
studies of consumer behavior, including studies of consumers who have filed for
bankruptcy. It finds that the focus on increased nonbusiness bankruptcy filing
rates ignores important data that raise puzzling questions about the locus of
rationality; if most borrowers act strategically, lenders should be reluctant to
expand the market for consumer credit, and indeed, should lose money by doing
so. Yet, consistently since 1978, the market for consumer credit has expanded,
especially the market for subprime lending to borrowers with blemished credit
records. For this business strategy to work, nonstrategic borrowers must
outnumber strategic borrowers and the interest and fees paid by (at least some)
nonstrategic borrowers must outweigh the costs of strategic borrowers' defaults.
What then accounts for lenders' increased willingness to extend consumer credit
in the face of increased bankruptcy filings?
A broader look at changes in the law and in the market for consumer credit
since 1978 suggests an alternative story. In this story, 1978 remains a focal
point, but not solely because the bankruptcy laws were amended. In 1978, the
Supreme Court decided Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Service Corp.,3 ' which effectively released consumer credit providers
from usury limits, and thereby encouraged the creation of a national, rather than
purely local, market for consumer credit. At around the same time, innovations
in point-of-purchase technology and risk-based credit scoring models permitted
lenders to discriminate successfully between high- and low-risk borrowers, and
impose fees and finance charges on high-risk borrowers that would have been
viewed as usurious in a pre-Marquette world. These legal and technological
changes do much to explain lenders' increased willingness to supply consumer
credit, particularly into the subprime market: advances in technology increased
lenders' access to information; deregulation erased legal barriers that otherwise
would have prevented lenders from acting on the newly available information;
decreases in the cost of funds ensured that, with all else unchanged, profits from
consumer credit would grow. With these edits to the story, it hardly seems
surprising that lenders have increased the supply of consumer credit. More
importantly, they have increased the riskiness of the credit pool, lending to
borrowers who would not have been profitable in a world of informational
asymmetries and usury limits-in short, a world where lenders are unable to
price discriminate among high- and low-risk borrowers. Under this view, the
increased bankruptcy filing rate is not a crisis; it merely represents a shift to a
new equilibrium rate of filing.32
The policy response, if any, to the filing rate thus turns on the extent to
which consumers can be viewed as instrumentally rational. Why have
consumers been willing to borrow at higher and higher levels, notwithstanding
relatively stagnant growth in income and wealth during this period? Incentive
31. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
32. See Moss & Johnson, supra note 9, at 347 (noting that the increase in bankruptcies since
1985 is attributable to changes in the distribution of consumer credit).
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analysts contend that these trends are fueled by strategic incentives ostensibly
embedded in the Bankruptcy Code (until those incentives were removed by the
2005 amendments). But rationality cannot comfortably coexist on both the
borrower and lender sides of the economists' story. In a world of expanding
consumer credit and increasing bankruptcy filings (not to mention increasing
profitability and relatively constant borrowing terms), somebody must be doing
the calculus wrong. Why would rational lenders with state-of-the-art
information technology, universal credit reporting, and empirically sound risk-
management models knowingly lend to borrowers who are out to game the
system? If consumers are rational, why do so many bankruptcy debtors appear
to be in such pain?
If one relaxes the assumption of consumer rationality, the pieces of the
puzzle fall more comfortably into place. Behavioral decision research assists in
understanding the behavior of borrowers as predictable, yet less than rational.33
This revised theory of the borrower suggests an alternative account for rational
lender behavior that is plausible, explanatory, and troubling all at once.
Experiments conducted by cognitive psychologists demonstrate that, far from
being rational individuals, consumers compensate for their own "bounded
rationality" by adopting decisionmaking heuristics-short cuts that help
33. Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An
Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 991, 994-95 (1985) (discussing value of using experimental
techniques to study economic theory because they offer opportunities to create environments that
will best predict human behavior in discrete, defined economic scenarios); Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1488-89 (1998) (asserting
that the behavioral approach to economic theory generates better predictions about human behavior
than that of conventional economics because it does not rely on the assumption that people are
rational actors); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1055-59 (anticipating that the "law and
behavioral science" movement will gradually displace rational choice theory in the law and
economics field because of its ability to explain "behavioral anomalies" in human behavior that
cannot be reconciled with the assumptions intrinsic to rational choice theory); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1501-02 (1998) (commenting that, because "behavioral
decision theory" is capable of explaining "complex and contingent" human behavior that departs
from "rational decision-making processes," it can successfully predict and model such behavior
where conventional economics cannot); Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human
Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1495 (1998) (discussing the
capacity of behavioral research to address and account for deviations from rational actor models
espoused by standard economics theories as an indispensable analytic tool in contemporary legal
scholarship); Symposium, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal
Implications, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (2003) (critiquing traditional models of normative rationality
and exploring the implications of alternative models of rationality for law and policy); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 121
(1999) (suggesting that, although the behavioral economics view of rationality in human behavior
represents a departure from "standard economic assumptions," it does so in a manner that provides a
"legitimate basis for predicting human behavior"); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL
LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (observing that, in applying behavioral
economics to the analysis of law and its effect on people, social scientists have discovered that,
while "[p]eople are not always 'rational' in the sense that economists suppose ... it does not follow
that people's behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive").
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individuals to make purchasing and borrowing decisions.34 These heuristics,
however, also introduce systematic biases into consumers' decisionmaking that
cause consumers to buy and borrow more than would a rational, credit-using
purchaser, and at a higher interest rate. More troubling yet, rational, profit-
maximizing lenders can capitalize on these biases to increase their profits in
ways that have significant negative social welfare consequences.
35
We outline the implications of behavioral decision research for existing
models of consumer borrowing and post-default behavior. This research
suggests that excessive consumer borrowing may result from biases in consumer
decisionmaking, not from strategic advantages embedded in consumer finance
and consumer bankruptcy laws. Under the behavioral view, lenders face market
incentives to expand access to credit by exploiting consumer borrowers' biased
decisionmaking.36 Marquette, coupled with changes in credit reporting and
lending technology, facilitates lenders' exploitation of individuals' faulty
decisionmaking through aggressive and sophisticated marketing of consumer
credit to an increasingly wide swath of the American public.
We divide the Article into four parts. Part I describes the ex ante incentive
analysis of consumer bankruptcy law. Part II contrasts incentive models of
consumer behavior with empirical studies of consumer bankruptcy filings. Part
III looks for alternative explanations for consumer borrowing and lending
behavior, specifically in the experimental research conducted by cognitive
psychologists and behavioral economists. It relates this expanding body of
scholarship to empirical research on consumer bankruptcy, and finds that the
consumer bankruptcy data corroborate the results of behavioral decision research
in refuting many of the assumptions that underlie the rational actor model of
consumer borrowing. Part IV accepts consumers as making borrowing decisions
based on biased heuristics and argues that behavioral decision research provides
theoretical backing for two claims frequently derided by economic analyses of
consumer bankruptcy law: that rational lending decisions are at the root of
34. See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482, 484 n.3 (2002) (describing the results of research in the area
of heuristics and biases).
35. See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1376 (portraying "the credit card contract as a tool designed
to exploit consumers' underestimation bias"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational
Borrowing: A Consumer's Guide 1-3 (Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program, Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 253, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=772186 (listing reasons why consumers might
be susceptible to borrowing money excessively and discussing the social welfare implications of
such excessive borrowing, specifically on those consumers).
36. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 722 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously] (arguing that the consumers' "cognitive anomalies" create market
incentives that "no profit maximizing manufacturer can ignore"); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1420, 1427 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Evidence of Market Manipulation]
(explaining that market forces drive manufacturers to exploit consumer beliefs even if
manufacturers are not actually aware of these beliefs).
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increases in borrowing and consumer default; and that behavioral decision
research may justify policymakers turning their attention to the costly results of
distorted consumption decisions and externalized costs of overborrowing.
Consumer protection, rather than bankruptcy reform, should, therefore, have
been the preferred policy response to the increased bankruptcy filing rate.37
I. The Ex Ante Incentive Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Law
Consumer credit transactions start with the proposition that they are two-
party transactions. According to economists, in a world of perfect information,
low transaction costs, and no externalities, rational actors will contract to
maximize their own welfare. Consumer credit contracts, therefore,
presumptively maximize social welfare. Mandatory, legally implied contract
terms, like the bankruptcy discharge, have no place in such a world.38 To justify
a deviation from the free-market default, advocates of a rule mandating a
discharge in bankruptcy must identify an imperfection in the bargaining process
or an externality that justifies inserting the mandatory term into the contract.3 9
Strategic incentive analysis of consumer bankruptcy law proceeds from this
starting point, and, finding insufficient justification, largely ends there. If one
assumes both rational lenders and rational borrowers, the bankruptcy discharge
will increase demand for credit (by reducing the cost of default), but will also,
and more importantly, lead to a restriction of supply. Credit contracts will be
riskier, interest rates will rise, and supply will fall. Thus, the ex ante incentive
analysis of consumer bankruptcy law leads to a set of powerful and testable
predictions: the discharge in bankruptcy encourages consumers to overborrow
and then default free of cost; there will be too many bankruptcy filings; this will
lead to an undersupply of credit at too high a price. As Posner said, "increasing
the rights of creditors... should reduce interest rates and thus make borrowers
better off.'40 Bankruptcy law is bad for consumers.
There is no way around the fact that the increasing bankruptcy filing rate is
a powerful datum in support of the economists' conclusion. If only the world
were so simple. The filing rate is only one fact in a much more complex story.
37. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224-37 (2003) (discussing less
"heavy-handed" consumer protection policies, such as creating default rules or mandating that
certain information be provided, that fall short of limiting consumer choices entirely); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159, 1160 (2003) (proposing a form of paternalism that "should be acceptable to those who are
firmly committed to freedom of choice").
38. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 10, at 589 (questioning wisdom of consumer protection
laws that invalidate contractual bankruptcy waivers or reaffirmation agreements).
39. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 284-87 (1995) (suggesting that debtors become wards of the state and rejecting, on economic
grounds, the claim that all voluntary contracts should be enforced and concluding that restrictive
contract doctrines are appropriate means for deterring socially costly behavior).
40. Posner, supra note 13.
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In this Part, we review the literature on borrowers' and lenders' incentives, and
seek to show that the recent history of consumer credit casts considerable doubt
on economists' simple story and resulting policy prescription. Later, we propose
an alternative.
A. Borrowers'Incentives
The economic analysis of consumer bankruptcy law posits the consumer as
a Nietzschian superman-instrumentally rational, fully informed, and able to
perform complex arithmetic calculations unfettered by cognitive and other
limitations. In this view, law has no normative content, only a price tag.
Consumers are assumed to try to game the legal system; legal rules should be
calculated to inhibit consumers' supposed opportunism.
1. Economic Analysis of Consumer Borrowing: Downward-Sloping
Demand Curve and Intertemporal Substitution.- "The economic theory of the
consumer is very simple: economists assume that consumers choose the best
bundle of goods they can afford. '41 Consumers are assumed to be rational utility
maximizers with complete information and stable preferences.4 The less
something costs, the more of it they will buy.43 The more it costs the less they
will purchase, or they will substitute to other lower cost alternatives. 4 They
41. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 20 (5th ed.
1999). Individuals choose among bundles of consumption goods based upon their preferences, the
price at which these goods are available in the market, and income constraints. Id. at 20-21. See
also ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THUROW, UNDERSTANDING MICROECONOMICS 109-11
(6th ed. 1984) (noting that individuals allocate spending to achieve the greatest utility within
constraints set by their incomes).
42. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (positing
that all human behavior can be viewed as involving people who "maximize their utility from a
stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a
variety of markets"); see also HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 41, at 45-47 (observing that
economists rely on the assumption that human beings are rational maximizers engaged in the
"calculated pursuit of pleasurable wealth").
43. Algebraically, this budget line can be modeled as Y = p-x, + p'x, where Y represents the
consumer's money income, x, and x, refer to two different goods or bundles of goods, and p. and p.
refer to the price of x. and x, respectively. Microeconomic models are typically framed in terms of
two bundles of goods in order to facilitate graphical depictions of the budget function, but too much
should not be made of this simplification. The variable x, can be said to represent some specific
good, while x2 can refer to "a composite good that stands for everything else that the consumer
might want to consume other than good 1." VARIAN, supra note 41, at 21 ("When we adopt this
interpretation, it is convenient to think of good 2 as being the dollars that the consumer can use to
spend on other goods.").
44. Although generally these consumption functions give little thought to borrowing decisions,
some texts note that a consumer's money income, Y, could be understood to include not only wages
and the like, but also the amount of money that a consumer can borrow. In this event, p. or p2 would
be understood to include the cost of borrowing if x. or x. were purchased on credit. EDWIN
MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 44 n.3 (11 th ed.
2003). Moreover, some models account for an individual's preferences for saving rather than
spending income. Consumers' decisions to save can be modeled by denoting savings as among the
goods and services that they can decide to "purchase" within their budget constraints. Id. at 44 n.4.
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have downward-sloping demand curves. Preferences are endogenous, arising
solely from within the consumer. Economists leave the question of preference
formation to psychologists, sociologists, and other social scientists. Changes in
the relative prices of goods are viewed as having a "substitution effect"-if the
price of pens increases, consumers increase their demand for lower priced
pencils.
45
In consumer credit models, the substitution effect is temporal-consumers
substitute present consumption for future consumption.4 6 If the consumer is a
borrower in the first period, she will consume an amount that exceeds her
income for that period;47 the cost of this loan is the principal and interest she will
repay in the second period.48 This model assumes that debt will be paid out of
income earned in the second period, and that consumption in the second period
will reflect this repayment.49 It suggests that there are only two relevant
variables-the interest rate and the consumer's preference for debt versus
savings. Rational consumers might also borrow where they expect income in the
second period to increase over that earned in the first period, but prefer to
equalize consumption levels over time.50  Here, too, the substitution between
present and future consumption will be driven by the interest rate.
2. Ex Ante Incentive Analysis of Consumer Default.-None of these
analyses, however, factor in the costs and benefits of default. In a 1977 article,
William Meckling relaxed the assumption that the debt a borrower incurs in the
45. VARIAN, supra note 41, at 38-40.
46. See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION 2-3 (1992) (recognizing the
difference in consumption over two time periods); VARIAN, supra note 41, at 180-99 (examining
consumer behavior by looking at the consumer's intertemporal choices).
47. Consumption in the first period would equal the cost of the goods and services purchased in
that period, including the cost of credit, and would exceed the income earned during this first
period. Algebraically, we could describe this inequality as follows: c' = (p'x' + p 2x 2) > Y,.
48. Algebraically, the cost of the loan can be represented as follows: (ca - Y') + r(ca - ya).
49. VARIAN, supra note 41, at 182 (describing this inequality as follows: cn = mn - r(ca - ma) -
(c' - ma), with r representing the cost of the loan, the interest rate at which the loan was extended).
Note that Varian does not present a strategic analysis of borrowers' incentives to borrow-he
presumes that the borrower will repay the loan on time and in full and makes no judgment about an
individual's preference for paying for current consumption with current income, savings, or
borrowed funds. See id. at 184 (discussing consumer preferences for the payment of current
consumption without exploring the potential consequences of choosing certain kinds of payments
over others). For him, the taste for debt depends upon a balance of the desire for current
consumption against the constraints presented by limited income. Id. at 185. He declines to include
any effect the law may or may not have on behavior in his models. See id. at 183-85 (presenting
various models for evaluating consumer consumption without any reference to the possibility of the
law as a restraint).
50. Life-cycle theories of individual economic activity posit that consumers who are beginning
their economic lives will save income in preparation for later retirement. See Albert Ando & Franco
Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 55, 56 (1963) (describing an individual's consumption pattern in relation to expected
current and future income and returns). Upon retirement, these models presume that consumers
earn less and pay for expenditures primarily out of savings. Id. at 76.
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first period will be repaid in the second.51 He modeled individual borrowers as
strategic actors, motivated to repay debt only where repayment would lead to
financial advantage.52  Even in a simple two-period model "[t]he debtor will
have an incentive to seek out income in forms that are exempt from
repayment .... [Debtors] will repay only if default is on balance less attractive
than repayment."53 Thus, consumers should be expected to breach their loan
contracts whenever default is less costly than repayment." He argues that the
primary benefit of bankruptcy "consists of a complete discharge of interest and
princip[al] payments on outstanding debt." 55 Meckling asserts that the costs of
bankruptcy to an individual debtor include the following: assets made available
for distribution to creditors; the costs of the bankruptcy filing, such as the
attorney's fees and filing fees incurred in prosecuting the case; the "adverse
effects on future borrowing; and [the] psychological or other costs that the
individual might suffer because of his failure to fulfill a contract. '56  Not
surprisingly, he concludes that "[c]hanges in bankruptcy law which lower the
costs or raise the benefits to debtors.., will without question increase both the
number of debtors who elect" to file for bankruptcy rather than repay their
obligations and the proportion of debtors who choose a chapter 7 liquidation
rather than a chapter 13 repayment plan.57
Strategic incentive analysis of consumer bankruptcy caught fire in the late
1990s and early years of the new millennium, with articles published by
commentators who had a policy axe to grind.58 These commentators used the
assumption of rationality as a tool to support proposed revisions to U.S.
consumer bankruptcy law59 and to critique reforms proposed by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission.60  Like Meckling, this scholarship
characterizes an individual's decision to file for bankruptcy as a function of the
benefits6' and the costs62 of a filing. Also like Meckling, this scholarship tends
51. Meckling, supra note 14, at 14.
52. Id. at 14-16.
53. Id. at 15-16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 27.
58. For a list of such articles, see supra note 10.
59. See Posner, supra note 10, at 972-73 (arguing that the bankruptcy reform dissuades
opportunistic behavior); Wang & White, supra note 10, at 286 (noting that under proposed
bankruptcy reform, strategic risk-taking behavior would no longer work to debtors' advantage).
Jones and Zywicki also focus on how means testing would alter a debtor's incentives in a chapter 7
liquidation versus a chapter 13 repayment plan, but do not otherwise model debtors' bankruptcy
decisionmaking. Jones & Zywicki, supra note 10.
60. See Adler et al., supra note 10, at 601-05 (arguing against the proposed reaffirmation
regulations).
61. Like Meckling, recent incentive models view the discharge as an important benefit of
bankruptcy-a benefit that varies depending on the size of the loan amount forgiven in bankruptcy
and on the chapter under which bankruptcy relief is sought. Modern-day incentive analysts provide
a lengthier list of the benefits of bankruptcy than did Meckling, however. One additional benefit of
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to emphasize the benefits, and understate the costs, of filing, and concludes that
the lure of the discharge proves irresistible to strategically minded consumer
borrowers.
B. Lenders'Incentives
Standing alone, the effect of the bankruptcy discharge on lender behavior
should be to extend less credit at a higher price and, therefore, shift the supply
curve to the left. This solution is undermined, according to economists, by an
information asymmetry. Borrowers know whether they are likely to default;
lenders do not. This means that lenders will be unable to distinguish between
low- and high-risk borrowers and, thus, to price discriminate successfully. The
supply of credit will be even further constrained, as a result, and the bankruptcy
discharge will lead to significant deadweight loss.
a chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, according to these models, is the ability to protect exempt assets from
the reaches of creditors. See id. at 599 (positing that "an exemption waiver reduces the amount of
insurance the borrower has but increases the amount of surplus the deal yields him"); Jones &
Zywicki, supra note 10, at 211 ("Another significant benefit of bankruptcy is that debtors may
retain exempt property free of most creditors' claims."); White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10,
at 10-18 (factoring asset exemptions into her economic model). Chapter 13 protects both the
exempt and the non-exempt assets of the consumer-debtor. See Posner, supra note 10, at 968
("Under Chapter 13 the debtor may sometimes keep some non-exempt property, but must pay debts
out of future income, over three to five years."); White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 18-23
(noting that certain debts protected under chapter 13, such as student loans or debts acquired by
fraud, are not protected under chapter 7). As a result, these commentators emphasize consumers'
freedom to choose between chapter 7 and chapter 13 as an important benefit of the current system.
See Posner, supra note 10, at 976 (offering explanations as to how the choice between chapter 7 and
chapter 13 can benefit debtors); Wang & White, supra note 10, at 256 (noting that because of this
choice, "few debtors in bankruptcy are required to use either their assets or their future income to
repay debts"). Some also mention the automatic stay as a benefit of bankruptcy, and the ability to
end "'annoying' phone calls by creditors seeking to recover assets and money." Jones & Zywicki,
supra note 10, at 210. Adler and his co-authors count the ability to reaffirm, or renegotiate, debts as
a benefit of a chapter 7 filing. Adler et al., supra note 10, at 605-07.
62. Modem-day incentive analysis varies somewhat in terms of what it counts as bankruptcy
costs but finds inspiration in the list of bankruptcy costs originally identified by Meckling. Michelle
White focuses on the costs of bankruptcy to an individual and defines these costs to include the
bankruptcy-filing fee, the expense incurred in hiring a bankruptcy lawyer, and the cost of reduced
access to credit. White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 11. Jones and Zywicki argue that
certain costs the individual incurs, including decreased access to credit and search costs, have
diminished over time. Jones & Zywicki, supra note 10, at 212-13. Specifically, they contend that
today there is less stigma associated with the bankruptcy filing than there was in the past. Id. at
215-21 (citing several unpublished manuscripts in support). Adler, Polak, and Schwartz provide no
detailed accounting of the cost of bankruptcy to an individual consumer; instead, they focus on the
costs of bankruptcy to the marketplace, contending that in a perfectly competitive market, increased
bankruptcy filings both enhance the cost and reduce the availability of consumer credit. Adler et
al., supra note 10, at 601-03. They argue that reaffirmation agreements "have good ex ante
incentive effects" because in a competitive credit market "[c]reditors who anticipate getting
reaffirmations will reduce the interest rate ..... Id. at 603 n.33. Although this accounting of the
detriments of bankruptcy differs slightly among these modem commentators, none adds to the list
of costs that Meckling provided in his earlier article.
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1. Meckling on Lenders' Incentives: Information Asymmetry.-In a
competitive market, lenders price loans based on their cost of funds,
administrative costs, and delinquency costs. Where bankruptcy laws such as the
discharge injunction protect consumer borrowers from their creditors,63
Meckling saw an increased incentive for consumer borrowers to file for
bankruptcy.64 In turn, he concluded, lenders would increase the cost of credit
(and constrict supply).65  These increases would be borne by all borrowers.66
Meckling warned that liberalized bankruptcy laws would actually be bad for
consumers, because they would increase the cost of consumer credit to the
marketplace as a whole.67
Meckling criticized then-current bankruptcy reform proposals aimed at
protecting consumers from supposedly rapacious lenders who "harass and take
undue advantage" of innocent and unsophisticated consumer debtors.68  He
viewed this approach as wrongheaded because it ignored borrowers' strategic
incentives to file for bankruptcy and the effect that increased default would have
on the cost of consumer credit.69  In a competitive market, "all increases in
lending costs as perceived by lenders will in the long run be borne by potential
borrowers., 70  For most borrowers, Meckling argued, these costs would be
passed on in the form of higher interest rates.7 ' Others would find "that the total
amount of credit available to them as individuals is reduced," while "some
potential borrowers will be forced out of the market entirely by higher interest or
more stringent screening. 72
A key assumption of Meckling's model is that lenders cannot effectively
distinguish low- from high-risk borrowers and engage in risk-based lending to all
consumers.
73
63. This criticism would also apply to outlawing reaffirmation agreements as had been
proposed by the first Bankruptcy Review Commission. COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. DOc. NO. 93-
137, pt. 1, at 169 (1st Sess. 1973).
64. Meckling, supra note 14, at 27.
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Meckling, supra note 14, at 18. Specifically, Meckling criticizes two proposals made by
the Bankruptcy Review Commission in its report to Congress in the mid-1970s. Id. at 18. The
Commission recommended, first, that Congress narrow or repeal the statute excepting from
discharge debts incurred through fraud and, second, that it invalidate contracts in which debtors
reaffirm contracts otherwise subject to the bankruptcy discharge. Id.; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 93-
137, pt. 1, at 12. The Commission made these proposals on the grounds that predatory consumer
fimancers often brought complaints alleging such fraud, knowing that consumer debtors, unable to
afford legal representation, would be all too eager to agree to lenders' offers to settle this litigation
in exchange for a debtor's reaffirmation of the debt. H.R. DOc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 10-11.
69. Meckling, supra note 14, at 17-18.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 24-27. Meckling states, "The cheaper it is to identify potential bankrupts, the
narrower the base will be on which the increased costs of bankruptcy are imposed." Id. at 24.
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2. Stiglitz and Weiss: Information Asymmetry and Adverse Selection.-
Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss retain Meckling's assumption that
consumer lenders can only charge one uniform market price for consumer credit,
and add in the problem of adverse selection. Stiglitz and Weiss argue that
lenders cannot pass on the cost of borrowers' defaults by increasing the interest
rate for the marketplace as a whole.74  In their view, high-risk borrowers'
demand for credit is inelastic (in that it does not decline as interest rates increase)
both because they have fewer credit alternatives and because they discount their
own likelihood of repayment.75  Low-risk borrowers' demand for credit, by
contrast, is highly elastic because they have credit alternatives, a reputation for
creditworthiness to protect, and an intent to repay.
According to Stiglitz and Weiss, a lender's best reaction to this confluence
of incentives is not to increase the cost of credit, but to tighten underwriting
standards and selectively lend only to those whose credit histories demonstrate a
willingness and ability to repay.76 If a lender were to increase its interest rate,
adverse selection would result because the high cost of credit will more likely
deter low-risk borrowers (who are price sensitive) than high-risk borrowers (who
are price insensitive).77 The increased riskiness of the borrowing pool would
swamp the increased price of credit; increasing interest rates will not, therefore,
increase the lender's profits. 78 And, as a result, competitive credit markets will
ration credit in reaction to increased bankruptcy costs.
Meckling argued that lenders would increase the cost of credit, but did not
explain why lenders would not pass on these increased costs to those most
responsible for the costs-he did not explain why lenders could not simply pass
on these costs to those with poor credit histories.79 Stiglitz and Weiss seek to
provide a twofold explanation: (1) information asymmetry and (2) adverse
selection. Lenders cannot identify borrowers by type (high- or low-risk, honest
or opportunistic), and marketwide increases in the cost of credit are more likely
to drive out price-sensitive creditworthy borrowers, further undercutting lenders'
ability to recover default costs. Under Stiglitz and Weiss's model, the
bankruptcy discharge not only increases the cost of credit, it also
disproportionately reduces its supply and increases deadweight loss. Note,
74. Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 15, at 393.
75. Cf id. (arguing that because "borrowers have different probabilities of repaying their
loans," higher interest rates may attract those borrowers with a low probability of repaying their
loans because they are willing to pay higher prices for the same loan as borrowers with a high
probability of repaying their loans).
76. See id. at 402, 408-09 (noting that in certain situations an increase in collateral
requirements will result only in an increase in lending to high-risk borrowers, and suggesting that
lenders will simply limit the availability of credit rather than increase the cost of borrowing).
77. Id. at 403 (suggesting that "since wealthier individuals are likely to be less risk-averse, we
would expect that those who could put up the most capital would also be willing to take the greatest
risk").
78. Id. at 393 (stating that "raising the interest rate decreases the return on projects which
succeed").
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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however, that if either the assumption of information asymmetry or borrower
rationality (and resulting price elasticities) breaks down, the Stiglitz and Weiss
model loses its predictive force.
3. Competitive Credit Markets.-Modem day incentive analysis thus
assumes that lenders and borrowers are both rational, but that all of the
informational advantages lie on the side of the borrower. The borrower knows
whether he intends to repay, and the lender needs to guess. If credit markets are
competitive and consumers are rational, lenders' incentives can safely be
ignored.80 The three key assumptions of the incentive analysts-information
asymmetry, adverse selection, and competitive markets-shift the focus away
from lender behavior and toward the problem of borrower opportunism.
C. Reconciling Borrowers' and Lenders'Incentives
There is elegance, internal consistency, and logic to these economic
predictions. Part II of this Article asks whether this view jibes with reality and
shows that a quarter century after the dual legal shocks of the Bankruptcy Code
and the Marquette decision, the prediction has turned out to be only half true.
On one hand, the number of bankruptcies has increased just as strategic incentive
analysis predicted. On the other hand, the absolute dollar amount of consumer
credit has increased even faster than the rate of bankruptcy filings, family
savings rates have declined, family debt loads have increased, and lenders have
reached out to extend credit to ever riskier groups of borrowers. Even so, the
interest rate spread charged by consumer lenders has not increased. While
debtors do seem willing to overleverage, creditors have not responded by credit
rationing or by significantly raising the risk premium they charge.
These additional data points significantly complicate the economists' story.
Is the bankruptcy discharge the culprit that has led to the skyrocketing filing rate
or is something else going on? If legal intervention is required, should it be
through reform of bankruptcy law or by regulating consumer credit? The
answers turn on whether, after looking at the data, one believes the picture of
rational consumers painted by economists. We turn to this data in Part II.
II. What is Wrong with This Picture?
This Part looks critically at the predictions of the economic model
described in Part I. On the lender side, the combined effect of competitive
markets, information asymmetry, and adverse selection should lead to credit
constraint. If the increased bankruptcy filing rate is driven by the 1978 changes
to the bankruptcy law coupled with a reduction of bankruptcy stigma, the result
should be credit rationing, creditors charging an increased risk premium, or both.
80. See White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 25-28 (discussing lenders' incentives with
reference to Stiglitz and Weiss, but otherwise ignoring lenders' incentives).
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Subpart 1(A) starts with lenders' behavior in light of the predictions of the
economic model. These models assume that lenders are unable to determine a
borrowers' propensity to default. Stiglitz and Weiss developed their model at the
very beginning of the development of modem credit reporting and credit
scoring,81 just as credit cards were becoming widely dispersed.82 They contend
that lenders cannot predict ex ante the riskiness of their credit pool and,
therefore, cannot effectively price default risk.83 As a result, they predict that
any increase in the prevalence of consumer bankruptcy will cause lenders to
increase the cost and reduce the supply of consumer credit. 84  In short, the
economic models predict that the existence of the bankruptcy discharge and
strategic borrowers should lead to a socially suboptimal supply of consumer
credit and artificially low levels of consumer debt.85 Our examination of data on
the pricing of consumer credit does not support the view that the rising rate of
bankruptcy filings is driving the cost of consumer credit upward to any
significant degree. The supply of consumer credit has never been higher, the
cost of credit in gross terms has never been lower, and the credit card lenders
charge over their cost of funds does not appear to have increased. Meanwhile,
consumer lenders' profits are at or near record levels.
Subpart H(B) next examines empirical support for the claim that rising
nonbusiness bankruptcy filings are the result of consumer debtors' strategic
response to the bankruptcy discharge. Here, we find a plethora of studies
reaching inconsistent results by means that have been criticized by economists,
government officials, and law professors alike. Our own analysis of the data
finds no clear picture of consumers' incentives in seeking bankruptcy relief.
While there is strong corroboration for the intuition that increases in outstanding
consumer credit are correlated to increases in consumer bankruptcy filings, there
is no simple explanation for the increase in consumer credit.
In both subparts 1(A) and H(B), the failure of data to support strategic
analysts' predictions about lenders' and borrowers' behavior raises new
questions, questions for which a strategic incentive analysis of the market for
consumer finance does not provide ready response. We leave our explanation of
this puzzle to Part III, however.
81. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 imposes requirements on the collection, use, and
dissemination of consumer credit information. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, Title VI, 84 Stat. 1127-36 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681(2000)).
82. See LEWtS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 51 (1990) ("The growth
of the bank card industry in the 1970s was phenomenal.... Once reserved for businesspeople and
the wealthy, credit cards were now carried by nearly half of all American consumers.").
83. Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 15, at 393 (noting the difficulty in identifying "good"
borrowers).
84. Id. at 408-09 (suggesting that because an increase in the cost of borrowing may drive out
low-risk borrowers, lenders will restrict the availability of loans, thereby creating credit rationing).
85. This prediction is not necessarily inconsistent with a high bankruptcy filing rate.
Opportunistic borrowers are likely to ignore high interest rates, precisely because they expect to file




1. Questionable Predictions Generated by the Model.-"[T]heory is to be
judged by its predictive power."8 6 On this ground, incentive analysis of lender
and consumer decisionmaking has, in our view, failed. The world is a
complicated place, and economic models are built holding many things equal
that do not stay equal in the real world. Strategic incentive analysts, like Todd
Zywicki and Michelle White, argue that the increased number of bankruptcy
filings is a function of the legal changes instituted by the 1978 reform of the
Bankruptcy Code.87 This is a simple story and it explains some of the facts.
We offer a counter-story, which in our view explains more of the observed
facts. We focus on a different legal change-the deregulation of interest rates
charged to consumers after the Marquette decision, also in 1978. We also
account for technological changes that have given creditors much better
information about the riskiness of particular borrowers. Under our story, credit
constraint did exist, but it peaked in 1978 when interest rate caps, coupled with
historically high market rates of interest, severely limited the supply of consumer
credit.
As soon as the Marquette decision and market forces lifted those
constraints, four things sequentially followed: credit supply increased; interest
rates (i.e., the cost of credit) decreased for most consumers, but not until lenders
succeeded in discriminating between high- and low-risk borrowers and began
charging the former much higher interest rates than the latter; family leverage
increased with the proliferation of consumer credit, especially for the lowest
income households; and consumer bankruptcy rates soared. Throughout this
period, however, the consumer credit industry was profitable, and the spread
between commercial lending rates and the interest rate charged on consumer
credit, especially credit card debt, remained quite sticky.
According to the story told by strategic incentive analysts, the motor behind
the increased filing rate is the discharge. According to our story, it is the
deregulation of consumer credit coupled with advances in consumer lending
technology, which led to higher levels of consumer leverage and a riskier credit
pool.
Two facts make us think that our counter-story is more plausible. First,
while the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act made major changes to the law, the
changes did not, by and large, enhance consumer debtors' access to a discharge
under chapter 7-most consumer bankruptcy law reforms adopted in 1978
86. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 8 (1953).
87. See, e.g., White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10 (asserting that the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 made bankruptcy "potentially much more attractive from the viewpoint of debtors");
Zywicki, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 10 ("The 1978 Bankruptcy Code profoundly
changed the bankruptcy system and its importance in society and the economy. By making
bankruptcy more attractive to individuals, personal bankruptcies rose from less than 300,000 in
1980 to over 1.5 million in 2002.").
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simply ratified rules that had already evolved under the common law or been
implemented pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Rules. 8 8 The major consumer
protection amendments had been made in the late 1960s and early 1970s and did
not at that time precipitate a steep increase in filings.8 9 Second, the major
changes occurred not in consumer bankruptcy law, but in the law governing
consumer credit and in the consumer credit markets themselves. 90
However, if the motor behind the increased default rate is not borrower
opportunism, then there is something else that is troubling about the increase in
bankruptcy filings. If bankruptcy filers are not predominantly opportunists, and
if nonlegal sanctions on filing are significant, then what we are seeing is a
significant increase in the number of borrowers (and families) that are in
financial extremis. In the next Part we take the discussion one step further.
Stiglitz, Weiss, and Meckling all assume that the information asymmetry runs in
favor of the borrower. We take the view that technology has diminished, if not
eliminated the asymmetry, and that systematic cognitive biases in consumer
behavior actually shift the burden of opportunism from the borrowers to the
lenders.
a. Interest Rates.-Meckling, Posner, and others predict that lenders
will pass on bankruptcy costs to the market for consumer credit. Implicit in this
prediction is the expectation that, other things being equal, consumer interest
rates should increase during a period in which bankruptcy filings steadily
increase.
But, as Figure 2 graphically depicts, changes in the cost of various types of
consumer credit between 1978 and 2003 actually declined.
88. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 110 (5th ed. 2006) (stating that the Bankruptcy Rules, adopted in 1973, "contained
many of the reforms that would later be included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978").
89. Susan Block-Lieb, Legislating Financial Responsibility (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the authors).
90. Indeed, an increase in the supply of consumer credit coupled with an expansion into riskier
credit pools looks more like a response to relaxation of price regulation than the predicted market
response to reducing the cost of default. The increased filing rate would simply be a secondary
effect of a market response to the elimination of a regulatory distortion. No additional regulatory
response would be called for, and that is where we will leave the discussion at the conclusion of this
Part.
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Figure 291










The line at the top of the graph represents the interest rate charged on credit cards.
The lower-middle line represents new car loans, and the upper-middle line
represents other miscellaneous types of consumer debt. Finally, the line at the
bottom of the graph represents the interest rate on six-month United States
Treasury bills.
While interest rates did increase for a short period following 1978, it is
important to note that this interest rate spike was most pronounced among U.S.
Treasury bills and new car loans, neither of which are affected by changes in the
bankruptcy law-treasuries, because the United States is not eligible for
bankruptcy, and car loans, because they are secured. The increase in credit card
interest rates was actually quite modest. Moreover, the interest rates for all types
of consumer credit have declined since 1980.
Of course, interest rates have steadily fallen across the board since 1990, but,
again, this is principally because of a decline in the lenders' cost of funds. We do
91. Figure 2 is based on data collected by the Federal Reserve Board. FED. RESERVE BD.,
FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE G. 19: CONSUMER CREDIT, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9 [hereinafter FED. RESERVE, G.19]; FED. RESERVE BD.,
FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE H.15: SELECTED INTEREST RATES, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/ (showing, among other data, historical U.S. Treasury
bill interest rates).
2006] The Myth of the Rational Borrower 1503
not have access to information about lenders' borrowing costs. However, the T-
bill rate can be used as a proxy for the cost of funds to the financial institutions that
issue consumer credit.92  For the most part, credit card issuers are extremely
creditworthy banks, so the T-bill rate should be a close approximation. Since we
are not looking at the absolute size of the spread, but the changes in the spread, the
difference should not matter.
The factors that influence the size of the spread are likely to be the cost of
funds (i.e., the risk-free rate), the cost of underwriting loans (i.e., administrative
costs), and the riskiness of the portfolio of loans (i.e., the default rate). Now, if the
rate of bankruptcy filings significantly increased default costs suffered by credit
card issuers, we would expect to see the spread increase significantly during a time
when bankruptcy filing rates were increased. As shown above in Figure 1, the
filing rate went from 170,000 filings per year to 310,000 filings per year, between
1978 and 1983. Then, after 1983, the filing rate skyrocketed to 1,600,000 filings
per year in 2003.
It is possible to distinguish the decline in the market interest rates generally
from the decline in the cost of credit card debt. This difference can be seen
graphically in a number of ways. First, if one plots the decline in the T-bill rate
and reduces it to a trendline through the use of an ordinary least squares regression,
the decline in credit card interest has a much less pronounced downward slope
(Figure 3) than the decline in the T-bill rate (Figure 4).
Figure 3








92. Mark J. Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and their Disclosure 2 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Phila. Payment Cards Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-02, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=572585.
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The stickiness of credit card rates can be seen in the difference between
the slope in Figure 3 and the slope in Figure 4.
Figure 4
6Month Treasury Bill Rate: 1975-2003
Another way to show the extent to which credit card rates have not
been responsive to changes in the lenders' costs is to look at what we call
the "credit card markup rate." The markup (represented by the middle line
in Figure 5) is simply the difference between the risk-free rate and the
credit card rate. This graphic representation of consumer credit interest
rates significantly undercuts the predictive value of the economic models of
consumer credit.
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Figure 5
Credit Card Rate and Credit Card/r-bil Spread: 1975-2003
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Because credit card interest rates changed very little between 1978 and the
mid-i 990s, the markup varies in almost direct negative relationship to changes in
the interest rate. Increasing bankruptcy filings would be expected to add to the
lenders' costs, and should have led to the markup increasing over time.
Curiously, this is not what happened. Instead of increasing over the same
period, the interest rate spread remained almost completely flat.9 3 If one plots an
ordinary least-squares trendline for the period (see Figure 6), the predicted
interest rate rises from about 11.1% to 11.4%, over a period of twenty years.
This is hardly an astronomical increase, or one that suggests a system that is
broken, particularly if one recognizes that this blended rate of interest also
reflects the increased market penetration of credit cards and the expansion of
subprime credit markets. Expansion of subprime credit markets should cause the
creditworthiness of the pool of borrowers, on average, to decrease and the
default risk associated with the pool to increase. With increases in the default
risk of the credit pool and other factors remaining equal, one would expect an
increase in the markup over time.
Indeed, if one looks at the credit card markup from 2001 to 2003, an
interesting thing appears to be happening. During this period, the T-bill rate fell
to historic lows. Given the historic stickiness of the credit card rate and increases
93. By contrast, the spread between new car loan interest rates and the T-bill rate remained
much more constant. The credit card markup varied between 4% and 14%, while the new car
markup varied between 2% and 6%.
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in bankruptcy filings during the same period, one would expect to see the
markup increase considerably. Instead, just the opposite occurred.94 The credit
card rate fell and the markup remained nearly flat at a rate very close to its
historic average (Figure 6).
There are a number of reasons why this might have happened. It may be a
function of a shift from fixed-rate cards to floating-rate cards. The credit card
issuing market may have become more competitive, leading some lenders to
offer very low introductory teaser rates, for example. Improvements in credit
scoring may have made it possible to price consumer credit risk more accurately.
Or, the administrative costs associated with issuing and servicing consumer
credit may have declined.95
Figure 6











What is most interesting about this data is that it does not support Meckling's
prediction,96 echoed by Posner,97 that the cost of consumer credit would increase if
consumer bankruptcy filings increased. Paradoxically, during this period filing
rates went up, while interest rates mostly went down. This surprised us, as
lobbyists likened the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments to a "tax" rebate for
94. The change in markup during the same period for new car loans followed a very similar
trend. In short, however much the bankruptcy filing rate has increased, it has not significantly
increased the cost of underwriting consumer loans.
95. One interesting coincidence is that the flattening of the curve in 2001 coincides with the
passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which permits and facilitates certain types of information
sharing among affiliates of financial institutions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000).
96. Meckling, supra note 14, at 23 ("[Ilncreases in lending costs as perceived by lenders will in
the long run be borne by potential borrowers. No doubt much of the market adjustment will take the
direct form of higher interest rates ... .
97. Posner, supra note 13.
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consumer borrowers.98 Lobbyists told Congress that bankruptcy reforms enacted
in 1978 imposed a "tax" on honest users of consumer credit who were forced to
pay higher interest rates because of the millions of borrowers out to game the
system.99 But evidence of this tax is sparse to nonexistent. Before explaining why
this tax failed to materialize, we turn to the next prediction made by strategic
analysts.
b. The Supply and Rationing of Consumer Credit.-Stiglitz and Weiss
argued that lenders would be reluctant to increase interest rates in reaction to
increases in default rates on the grounds that honest borrowers, whose demand for
consumer credit is elastic and thus price sensitive, would borrow less and that
strategic borrowers, whose demand for consumer credit does not depend on the
cost of credit, would borrow more. They claimed that increasing interest rates
might, contrary to lenders' interests, increase the riskiness of the borrowing
pool.'00 They predicted that lenders would instead ration credit in the face of
increased bankruptcy losses.' 0 '
On the face of it, the data appear to support this prediction. Empirical studies
seeking to estimate credit constraints faced by U.S. households consistently find
indicia that many consumers face liquidity constraints. Drawing data from the
Federal Reserve Board's 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, 0 2 Tullio Jappelli
concludes that the total number of liquidity constrained households is 19.0% of the
sample.'0 3  Other commentators have reached similar conclusions based on
indirect criteria of liquidity constraint, such as net worth, liquid assets, and
savings.'0 4  However, liquidity constraint may not indicate credit rationing.
98. See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 83 (2004) (stating
that lobbyist George Wallace's testimony before Congress found that there is a hidden $400 "tax"
for consumers due to bankruptcy losses for creditors).
99. Id.
100. Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 15, at 401-02, 409.
101. Id.
102. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a triennial survey conducted through the
Federal Reserve Board. It assesses the balance sheet, pension, income, and other demographic
characteristics of U.S. households. Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html. Data from the 1983 SCF, and
hyperlinks to articles discussing the implications of this data, are available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/83/scf83home.html.
103. Tullio Jappelli, Who Is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy?, 105 Q.J. ECON. 219, 221
(1990). See generally id. at 230-32 ("Current income, wealth, and age are the most important
determinants of the probability that a consumer is denied loans.").
104. See id. at 219 (discussing multiple studies that address liquidity constraints and noting the
studies' conclusions); see also RANDALL P. MARIGER, CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR AND THE
EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT FISCAL POLICIES 130-31 (1986) (estimating liquidity-constrained
families at 19.4% of the U.S. population); Donald Cox & Tullio Jappelli, The Effect of Borrowing
Constraints on Consumer Liabilities, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 197, 198 (1993) ("Desired
debt predicted from the characteristics of the liquidity-constrained group is 75 percent higher than
their actual debt, which implies that removal of liquidity constraints would raise aggregate debt
holdings by 9 percent."); Charles Grant, Estimating Credit Constraints Among U.S. Households 1
(EUI Working Paper ECO No. 2003/14, 2003), available at
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/1835/1/ECO2003-14.pdf (analyzing data from a
consumer expenditure survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate that between
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Liquidity constraint suggests that individual consumers may wish to borrow more.
It does not necessarily indicate that credit is being undersupplied, however, or that
the price is artificially high. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that many of the
families who are credit constrained are simply not creditworthy. Even in a
perfectly competitive market, there are likely to be people who would like to
borrow money, because they do not have enough to satisfy their consumption
preferences, but are unable to demonstrate an ability to repay.
Lenders appear not to have constricted the supply of consumer credit during
this period, despite changes in the rate at which individuals filed nonbusiness
bankruptcy cases. Instead, as shown in Figure 7, the per capita amount of
consumer credit (adjusted for inflation) has more than doubled since 1975.
Figure 7








While an increase in the amount of outstanding consumer credit does
not unequivocally refute the claim that credit rationing is occurring, or
occurring at a policy-relevant level, a more detailed examination of the data
gives us pause.'05  We turn to developments in the market for consumer
credit in an effort to make sense of this data.
26% and 31% of households are credit constrained and that "poorly educated, ethnic minority, low
income, men and older households are less often constrained").
105. This data does not itself refute the prediction that lenders will ration credit in the face of
increased bankruptcy filings. First, the simple fact that the supply of credit increased does not mean
that credit is no longer rationed. Credit rationing exists where lenders supply less credit than
borrowers demand. A sharp increase in the supply of consumer credit over time might mean that
supply now equals demand, but it might not. If credit had been severely rationed in the past, an
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2. Chinks in the Model.-The economic models describe lenders as
participants in a competitive market but suffering from asymmetries in
information about borrowers' willingness to repay loans. This section finds
the claim of information asymmetry selection to be largely inaccurate in
today's market for consumer credit. While the assumptions that underlie
their predictions might have been accurate in the late 1970s and early 1980s
when Meckling, Stiglitz, and Weiss first constructed their models of lenders'
behavior, these depictions no longer fit today's market. Credit reporting,
credit scoring, securitization, and modem data capture and marketing
technologies have changed everything.
a. Asymmetries in Lenders' Information? The Role of Credit
Reporting.-From approximately 1900 to 1950 the U.S. consumer finance
industry was largely local.10 6  Retailers extended credit to their regular
customers. Lenders' decisions to extend consumer credit were based on the
experience and intuitions of retailers' credit departments and of loan officers
working at local banks, credit unions, savings associations, and finance
companies. Even then, however, it was not possible for lenders to "know"
every customer. The United States is a big place; a borrower's commercial
reputation may not have been known personally to a prospective lender. As
early as the late nineteenth century, lenders looked to reports issued by local
consumer credit bureaus for information about an individual borrower's
credit history.1
0 7
increase in supply might only cause it to approach, but not clear, demand. Moreover, credit
rationing might still result following an increase in supply if borrowers' demand correspondingly
increased during this period. When interest rates fall, we would normally assume that borrowers'
demand for credit would increase and so increases in outstanding consumer credit might partly
reflect the influence of diminished borrowing costs. Second, economists also predict that usury
regulation results in credit rationing. The Supreme Court's decision in Marquette should have
increased creditors' willingness to supply consumer credit, assuming no changes in the bankruptcy
filing rate. Thus, it is difficult to disaggregate the effect of interest rate deregulation from the
discharge rate. Credit supply could increase because interest rate deregulation allowed creditors to
move to a different (previously nonexistent) place on the supply curve, while at the same time
providing less credit at higher cost than they would in the absence of the bankruptcy discharge.
106. See Robert M. Hunt, A Century of Consumer Credit Reporting in America 11-13
(Research Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005), available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2005/wpO5-13.pdf (describing the changes in the consumer
finance industry from the first to the second half of the twentieth century).
107. Id. at 10-11 (noting that consumer credit bureaus, which emerged in the late nineteenth
century, generally "were cooperatives or nonprofit ventures set up by local merchants to pool the
credit histories of their customers and to assist in collections activities"); see also ROBERT COLE &
LON MISHLER, CONSUMER AND BUSINESS CREDIT MANAGEMENT 188 (10th ed. 1995) (discussing
the history and organization of credit bureaus); Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Information
Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 2017, 2025 (2002)
(reporting the existence of credit bureaus in the U.S. and Sweden as early as 1890). Commentators
explain that consumer credit reports typically contain four types of information: (i) identifying
information, such as name, address, and social security number; (ii) credit information that includes
accounts at banks, retailers, and other lenders; (iii) information from public documents, such as
2006] 1509
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The information held by these reporting agencies was incomplete,
however. First, their access to information was geographically limited (but
so was the lending market). Second, information processing was not
automated. Information trickled in from private and public sources and was
filed in cabinets arranged alphabetically. A defaulting debtor who was
strategic enough could escape a bad credit history by simply crossing state
lines.
Over time, the credit reporting industry slowly became automated and
national in scope in order to meet the demands of an increasingly national
market for consumer credit. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
bank-issued credit cards started to replace a preexisting system of credit
through which major retailers offered their own payment plans directly to
consumers seeking to buy goods on credit.'08 This shift accelerated by the
late 1970s. As a practical matter, the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,'09
freed credit card issuers from state usury regulations. So long as the lender
had the wherewithal to incorporate a subsidiary in an unregulated state, such
as South Dakota or Delaware, they could lend free of usury limits. This
allowed lenders to charge higher interest rates and added further impetus for
the nationalization of the market for credit card credit."10 On its face, this
judgments and bankruptcy filings; and (iv) a count of the number of inquiries authorized by the
consumer. See Hunt, supra note 106, at 1.
108. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 63 (1999); JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION:
How THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE MONEY CLASS 20-33 (1994); Hunt, supra note 106, at 13-
14.
109. 439 U.S. 299 (1978). In this case, Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis questioned
the ability of First National Bank of Omaha to charge credit card customers residing in Minnesota
an interest rate that was usurious under Minnesota law but permissible under Nebraska's more
generous usury laws. Id. at 301-04. The Supreme Court held that section 85 of the National Bank
Act of 1863 permitted a national bank to "charge interest 'on any loan' at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State where the bank is 'located."' Id. at 308. Moreover, the Court held that a bank is
"located" in the states in which the bank is chartered regardless of the location of its customers. Id.
at 3 10-11.
110. Marquette led to several important market developments: First, by placing its imprimatur
on the export of state interest rate regulation, Marquette permitted national banks to relocate their
credit card operations in states with favorable usury laws such as South Dakota and Delaware.
Relocation spurred a race among state legislatures seeking to encourage nationally chartered
financial institutions to locate in their "usury haven." By 1988, many states had increased
permissible interest rates or otherwise modified or repealed their usury laws. EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 108, at 72. Finally, although Marquette did not hold that the Banking
Act in any way preempted state usury laws, in practical effect it allowed national banks to charge
their customers a single credit card interest rate, no matter where they resided, thus permitting banks
to engage in national efforts to market credit card and other consumer credit. Before Marquette,
credit card issuers, whether nationally or locally chartered financial institutions, might have been
required to market credit cards to customers one state at a time; after Marquette, issuers could
market credit cards to customers nationwide. By facilitating the nationwide marketing of consumer
credit, industry analysts conclude that "Marquette probably enabled issuers to realize scale
economies in marketing and processing costs, and thus to make payment cards more readily
available to consumers across the country." Id.
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seems to undercut the assumption that credit markets were competitive at the
time. The ability to raise prices and nonetheless increase supply (as occurred
between 1978 and 1985"'.) suggests that the source of credit constraint in the
1970s was credit limits rather than information asymmetry. Similarly, the
inability to price discriminate was likely imposed by usury limits, not by an
adverse selection problem. Following Marquette, national banks and other
lending institutions avoided the reach of local usury laws by issuing credit
cards, car loans, home equity loans, and other forms of consumer credit from
unregulated states.'12
To facilitate lenders' creation of a national rather than a local market for
consumer credit, "credit bureaus had to automate and they had to get
larger."'1 13 This improvement in credit reporting further improved the ability
of lenders to price discriminate. By the 1980s, the three largest U.S. credit
reporting agencies claimed to attain "universal coverage" 14-comprehensive
information on every individual loan transaction incurred in the nation.'
15
According to industry sources, each of the three national credit reporting
agencies currently holds records on nearly 1.5 billion credit transactions
involving more than 190 million consumer borrowers;" 16 credit reporting
companies receive more than 2 billion items of information each month and
issue approximately 2 million consumer credit reports each day." 17
Credit scoring models further refine lenders' predictions of default
risk."18 These models compare the payment histories of borrowers who have
timely repaid their loans in full with those of borrowers who have defaulted
on past loans, and then compile a numerical profile or "credit score" for both
groups. 19 The best credit scoring models are developed based on lenders'
own past practices to permit them to create a transparent and predictable
indicator of loan approval. Because scoring models are used both to assess
current customers and to determine the creditworthiness of potential
111. In February of 1978, the average interest rate for credit cards was 16.9%. In February of
1985, the rate peaked at 18.85%. Federal Reserve Release G-19, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/cc-hist-tc.html. During the same period, the
supply of revolving consumer credit rose from $13.6 billion to $105 billion. Id. The level is now
(January 2006) at $814 billion. Id.
112. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REv. 445, 455-66 (2000)
(discussing this strategy and its effects).
113. Hunt, supra note 106, at 15.
114. Id. (referring to TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax).
115. Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED.
RES. BULL. 47, 49 (2003).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 47, 48-49.
118. See Loretta J. Mester, What's the Point of Credit Scoring?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
PHILA. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 3, 3, 5-7, available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/files/br/brso971m.pdf ("Credit scoring is a statistical method used to predict
the probability that a loan applicant or existing borrower will default or become delinquent.").
119. Id. at 4 ("Using historical data and statistical techniques, credit scoring tries to isolate the
effects of various applicant characteristics on delinquencies and defaults.").
15112006]
Texas Law Review
borrowers, they also frequently make use of publicly available data. The
most commonly used credit scoring models120 rely on a consumer's current
borrowing and payment behavior, as well as information from credit
inquiries, public records of collection actions, judgments, and bankruptcy
filings.' 2 '
Lenders rely on these credit scoring models in a number of contexts. 1
2
First, credit scoring assists lenders when the consumer credit transaction is
initiated. 23  Credit scoring models help lenders determine the credit score
cut-off beyond which they will not lend. 124  Second, credit scoring models
help lenders to price and service credit accounts after they are opened,
sometimes raising interest rates based on a change in a customer's credit
score. 25  Lenders also use credit scores to determine whether "account
closure" is warranted. 1
26
Lenders generally view customers who respond to solicitations as safer
risks than borrowers who seek out the lender themselves. Credit scoring
models help lenders to counteract this potential for adverse selection by
assessing applicants' risk of default, and by identifying potential fraud
through cross-checking basic information on the application. Credit scoring
models can also help lenders identify low-risk borrowers for targeted
marketing such as preapproved credit cards. Marketing models can be
calibrated to predict likelihood of response, risk of default, and revenue
potential in an effort to minimize the risk of default and maximize response
rates and revenue potential.
120. Satyajit Chatterjee et al., Credit Scoring and Competitive Pricing of Default Risk 1 (Apr.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://raven.cc.ku.edul-econsem/Friday/chattejee.pdf
("The credit scores most commonly used are produced by a single company, the Fair Isaac and
Company, and are known as FICO scores. These scores range between 300 and 850, where a higher
score signals a lower probability of default.").
121. Id. at 2 (noting that credit scoring models often rely on information from borrowers' loan
applications and from credit bureaus).
122. See, e.g., Mester, supra note 118, at 5-6 (noting that "over the past 25 years, credit scoring
has become widely used in issuing credit cards and in other types of consumer lending, such as auto
loans and home equity loans," and also noting that credit scoring is, of late, increasingly relied on in
consumer mortgage lending and small business lending); Chiwon Yom, Limited-Purpose Banks:
Their Specialties, Performance, and Prospects, 17 FDIC BANKING REv. 19, 20 (2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005apr/article2.pdf (discussing briefly the derivation
and use of credit scores).
123. See Mester, supra note 118, at 8 (discussing the efficiency and time-saving benefits of
credit scoring in loan approval).
124. See id. at 4 ("In most... scoring systems, ... a lender sets a cutoff score based on the
amount of risk it is willing to accept.... [T]he lender would approve applicants with scores above
the cutoff and deny applicants with scores below.").
125. See Yom, supra note 122, at 20 (discussing how credit scoring is utilized by banks "to
price loans, to constitute input in automated underwriting processes, ... to price the default risk of




The Myth of the Rational Borrower
Credit scoring models are also used to set the cost of consumer credit-
the so-called risk-based pricing models127-as well as its terms, such as
credit limits and minimum payment amounts for revolving credit accounts,
and choice of down payment, collateral amounts, and repayment periods for
installment loans.1 28 Pricing models may be applied at the time the credit
decision is made, when the loan is securitized, and later as changed
circumstances, including default, may justify changes in the charge for credit.
There is broad agreement that credit scoring models are at least partially
responsible for increases in the availability of consumer credit.1 29 While the
growth of the credit reporting and credit scoring industries does not show
that lenders possess perfect information about consumer borrowers, there is
widespread agreement among industry experts that these developments have
substantially improved underwriting decisions. For example, Peter
McCorkell contends that credit scoring and credit reporting result in "20 to
30 percent improvements-either in reduced delinquency rates or increased
acceptance rates-compared with judgmental evaluation."', 30  Others note
that the use of credit scoring models enables lenders to increase the number
of applications they accept while leaving their default risk constant.131 For
this reason, then Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan lauded
the benefits of credit scoring models for both reducing the costs of evaluating
borrowers' creditworthiness, and increasing access to consumer credit for a
broader swath of Americans.1
32
127. Maria T. Pincetich & Kristin M. Tobin, Using Consumer Credit Information, in CREDIT
RISK MODELING: DESIGN AND APPLICATION 23, 32 (Elizabeth Mays ed., 1998) ("Risk-based
pricing helps identify more accounts to approve, thus increasing the size of the portfolio, while
controlling risk and profitability by charging higher rates for higher risks.").
128. Id.
129. See John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience, in CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 273, 273 (Margaret J. Miller ed., 2003) ("[C]redit bureau data has made a wide range of
credit products available to millions of households who would have been turned down as too risky
just a generation ago.").
130. Peter L. McCorkell, The Impact of Credit Scoring and Automated Underwriting on Credit
Availability, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 209, 213 (Thomas A.
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002); see also Hunt, supra note 106, at 10 (estimating that the
use of consumer credit bureaus saves lenders $5 billion a year).
131. See Barron & Staten, supra note 129, at 276 ("Low-risk borrowers are offered more
attractive prices, which stimulates the quantity of loans demanded, and fewer high-risk borrowers
are rationed out of the market because lenders can offer them an appropriate price to accommodate
them rather than turn them away."); Gary G. Chandler & Robert W. Johnson, The Benefit to
Consumers from Generic Scoring Models Based on Credit Reports, 4 IMA J. MATHEMATICS
APPLIED BUS. & INDUSTRY 61 (1992); Gary G. Chandler & Lee E. Parker, Predictive Value of
Credit Bureau Reports, J. RETAIL BANKING, Winter 1989, at 47, 49-50 (outlining how credit
scoring models allow banks to more accurately predict default rates by increasing the level of detail
incorporated into their assessment).
132. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Consumer Finance, Remarks at the Federal
Reserve System's Fourth Annual Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C.




In sum, credit scoring models have reduced the informational
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders who are complete strangers to
each other. 33 As a result, credit scoring has helped create national, rather
than local, markets for consumer credit. Credit scoring models have also
enabled lenders in a diverse range of consumer credit transactions to sell
their loan portfolios in secondary markets and, by securitizing these payment
streams, to keep their cost of funds down and expand the source of funds
made available to consumer borrowers.
The growth of securitization also facilitated expansion in the market for
consumer credit by allowing lenders to fine tune the amount of risk they were
willing to take on in their lending portfolios. 134 By June 2002, more than
$400 billion in credit card receivables had been securitized.' 35 At present,
securitized credit card debt accounts for roughly three-fifths of the market for
revolving consumer credit.' 36 Indeed, there is even a market for securitized
pools of defaulted, and more surprisingly, discharged consumer debt.' 
37
b. Data on the Subprime Lending Market.-In both their articles,
Meckling, as well as Stiglitz and Weiss, assumed that consumer lenders
could not effectively price discriminate or engage in risked-based lending to
all consumers, 138 but the new market for consumer credit is based on the fact
that lenders can. Credit scoring and risk-based pricing have permitted
financial institutions and other consumer lenders to open up entirely new
markets for their products, including the market for subprime lending.
Subprime lenders extend credit to borrowers characterized by one of the
following: "(1) a FICO credit score of 660 or below; (2) two or more 30-day
delinquencies during the past year; (3) bankruptcy within the last five years;
more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite
efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk appropriately.").
133. But see, for example, the November 1996 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, which
reports that "56 percent of the 33 banks that used credit scoring in their credit card operations
reported that their models failed to accurately predict loan-quality problems by being too
optimistic." MESTER, supra note 118, at 11.
134. Yom, supra note 122, at 21 ("Since its introduction in 1987, credit card securitization has
been a primary source of funding and is integral to the growth of the credit card industry." (citations
omitted)).
135. MARK FURLEIri, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., AN OVERVIEW OF CREDIT CARD
ASSET-BACKED SEcURTrrIES 1-2 (2002),
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/workshops/workshop 11.pdf.
136. Id. at 2 n.3.
137. For example, a company called Portfolio Recovery Associates describes its business on its
webpage, stating that it "purchases, collects and manages portfolios of defaulted consumer
receivables." Portfolio Recovery Associates, http://www.portfoliorecovery.com.
138. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; cf Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 15, at 393 ("we
have presented a model of credit rationing in which among observationally identical borrowers
some receive loans and others do not.").
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(4) judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-offs in the prior 24
months; or (5) debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater." 139
Although figures on subprime lending are sketchy, they reveal
significant growth in this industry over the past ten to fifteen years. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, vested with jurisdiction over most
federal banks, reports a steady increase in subprime debt since 1999:
Figure 8
Subprime Debt (in millions)
The bold trendline at the top shows the total subprime debt held by
insured financial institutions. 140  It shows total subprime debt growing
through the third quarter in 2001, then declining slightly to just below its
1999 level. Although the bulk of subprime debt is supported by residential
mortgages, the FDIC also reports increases in subprime car loans, credit card
debt, and payday loans during this period. The trendline at the bottom of
Figure 8 depicts credit card subprime debt, the second largest component of
subprime debt following subprime mortgage debt. Figure 8 demonstrates
139. Yom, supra note 122, at 25 n.4 (relating possible indications of subprime borrowers).
140. This obviously excludes subprime debt held by finance companies, payday lenders, and




that while overall subprime debt has fallen since 2001, subprime credit card
debt levels, which plateaued in 2002, have decreased less than other forms of
subprime debt during this same period.
It is crucial to note that this graph does not capture the whole subprime
picture. While the FDIC began reporting data on subprime lending in 1999,
it is not such a new phenomenon. There has always been "subprime debt."
Indeed, it is one of the oldest professions; pawnshops, finance companies,
rent-to-own, and other fringe lenders have been marketing high-cost credit to
high-risk borrowers, in various forms, forever. This "subprime" market was
principally local, face-to-face, and somewhat unsavory. With the advent of
credit scoring and securitization, national financial institutions, including
insured banks, discovered this profit center and entered the market with a
bang. So have other lenders who are not regulated by the FDIC (or anyone
else).
The market for subprime lending has grown because subprime lending
is highly profitable. Studies show, not surprisingly, that lenders charge much
higher rates of interest for subprime loans than for loans extended to
consumer borrowers with unblemished credit histories. While default rates
on subprime loans are nine times higher than default rates on loans extended
to those with the best credit ratings,1 41 lenders can and do compensate for this
risk by charging higher interest rates. On average, subprime lending rates are
800 basis points (8%) higher than interest charged on prime loans in
comparable transactions. 142 Therefore, despite the increased risk, industry
experts report that subprime lending is highly profitable. A recent FDIC
report on insured institutions' subprime lending activities indicates that,
between September 1999 and December 2003, "subprime lenders had the
average annual net interest income-to-assets ratio of 5.8 percent, compared
with 3.9 percent for the industry.' 43  Similarly, subprime lenders had an
average return on equity of 10.9%, compared to 10.8% for the industry. 44
c. Circling Back to Data on the Cost of Credit and Its
Prevalence.-Incentive analysis would not have predicted recent
developments in the market for consumer finance. Between 1978 and 2004,
141. Yom, supra note 122, at 21.
142. Furletti, supra note 92, at 7-8.
143. Yom, supra note 122, at 28. Net interest income-to-assets ratios measure an institution's
income from interest (net of cost of funds) as a percentage of its total loan portfolio. It should be
noted that subprime lenders also spend more to administer loans than do prime lenders. See id. at
28 ("[L]oans to subprime borrowers usually require intensive levels of servicing and collection
efforts to ensure timely payment .. "). Thus, much of the interest premium is eaten up. As such,
these lenders may not earn supercompetitive profits. See id. ("[H]igh charge-offs and loan-loss
provisions deplete the earnings of these institutions.").
144. Id. at 28. This is consistent with the common assertion that credit markets are competitive,
but it also demonstrates the profitability of subprime lending.
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nonbusiness bankruptcy filings doubled and then doubled again, while-at
least from 1992 to 2001-both the cost of consumer credit 145 and the credit
card markup 146 decreased. These figures would be significant on their own,
but they take on heightened significance when considered in light of data
detailing increases in the amount of subprime lending in the market for
consumer credit generally, and in the market for credit card debt specifically.
Risk-based pricing of consumer credit, thus, complicates discussions about
the cost of credit. Before advances in credit scoring technology, low-risk
borrowers paid for consumer credit at the same rate as high risk borrowers;
now, the lowest risk borrowers may pay as much as 800 basis points less than
subprime borrowers.147 Sophisticated analysis of the cost of credit over time
no longer permits examination of a single line graph. Prime and subprime
debt need to be considered separately.
Risk-based pricing also complicates discussions about the relative
supply and demand of consumer credit and its possible rationing. As with
conversations about the cost of credit, data on growth in the supply of
consumer credit should be viewed with an understanding of market changes
that have occurred during the past twenty-five years.
First, industry experts report the saturation of the market for consumer
credit, especially the market for credit card credit, and the data supports this
characterization.148 The Payment Cards Center at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia reports that the number of credit card solicitations increased
500% between 1991 and 2001, from less than a billion to more than 5 billion
mailings. 49 And this just counts the mail sent by credit card solicitors-
increasingly, these marketing efforts also include telephone, event, and
Internet campaigns. Lenders' widespread efforts to extend more credit to
existing borrowers and additional credit to new borrowers are inconsistent
with the claim that lenders continue to ration consumer credit.
Second, if credit rationing occurs through tightened underwriting
standards, improvements in credit risk management and credit scoring
models might be viewed as evidence that consumer credit continues to be
rationed. But that would misconstrue the practical effect of credit scoring
and risk-based pricing on the marketplace. Lenders have improved their
145. See Furletti, supra note 92, at 2 ("From 1992 to 2001 ... the average interest rate that
issuers charged revolving customers fell 320 basis points, from 17.4 percent to 14.2 percent.").
146. See id. at 2, 29 fig.3 ("Issuer markup, a metric that normalizes for funding costs by
subtracting the six-month Treasury bill rate from the average APR, decreased 330 basis points
during the same period [ 1992-2001].").
147. Id. at 7-8.
148. See, e.g., DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY 76-79 (1993) (describing growth in the credit card market); EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 108, at 85-100 (detailing growth in the market for credit card credit
between 1970 and 1995).
149. Furletti, supra note 92, at 1, 27 fig. 1. Furletti relies on industry experts, BAI Global, to
note that "these solicitations in 2001 reached 79 percent of U.S. households, which, on average,
received five offers each month." Id. at 1.
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ability to identify credit risks in advance of a loan initiation, but not solely so
that they can turn down the high-risk borrower. Instead, high-risk subprime
borrowers are actively courted by lenders, who extend credit to this group at
substantially higher rates of interest than "prime" customers. Lenders can
earn sufficient returns both from high-risk borrowers who "beat the odds"
and do not default or who transfer their balances to another lender before
defaulting, and from those who do default, but only after they have paid
interest at much higher default rates, as well as paid late charges and other
fees over time.
For example, imagine a debtor who is carrying a $1,000 balance at an
effective annual interest rate of 25%. Such a rate is not unusual in the
subprime market. If the balance is carried for five years, and the debtor pays
interest only, the payments would be $1,250 over the five-year period. If a
discount rate of 5% is applied to the payment stream, the present value of
those payments would be approximately $1,000. In other words, even if the
debtor defaults and discharges the entire principal balance on the loan, the
creditor will still have a positive rate of return on the invested funds.
150
Thus, not only is more consumer credit outstanding today than at any
point in history, lenders have also increasingly extended consumer credit to
lower income borrowers and borrowers with imperfect credit histories,
including borrowers who previously filed for bankruptcy. The market is now
characterized not by credit rationing, but by price discrimination and market
saturation.
3. Puzzles that Remain.-What explains this expanding market for
consumer credit in the face of increased nonbusiness bankruptcy filings? In
prior sections, we pointed to the demise of state usury laws and the
deregulation of the banking industry to explain the growth in the consumer
credit market. Securitization and improvements in credit verification and
credit risk assessment also play a significant part in explaining this
expansion.
The data on the consumer credit market seems, in many important
respects, to undercut the assumptions and to falsify the predictions that
economists make. Information asymmetries may not be as strong as
suspected--credit scoring has allowed creditors to segment the market into
prime and subprime markets and to charge different interest rates
accordingly. The evidence of "credit rationing" is weak. The supply of
consumer credit seems to be constantly increasing, and most importantly,
since 1978, the amount of debt carried by consumers has increased rather
than fallen, while the spread between the risk-free rate and consumer credit
rate has not increased significantly. While the bankruptcy rate has climbed,
as have charge-off numbers, consumer lending remains a profitable business,
150. In the real world, the consumer will have made some payments toward principal and may
even have paid some late fees, enhancing the profitability of the consumer finance transaction.
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and rational lenders seem willing to absorb these higher charge-off and
default rates without significantly increasing interest rates. 51
But the question remains: If consumer borrowers are strategic actors,
why have lenders expanded into subprime markets for consumer credit?
B. Borrowers' Incentives
1. Data.-Notwithstanding the puzzles in the data described above,
strategic incentive analysts and legislators have fixated on the fact that
nonbusiness bankruptcy filings have increased steadily regardless of the rate
of inflation, joblessness, and other macroeconomic factors. Despite the
apparent foresight of strategic incentive analysis, econometric and other
empirical studies seeking to explain the causes of increased bankruptcy
filings find no simple correlation between consumer debtors' strategic
incentives and the number of bankruptcy petitions filed annually. Studies
have attempted to explain the increase in nonbusiness bankruptcy filings
since 1978,152 but in the end bring no clarity or consistency to the question
posed.
153
The studies reach inconsistent conclusions, in part, because they face
difficult statistical complications. 154 Looking for correlations among dozens
of macroeconomic and social factors and the number of bankruptcy petitions
filed over time, a handful of these studies do conclude that the increase was
151. The year 2003 was the third most profitable year for credit card banks ever. See BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD
OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (June 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2004/ccprofit.pdf.
152. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A
BEFORE AND AFTER LOOK 20 (1983) (finding that for fiscal year 1982, in addition to social and
economic factors, "the implementation of the [bankruptcy] code may have contributed no more than
6 percent of the total adjusted [bankruptcy] filings"); Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss,
The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1993)
(finding that "the increase in the number of bankruptcy filings is primarily due to the increased level
of debt as a percentage of income, and not to the [introduction of the Bankruptcy Code]").
153. Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L.
& ECON. REv. 168, 190-92 (2002) (describing studies that found an increase in bankruptcy filing
rates since 1978 and discussing those studies' weak conclusions as to what caused the increase).
154. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 17-18 (2000),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/24xx/doc2421/Bankruptcy.pdf (finding several factors to
explain the studies' limitations: (1) "[t]he difficulty of measuring the magnitude of the changes in
incentives to file for bankruptcy"; (2) the lack of data for key variables; (3) shifts in data collection
following the 1978 Code's enactment, such as the introduction ofjoint filings; and (4) inconsistent
and inadequate treatment of macroeconomic factors); Hynes & Posner, supra note 153, at 190-92
(discussing studies and noting difficulties with empirical analysis, including shifts in data collection
on joint filing in 1978 and the fact that there were at least three other major legal changes that
occurred simultaneously with reform of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978-the Supreme Court's
decision in Marquette, another Supreme Court decision holding that restrictions on attorney




the result of the change in the law.155 But in reaching this conclusion, the
studies perform a bit of econometric sleight of hand-assuming that any
increase in bankruptcy filings that does not correlate to factors such as
changes in the employment rate, the cost of funds, or other specified
variables must have been due to changes to the bankruptcy law made in
1978. 156 As one report notes, the problem with this approach is that its
accuracy depends upon how well the model otherwise identifies potentially
explanatory variables and applies reliable data to the model. 157 But, again,
1978 saw more than one legal change with the potential to influence
consumer bankruptcy filings: in that same year, the Supreme Court decided
both Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service
Corp.,158 which in practical effect freed consumer credit providers from state
usury laws and instigated national markets for credit card and other consumer
credit, and Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,'59 which struck down regulations on
attorney advertisements as violative of the First Amendment, changing the
practice of consumer bankruptcy law. 160 And many of these models neglect
key macroeconomic and social factors, either because data cannot be found
to insert into the model or for other reasons.'
61
The correlation between bankruptcy filings and macroeconomic factors,
particularly unemployment, has also not been definitively established,
162
155. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 15 ("The results of studies of how BRA-78
affected the personal filing rate range from no effect to a substantial one .... ).
156. Id. at 18 ("The studies typically assumed that any increase in the personal filing rate that
their models could not explain was due to BRA-78.").
157. Id. at 18-19 ("The problem with that approach is its sensitivity to the specification of the
models: the effects of an error in choosing the explanatory variables or in the relationship between
those variables and the personal filing rate may be mistakenly attributed to BRA-78.").
158. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
159. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
160. Hynes & Posner, supra note 153, at 191.
161. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 19. A handful of studies have attempted to
study empirically the diminishing influence of social stigma on consumers' bankruptcy filings and,
in doing so, rely on proxy variables to stand in for the effect of stigma. See, e.g., F. H. Buckley &
Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 200 (1998) (using a divorce
"variable as a proxy for the social stigma of promise-breaking"); Scott Fay et al., The Bankruptcy
Decision: Does Stigma Matter? 2 (Univ. Mich., Working Paper No. 98-01, 1998), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-70915 ("We use the aggregate bankruptcy filing rate in the debtor's state of
residence over the past three years, controlling for state fixed effects, as an inverse proxy for the
level of bankruptcy stigma."); David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Explaining the Increase in
Bankruptcy and Delinquency: Stigma Versus Risk-Composition 1-2 (1998) (Wharton, Fin. Insts.
Ctr., Paper No. 98-28-B), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/53.pdf (using a
hazard function to find that the increase in bankruptcy filings is consistent with the stigma effect);
VISA U.S.A., INC., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 16 (1996), available at
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/g2a.pdf (using a trend term as a proxy for "social factors").
Commentators have criticized the use of proxy variables on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 21-23, 45-46 ("A critical problem with ... stigma variables is
that they appear to incorporate other effects besides stigma.").
162. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 11 ("[E]mpirical studies do not
consistently find that macroeconomic factors significantly affected the filing rate."). Compare
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although survey data consistently show that debtors frequently cite
unemployment as an important factor in their decision to file. 63  Other
studies tentatively suggest a correlation between bankruptcy filings and the
rate at which lenders charge off indebtedness,164 and a correlation between
bankruptcy filings and the debt-to-income ratio and debt-service burden
suffered by consumers over time.' 65 Ronald Mann contends that bankruptcy
filings increase one or more years after an increase in credit card usage.
166
He concludes that debtors are not loading up in anticipation of bankruptcy; if
debtors were behaving strategically, they wouldn't wait so long to file. 1
67
We dug into the data ourselves to compare the nonbusiness bankruptcy
filing rate to a number of macroeconomic variables between 1994 and 2004.
While our conclusions are still very tentative, we too found a strong
relationship between the bankruptcy filing rate and the financial-obligations
ratio or "FOR" for that period. The FOR is a measure compiled by the
Federal Reserve Bank that consists of a consumer's mortgage debt, car
Sumit Agarwal & Chunlin Liu, Determinants of Credit Card Delinquency and Bankruptcy:
Macroeconomic Factors, 27 J. ECON. & FIN. 75, 75 (2003) (showing that county unemployment
rates significantly influence consumers' delinquency behavior), with Ronel Elul & Narayanan
Subramanian, Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 233, 247
(2002) (demonstrating that county unemployment rates have statistically insignificant effects on
bankruptcy filings), and Scott Fay et al., The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV.
706, 714 (2002) (same). For studies finding a correlation between related delinquency measures
and macroeconomic factors, see the following: Yongheng Deng et al., Mortgage Terminations,
Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68 ECONOMETRICA 275, 303 (2000) (finding
that "unemployment... rates have significant effects on [mortgage] default"); Patric H.
Hendershott & William R. Schultz, Equity and Nonequity Determinants of FHA Single-Family
Mortgage Foreclosures in the 1980s, 21 J. AM. REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECON. ASS'N 405, 429
(1993) (finding the same).
163. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at
77-78 (relating that 68% of the bankruptcy filers in the Western District of Texas reported job
problems in 1991, and the same proportion of filers reported job problems in the study developed by
the authors).
164. See, e.g., Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS, Mar. 1998,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt 9805.html (showing "the close relationship between
the rising U.S. personal bankruptcy rate and the consumer charge-off rate for commercial banks,
which is being driven by charge-offs on credit card loans").
165. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 5-10 (finding a strong, although imperfect,
correlation between both the debt-to-income ratio and the debt-service burden suffered by
consumers and increases in the bankruptcy filing rate); see also SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 70-72 (finding a strong correlation
between high debt-to-income ratio and consumer bankruptcy filing); Ellis, supra note 164 (arguing
that interest rate deregulation triggered, among other effects, an increase in consumer credit card
debt, which caused higher debt-to-income ratios and resulted in increased bankruptcy filings).
166. See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy 23 (Univ. of Texas
Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 044, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-690701 (noting that "bankruptcy rates rise one or more years after [an]




payment, consumer debt payments, and residential and nonresidential lease
obligations as a ratio of his monthly disposable income.
1 68
The strongest correlation between FOR and the bankruptcy filing rate
appeared when we lagged the filing rate by six months. 169  Most other
variables we examined, such as unemployment rate, consumer price index,
savings rate, mortgage default rate, and GDP growth rate, had much weaker
effects or even behaved perversely. Also, while lags of six months to a year
produced correlations that were almost as strong, the correlation fell off
significantly as the lag approached two years. It should be noted that this
relationship is much weaker if one includes the ten years prior to 1994.
Indeed, for that period, the correlation is negative. Robert Lawless has noted
that a similar anomaly appears when one looks at the Debt Service Ratio, a
related statistic compiled by the Federal Reserve, which compares a
household's monthly consumer debt payments to household income.
Lawless noted, however, that when he, like Mann, looked at aggregate debt
loads, the correlation with the nonbusiness bankruptcy filing rate was almost
perfect; he concludes that the anomalous results are likely a result of
problems in the way the Federal Reserve estimates debt load.
170
High debt loads prior to bankruptcy do not necessarily undercut the
contention that borrowers are borrowing opportunistically. However,
reconciling our data and Mann's and Lawless's may tell a different story. A
spike in debt load can result from either an increase in debt or a loss of
income. Therefore, the different lags between credit card use (or absolute
debt level) and the FOR (debt-to-income ratio) may suggest that increased
borrowing occurs first, followed by a decline in income or other event that
triggers the filing.
171
Strategic incentive analysts also contend that legislative provisions
adopted in 1978 to identify exempt property are responsible for increased
168. For definitions of and data on the changing household debt service and financial
obligations ratios, see Karen Dynan et al., Recent Changes to a Measure of U.S. Household Debt
Service, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 417 (2003).
169. Our regression analysis produced the following results:
Regression Analysis: rate lagged six months versus FOR
The regression equation is
rate lagged 6 months = - 9.62 + 0.719 FOR
39 cases used, 2 cases contain missing values
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant-9.6241.176 -8.18 0.000
FORO.71911 0.06641 10.83 0.000
S = 0.254001 R-Sq = 76.0% R-Sq(adj) = 75.4%
170. Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings and
Various Basic Measures of Consumer Debt (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawlessibusbkr/filings.htm.
171. However, the negative correlation in the DSR and FOR data prior to 1994 suggests that
these suppositions can only be viewed as suggestive, and certainly not as conclusive.
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consumer bankruptcy filings. 172  Here again, however, studies of the
correlation between exemption law and personal filing rates have produced
conflicting and confusing results. 173  Moreover, Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook found that variations within states (where state exemption laws
were obviously uniform) were greater than variations among states where
exemption laws differed substantially.
174
In part, this confusion results from complexities in this area of the
law.175 Exemption law is complicated because it can involve either state or
federal law, or, if the state desires, only state exemption law., 76 Since 1978,
about two-thirds of states have indicated legislatively their desire to opt out
of the federal exemption scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. 177 But if
172. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 16-17, 34-35 (declining to make
a definitive assessment, although data suggested that states opting out of the federal exemption
scheme seemed to have slower growth in the chapter 7 filing rate); Ian Domowitz & Robert L.
Sartain, Incentives and Chapter Choice: Evidence from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
461, 467-69, 482-85 (1999) (finding a correlation between increase in exemptions and increased
bankruptcy filings in a small sample); cf Vincent P. Apilado et al., Personal Bankruptcies, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 371, 390-91 (1978) (finding mixed results); Joseph Pomykala, Bankruptcy Reform:
Principals and Guidelines, REGULATION, Fall 1997, at 41, 47 (concluding that the bankruptcy filing
rate grew at a slower rate in opt-out states); White, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 45-47
(finding a weak but statistically significant correlation for data counted at the county level). But see
Alden F. Shiers & Daniel P. Williamson, Nonbusiness Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical
Results, 21 J. CONSUMER AFF. 277, 289-91 (1987) (arguing that increased exemptions did not lead
to increased bankruptcy filings); William J. Woodward & Richard S. Woodward, Exemptions as an
Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 53, 66-70 (1983)
(concluding that altering federal exemptions probably has no significant effect on bankruptcy filing
rates). But cf Buckley & Brinig, supra note 161, at 204-06 (arguing that there is no correlation
between changes in the exemption law and increased bankruptcy filings); Ellis, supra note 164
(same); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States: A Study of Alleged
Abuse and of Local Legal Culture, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 223, 255-56 (1997) (same); Teresa A.
Sullivan et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer
Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 147 (1994) (same); Michael Bork & Susan D.
Tuck, Bankruptcy Statistical Trends, Chapter 13 Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular
Income (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Working Paper No. 1994) (same). See generally Ian
Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Banknptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403,
404 (1999) (describing the relationship between exemption law and choice of bankruptcy).
173. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 20-21 (noting that "[s]tudies of the
relationship between asset exemptions and personal filing rates at the state level have yielded
conflicting results"); Hynes & Posner, supra note 153, at 188 ("While several studies cited find that
restrictions on creditor remedies, including exemptions that apply in bankruptcy, affect the decision
to borrow, there is little evidence that these same restrictions affect the decision whether or not to
repay.").
174. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE, supra note 18, at 240-42.
175. See Philip Shuchman & Thomas L. Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out
Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3-4, 14-15 (1982) (limiting the discussion to
addressing "the complexity of the problem of analyzing trends in bankruptcy"); William C.
Whitford, Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y
179, 190-91 (1997) (detailing how changes to U.S. bankruptcy law since 1978 have put limitations
on developing the concept of a fresh start for consumer debtors).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000) (allowing states to opt out of the federal exemption scheme).
177. Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. &
ECON. 19, 24 (2004).
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state law exclusively governs the list of property that individual debtors can
exempt from the reaches of creditors, then consumer debtors face little
practical incentive to file for bankruptcy in order to take advantage of
generous exemption laws or the bankruptcy discharge.1 78
Additional studies have attempted to corroborate the assertion that
chapter 7 filers, if they only chose, could repay the bulk of their debts in a
chapter 13 repayment plan over time. 179  Although they disagree on the
details, none of these studies indicates widespread abuse of the bankruptcy
system. The studies suggest that a small proportion of those who file for
chapter 7 liquidation could repay a substantial portion of their nonpriority,
unsecured debt through a chapter 13 plan, and that a very small fraction of
chapter 7 filers (less than 5%) could repay all of their debt in this way; these
studies also suggest that a larger percentage of chapter 7 filers (about 15%)
could repay between 20% and 25% of this debt over a five-year period.1 81 In
addition, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found that debtors-who,
according to the economic incentive model, are supposed to respond to
exemption levels-in the high-, medium-, and low-exemption districts were
essentially indistinguishable on economic grounds, making the respond-to-
incentives argument much harder to sustain.1 82 In a later study, they showed
that the filing rates tend to persist over time-that is, that high-13 districts
tend to remain high-13 districts and low-13 districts tend to remain low-13
districts-suggesting more influence from local legal culture than from an
incentive model.1
83
2. Continuing Questions About Consumers' Incentives to Borrow.-
Much paper has been consumed in trying to determine why consumer debtors
have filed for bankruptcy at rates that seem to increase each year-study
after study demonstrates little more than that the question of causation is
178. See Hynes & Posner, supra note 153, at 189 (explaining the lack of correlation between
exemptions and bankruptcy filing rates).
179. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michelle M. White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 27, 31 (1999) (finding abuse of chapter 7 by debtors who could repay under the H.R. 3150
formula to be minimal); GORDON BERMANT & ED FLYNN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES,
tNCOMES, DEBTS, AND REPAYMENT CAPACITIES OF RECENTLY DISCHARGED CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS
7 (1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/publicaffairs/articles/docs/ch7trends-01.pdf (studying the
characteristics of those who file for chapter 7 and finding that only a small percentage have
sufficient income to repay any unsecured debts).
180. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 154, at 26-27.
181. Id. at24.
182. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 18, at 240-41.
183. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 828-30 (1994)
(noting "that a district that was high in Chapter 13 filings in one year tended to be high in later
years" and reasoning that "districts and states tend to replicate predictable patterns in their relative
balance of Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 filings; that is, their preferences as between the two
procedures persist over time").
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complex, both multifaceted and the result of factors that defy precise
empirical prediction. In our view, consumer motives in borrowing and filing
for bankruptcy are not really germane to the policy debate. It is implausible
that rational lenders would extend ever-increasing amounts of consumer
credit to a population that was, to any significant degree, intent on fleecing
banks, credit card issuers, credit unions, finance companies, and other
providers of consumer credit. We remain convinced, and view the data as
convincingly demonstrating, that while strategic borrowers may exist, they
likely exist only on the margin. Moreover, recent developments in the law
and in improvements in the technology and practices governing consumer
credit have made it easier than ever for lenders to identify these high-risk
borrowers.
The data thus suggest an alternative story that goes something like this:
Legal and technological developments explain lenders' increased willingness
to extend consumer credit. As a result of these developments, consumer
credit, especially credit card credit, has been immensely profitable for the
consumer finance industry. From this perspective, it is easy to explain
lenders' willingness to extend consumer credit in increasing amounts at a
time when consumer bankruptcy filings have increased. Increases in
bankruptcy filings might be explained, from this perspective, as the natural
consequence of increasingly leveraged consumer borrowers, who, from time
to time, face unexpected shocks to income-job loss or wage reduction,
divorce, uninsured medical expenses, and other expenses of life in general.
Neither incentive analysis nor this counter-story adequately explains
why consumers borrow in the first place. While it is clear that consumers are
more indebted than ever before and that bankruptcy filings are driven by the
underlying level of consumer indebtedness, the source of this overleverage
remains a puzzle. Strategic incentive analysts would tie this indebtedness to
consumer opportunism. But this conclusion is a product of the assumption of
the instrumentally rational consumer. It is not driven by the data.
In our view, a more plausible picture of consumer credit posits a
rational lender and a quasi-rational borrower. For reasons we discuss in Part
Ill, the current bankruptcy filing explosion is better explained not by
strategic borrowers exploiting unwitting lenders, but by rational lenders
exploiting predictable cognitive weaknesses in consumers.
III. Are Consumer Borrowers Rational Actors?
Up to this point we have assumed, as do economists, that both
consumers and lenders act rationally. While the theoretical literature points
in one direction (the bankruptcy discharge will lead to credit constraint and
increased interest rates), factual observations (expanding consumer credit and
steady interest rate spreads in the face of an increasing bankruptcy and
default rate) confound the prediction. This led us to ask whether there might
be something wrong with the theory, or at least some of its assumptions.
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To help answer this question, we look to the growing body of
experimental evidence that suggests individuals are not reliably and
instrumentally rational. 84 Relaxing the assumption of consumer rationality
has considerable relevance to the policy debate surrounding bankruptcy
reform. Or, to put it more forcefully, if consumers are not rational
decisionmakers, tinkering with ex ante incentives by increasing the cost of
default to deter overborrowing is likely to be noisy at best, and
counterproductive at worst. Indeed, to take it yet a step further, if there are
systematic biases in consumer decisionmaking that consumer lenders can
exploit, the focus of regulation would shift entirely from altering consumers'
incentives to borrow (or default) to altering lenders' incentives to lend. The
focus of consumer bankruptcy reform would shift from consumer
opportunism (lender protection) to consumer protection (lender regulation).
Rational choice theory presumes that individuals possess the intellectual
capacity to identify their preferences, to maximize their utility when possible,
and to act rationally under conditions of uncertainty when necessary.
1 85
Cognitive psychologists have used a variety of behavioral experiments to
cast doubt on each of these assumptions. According to a vast body of
psychological literature dating back to the early 1980s, rationality appears to
be "bounded" at best, and systematically biased at worst.' 86 Preferences are
not fixed and unchanging. 187 Instead, cognitive experiments show that an
individual's preferences change depending on how choices are framed.
188
184. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1501 ("Work by researchers such as Amos
Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Hillel Einhom, Robin Hogarth, Arie Kruglanski, Lee Ross, Richard
Thaler, and many others suggested that there are heuristics, biases, and other departures from
rational decision-making processes that are systematic and predictable and can thus be modeled and
tested with a fair degree of rigor. The challenge to orthodox economic theory was plain, and a
debate between the disciplines quickly began."). However, the questions that these cognitive
experiments raise about the assumptions that underlie rational choice theory do not indicate that
individuals behave "irrationally." Sunstein, supra note 33, at 121 (noting that cognitive
experiments are "not best taken to demonstrate that people are 'irrational' or that their behavior is
unpredictable and arbitrary" but rather to "suggest departures from standard economic assumptions,
but departures that are systematic and predictable, and thus a legitimate basis for predicting human
behavior").
185. See BECKER, supra note 42, at 14 (asserting that "all human behavior can be viewed as
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets").
186. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MODELS OF
MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261, 270-71 (1957) ("Since the organism... has neither the senses
nor the wits to discover an 'optimal' path... we are concerned only with finding a choice
mechanism that will lead it to pursue a 'satisficing' path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some
specified level of all its needs.").
187. See BECKER, supra note 42, at 133, 160 (describing how an individual's utility function is
dependent upon preferences that change according to variables such as time of the year or aging of
the individual).
188. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1102-26 (discussing the assertion that "despite
rational choice theory's implicit prediction to the contrary, context matters in decision making");
Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1503-05 (stating that there is a "large body of work that suggests that
whether decisions are 'framed' in terms of potential gains or losses affects decisions even though
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Decisions are not made coolly and rationally. Instead, individuals take
mental shortcuts that often lead them astray. Worse yet, individuals will not
always act upon their utility-maximizing determinations. 89  People often
lack self-control. The clear-sighted planner only imperfectly restrains the
impulses of the myopic doer.' 90 Although this literature has had considerable
impact on the legal theoretical literature, 19' it has not had much, if any
influence on the legislative debates over bankruptcy policy. 192  It should
have.
This Part argues that behavioral decision research casts doubt upon
whether rational actor models of consumer behavior should be relied upon to
set consumer bankruptcy policy. It divides household consumption decisions
chronologically: beginning with purchasing decisions; next considering a
consumer's decision whether to pay for these purchases with cash, savings,
or borrowed funds; and concluding with the consumer's assessment of post-
default options, including the decision to file for bankruptcy and under what
chapter. At each stage, we consider the implications of behavioral decision
research for bankruptcy policy. More specifically, we consider how the
policy prescriptions would differ from those generated by a model of rational
consumer behavior. We conclude this Part with a borrower who behaves
much like the economist's bankruptcy opportunist, but for very different
reasons.
the framing may be completely arbitrary and manipulable"); Sunstein, supra note 33, at 122-24
(discussing the difference in preferences for losses versus gains and stating that "people are risk
seeking for losses.., and risk averse for gains").
189. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES 1-17 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (demonstrating that
individuals will change their choice between options A and B when the decision is framed in terms
of gains instead of losses, even though the objective utility value of each option remains the same).
190. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 98 (1992) (describing scenarios where the "far-sighted self takes actions which
constrain or alter the behavior of the myopic self"); Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The
Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, in QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 91, 92 (Richard H. Thaler ed.,
1991) (discussing imperfections in self-control that should be modeled when considering consumer
behavior); Richard H. Thaler, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, in QUASI-RATIONAL
ECONOMICS, supra, at 77, 88 [hereinafter Thaler, Economic Theory] (comparing the problems of the
restraints that a planner imposes on himself to the problems in an agent-principal relationship).
191. Cognitive psychology and behavioral decision research have spawned new areas of inquiry
in both the fields of economics (behavioral economics) and law and economics (behavioral law and
economics). For a short list of this literature, see supra note 33.
192. A recent exchange between Professor Elizabeth Warren and Senator Joseph Biden during
the February 10th Judiciary Committee Hearings on S. 256, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, is an exception. Senator Biden accused Professor Warren, an
opponent of the bill, of seeking to use bankruptcy law to bring back usury restrictions (i.e., to
regulate consumer lending). Professor Warren conceded the point but noted that lender regulation
would be a political nonstarter. An audio recording of the exchange can be found at:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4515876. Even this exchange is instructive,




The policy implications of those differences are considerable.
Behavioral decision research suggests both that consumers will purchase
more than rational actors would and that these purchases will be paid for with
borrowed money more frequently than their idealized counterparts would
find rational. Further, it predicts that individuals' post-default strategies will
differ from those that rational actors would be expected to adopt.
What is different about the behavioralist's consumer is that this
overborrowing will persist regardless of the post-default remedial regime.
Consumers will overborrow with the bankruptcy discharge in place or
without it. Because of the effects of various decisonmaking biases,
consumers would, in our view, overborrow even if we were to bring back a
modem equivalent of debt peonage. Perhaps more importantly, lenders will
profit from consumers' overborrowing under either regime (the lenders'
profit will be greater, however, under debt peonage).
A. Purchasing Decisions
Rational actor models presume that individuals make consumption
decisions based on complete information and stable preferences. Behavioral
decision research questions consumer rationality at a number of levels. First,
it raises a cognitive objection, suggesting that many individuals do not
possess the ability to process complex market information. Second, it raises
a temporal objection, questioning whether individual preferences are stable,
as presumed in rational actor models.
1. Bounded Rationality.-The decision to make household purchases
under a budget constraint is a complex enterprise that involves
decisionmaking over time. Classical microeconomic theories of consumer
behavior present simplified models that involve decisions among a handful
of widgets over a limited number of time periods. 193 Although economists
appreciate that the real world is more complex than this, 194 they defend
rational actor models as elegant and robust theories that successfully predict
consumer behavior. 95 Consumers may not possess perfect information, but
193. DEATON, supra note 46, at 1 ("The simplest possible version is that found in the
elementary textbooks, where the consumer, living in a two-period world of complete certainty,
chooses how much to spend today and how much to spend tomorrow.").
194. See HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 41, at 46-47 (expanding upon the statement that
"economists do not believe that men and women are solely rational, acquisitive creatures" and that
"[t]hey are fully aware that a hundred motivations impel people").
195. Milton Friedman is best known for his defense of such models. He remonstrates against
the search for greater "reality" in modeling by arguing that "[c]omplete 'realism' is clearly
unattainable, and the question whether a theory is realistic 'enough' can be settled only by seeing
whether it yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better than
predictions from alternative theories." MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMIcS 41
(1953) (emphasis added).
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they can acquire information over time and learn from their mistakes. 196
Even within the economic community, however, critics question the
reliability of rational actor models as applied to individuals and their
household purchasing decisions.
Specifically, Nobel Prize-winning economist Herbert Simon focused on
the difficulties faced by an individual who must make choices in a
marketplace awash with information.' 97  The rationality of Simon's
consumers was "bounded." They would expend a limited amount of time
and effort in making consumption decisions. 98  They would exert just
enough effort to acquire a "satisfactory" amount of information about options
available in the marketplace. 99  He called this "satisficing. ' '200 While
satisficing admittedly falls short of full and perfect information, 20 1 he did not
view it as undermining the strength of microeconomic models of consumer
202
activity. Through satisficing, Simon argued, individuals reveal their
preferences for both the consumption of goods and the effort needed to
search for information about those goods.2 °3 Thus, satisficing may be viewed
196. See Becker, supra note 42, at 6-7 ("The economic approach does not assume all
participants have complete information .... [But it] has developed a theory of the optimal or
rational accumulation of costly information that implies, for example, greater investment in
information when undertaking major [rather] than minor decisions ....").
197. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON.
REV. 493, 503 (1979) (reprinting a lecture delivered by Simon when he received the Nobel Prize in
Economic Science in 1978 in which he traced the development of his theories of bounded
rationality, satisficing, and the relevance of psychological and sociological influences on
decisionmaking).
198. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 269-70 (1959) (arguing that economic theory should apply the
rules of marginal analysis to information-gathering with the result that information is only gathered
to the point when the incremental cost of additional information equals any incremental profit
derived from the additional information).
199. Id. ("Information, says price theory, should be gathered up to the point where the
incremental cost of additional information is equal to the incremental profit that can be earned by
having it. Such an approach can lead to propositions about optimal amounts of information-
gathering activity and about the relative merits of alternative information-gathering and estimating
schemes.").
200. HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF THOUGHT 3 (1979) (defining "satisficing" as "aiming for
the good when the best is incalculable" and arguing that satisficing provides a method of searching
for and analyzing essentially infinite alternatives until a "good-enough alternative is found").
201. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION
161, 168 (C.B. McGuire & R. Radner eds., 2d ed. 1986) ("In satisficing procedures, the existence of
a satisfactory alternative is made likely by dynamic mechanisms that adjust the aspiration levels to
reality on the basis of information about the environment.").
202. Simon, supra note 198, at 263 ("Models of satisficing behavior are richer than models of
maximizing behavior, because they treat not only of equilibrium but of the method of reaching it as
well.").
203. Simon, supra note 197, at 503 (suggesting, as an alternative to utility maximization, the
"satisficing" mode of selection and arguing that "one could postulate that the decision maker had
formed some aspiration as to how good an alternative he should find," and "[a]s he discovered an




as a response to bounded rationality. The question is not whether people
satisfice or take shortcuts, but whether the shortcuts create systematic biases
and, if so, whether these biases have policy implications. Behavioral
decision researchers' experiments raise just this question, and their results
provide an empirical basis for questioning whether consumer satisficing is an
adequate substitute for rational behavior.
20 4
For example, experiments start by confirming Simon's intuition that
individuals face practical limitations on the amount of information they can
access and recall, and question whether more information is even helpful.
These experiments explore whether individuals suffer from information
overload where they have only a limited amount of time to assess the
significance of information.20 5  Although the details of these experiments
vary, they all ask individuals to make decisions when confronted with
multiple choices. Based on these experiments, commentators, such as Jacob
Jacoby, initially concluded that "[t]here appear to be definite limits to the
amount of information that can be accommodated and effectively processed
during a limited time span by consumers in arriving at purchase
decisions. 20 6  If even a small amount of complexity overloads and, thus,
confuses consumers, then it may be counterproductive to provide consumers
enhanced access to information, but critics disagree both with the design of
these experiments2°7  and the policy prescriptions offered by thesecommentators,20 8 with Jacoby, at times, acting as his own worst critic.20 9
204. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational To Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 83, 124-25
(2000) (enumerating various implications of problematic satisficing); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
24, at 1075-1102 (explaining how satisficing techniques such as the availability heuristic, self-
serving bias, and hindsight bias can affect policy decisions in the fields of tort, health care, and
securities law).
205. See Lise Hdroux et al., Consumer Product Label Information Processing: An Experiment
Involving Time Pressure and Distraction, 9 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 195, 211 (1988) (finding that the
amount of product label information recalled by subjects decreased as the quantity of information
contained in the product labels increased); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a
Function of Information Load, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 63, 67 (1974) (finding that as the amount of
grocery package label information increased, college students made poorer brand selections even
though they felt more satisfied with their decisions); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as
a Function of Information Load. Replication and Extension, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33, 40 (1974)
(finding that subjects-here, labeled "housewives"-started "tuning out" when too much package
label information was provided about grocery store brands); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load
and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 422-23 (1982) (finding that subjects
felt dysfunctional effects when too much information was provided when deciding which house to
buy); Debra L. Scammon, "Information Load" and Consumers, 3 J. CONSUMER RES. 148, 153-54
(1977) (finding that although television commercials successfully conveyed brand information to
consumers, consumers were nonetheless not influenced by this information in brand decision-
making).
206. Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 14 J.
MARKETING RES. 569, 570 (1977).
207. See, e.g., Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Assessing Biases in Measuring Decision
Effectiveness and Information Overload, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 504, 508 (1989) (addressing and
minimizing the impact of potential bias flaws identified by critics of their research); Naresh K.
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In this regard, behavioral research supports the prediction of satisficing,
but undercuts Simon's benign view of its consequences. Cognitive
experiments demonstrate that individuals adopt time-saving strategies in
order to simplify complex decisionmaking.1 ° Unfortunately, this is where
the wheels come off the cart. Some of these shortcuts systematically color
and bias the decisions that individuals reach and undercut the notion that
consumers should be modeled as rational actors. Worse, these biases may be
exploited.
2. Mental Shortcuts and Decisional Biases.-Rational choice theory
treats preferences as endogenous-generated internally by the needs and
desires of each individual. Madison Avenue relies, however, on the
inaccuracy of this premise. Advertisers operate on the assumption that
preferences can be shaped, and that there are profits to be made by exploiting
consumers' decisional biases. Cognitive research corroborates the street-
wise insights of marketing success stories. The heuristics, once identified,
can be manipulated and capitalized upon by sophisticated marketers. They
include, among others, "framing" and "anchoring and adjustment."
Malhotra et al., The Information Overload Controversy: An Alternative Viewpoint, 46 J.
MARKETING 27, 29-30 (1982) (remarking how market researchers have rejected the conclusions of
information overload experiments because of several common analytical flaws); Naresh K.
Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J.
CONSUMER RES. 436, 439 (1984) (noting that although consumers can be overloaded with
information, many prior experiments did not demonstrate this phenomenon due to ambiguous
experimental results); John 0. Summers, Less Information is Better?, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 467,
467-68 (1974) (questioning the accuracy of Jacoby's study of college students because of
experimental procedure and evaluation issues).
208. See, e.g., David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (1986) (rejecting any notion of regulatory
market response to consumer information overload because consumers adequately satisfice, rather
than become "overloaded," when confronted with large amounts of information).
209. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432,
435 (1984) (concluding that although consumers can be overloaded, they generally will not be
because they stop looking for additional information short of overload; "[t]he issue is thus
considerably more subtle and complex than might be suggested by the relatively simplistic
information overload paradigm").
210. See Grether et al., supra note 208, at 279 (reaching a similar conclusion that "when the
information environment becomes very rich or the decision task becomes very complex relative to
the consumer's available time or expertise, the consumer satisfices"); see also JOHN W. PAYNE ET
AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993) (constructing a theory of decisionmaking in which
actors balance effort and accuracy); James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice
Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 189 (1998) (detailing decisionmaking heuristics); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213-25
(1995) (discussing the limits of human cognition); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1078 ("As
the problem becomes more complex, either because there are more options from which to select or
because each option has more attributes associated with it, actors might attempt to minimize effort
by adopting simplified strategies, thus violating the procedural predictions of rational choice
theory."); Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1990)
(noting that human behavior is "shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor"); Simon, supra note 201, at 165-74
(describing the effectiveness of"satisficing" in chess, engineering, and management science).
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a. Framing.--Contrary to economic assumptions regarding the
internal stability of preferences, behavioral experiments suggest that
perceptions and preferences shift depending upon context:
211
Observed preferences are not simply read off one master list; they are
actually constructed during the elicitation process.... Different
elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of options and
suggest alternative heuristics, which give rise to inconsistent
212responses.
In a series of experiments, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
demonstrated that the choices that individuals make depend upon how
information is framed.213 The same choice can elicit different responses from
individuals depending upon how the problem is described.214
The classic example of a framed decision involves two groups of
people.215 One is given a coffee mug then asked how much they would
charge to give up the mug. The others are not given a coffee mug but are
instead shown the same mug as the first group and asked how much they
would pay to purchase such a mug. The first group consistently priced the
mug higher than the second, 216 suggesting what has been termed an
"endowment effect." 217 Losses are felt more intensely than gains.
Other studies have framed equivalent choices in both negative and
positive terms, and found that individuals are more likely to react positively
to choices framed in terms that appear to minimize the risk of an event. For
example, labeling hamburger as 75% lean evoked more favorable evaluations
from potential consumers than labeling the meat in negative terms as
211. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 1 (echoing a primary claim of behavioral economics that
"[h]uman preferences and values are constructed rather than elicited by social situations").
212. Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE RATIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 185, 186 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1996).
213. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman coined the concept of "framing." See Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). According to Tversky and Kahneman, "the term 'decision frame'...
refer[s] to the decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with
a particular choice." Id.
214. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,
59 J. Bus. (BEHAV. FOUND. ECON. THEORY) S251, S257 (1986) ("Framing is controlled by the
manner in which the choice problem is presented as well as by norms, habits, and expectancies of
the decision maker.").
215. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329-33 (1990) (explaining how the well-known coffee mug
experiment was set up by dividing college students into two groups); see also Russell Korobkin,
Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS, supra note 33, at 116, 118 (referring to the "well-known" coffee mug experiment that
questioned the assumptions of rational choice theory).
216. Kahneman et al., supra note 215, at 1331.
217. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1041 (1991) (explaining that the term "endowment effect,"
which was coined by Richard Thaler, captures how the value of a good "appears to change when
[that] good is incorporated into one's endowment").
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containing 25% fat.218 Similarly, framing a computer advertisement in terms
of "percent of students who improved their grade" was viewed by
participants as more persuasive than framing it in terms of students who did
not improve their grade.
219
Pricing strategies also frame purchases for consumers.220  Sale-priced
items are more desirable than identically priced items at an "everyday low
price. '22' Multiple-unit prices (e.g., prices that are presented as "4 cans for
$2" instead of "500 per can"), and purchase quantity limits (involving
restricted offers of goods that set "limits of 6 per customer") impel
consumers to buy more than they otherwise would.222 Costly product options
are also more likely to be purchased when consumers are invited to remove
them from the package presented than when they are offered as add-ons.
b. Anchoring and Adjustment.-Framing often works hand-in-hand
with an anchoring effect: individuals tend to focus on an obvious or
convenient number or event; although individuals adjust their perceptions
upward or downward, they continue to skew their estimates toward the
anchor.223 Indeed, some researchers argue that the bundle pricing effect
described above may arise as a consequence of anchoring effects,224 much in
the same way that consumers are lulled into viewing a product offered at
$3.99 as "about $3.00," and car manufacturers package models in "economy"
218. Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the Framing ofAttribute
Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 374, 376 (1988).
219. Gary J. Gaeth et al., Framing of Attribute Information in Product Description, in 17
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 531, 532 (Marvin E. Goldberg et al. eds., 1990).
220. See Gerald E. Smith, Framing in Advertising and the Moderating Impact of Consumer
Education, 36 J. ADVERTISING RES. 49, 53 (1996) (stating that consumers "may infer better quality"
products because of their "higher prices").
221. Gail Tom & Susan Ruiz, Everyday Low Price or Sale Price, 131 J. PSYCHOL. 401, 402-03
(1997) ("The failure of the everyday low price strategy when compared with the traditional
marketing strategy for the department store... suggests that an everyday low price presentation
frames a price as an expenditure, whereas a sales price presentation frames a price as a savings.").
222. See John T. Gourville, Pennies a Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction
Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395, 395 (1998) (discussing the "widespread use" of the pricing
strategy that reframes aggregate pricing to "a series of small daily expenses"); Brian Wansink et al.,
An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 71,
72 (1998) ("Multiple-unit promotion pricing led to a 35% increase in sales compared to single-unit
pricing.").
223. See Itamar Simonson & Aimee Drolet, Anchoring Effects on Consumers' Willingness-to-
Pay and Willingness-to-Accept, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 681, 688-89 (2004) (concluding that four
studies reveal that willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept formulations are at some degree
dependent on anchors pervasive in the consumer's environment).
224. See Dipankar Chakravarti et al., Partitioned Presentation of Multicomponent Bundle
Prices: Evaluation, Choice and Underlying Processing Effects, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 215,
216 (2002) (stating that anchoring may influence how bundle components are processed); Dilip
Soman & John T. Gourville, Transaction Decoupling: How Price Bundling Affects the Decision to
Consume, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 30, 42 (2001) (stating that the bundling effect on consumers of
forgoing consumption when an individual benefit is part of a bundle results from the dissociation of
a product's costs and benefits).
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and "luxury" versions. Others contend that branding succeeds because
consumers anchor their attention on a retailer's readily recognizable brand
name, thus saving them additional search costs. 225 Cognitive research also
finds that individuals are reluctant to walk away from sunk costs, irrationally
ignoring the marginal costs and benefits of additional action.226 Again,
anchoring effects provide an explanation for individuals' overemphasis on
sunk costs. 227 Researchers find that sunk cost biases influence consumers'
purchasing decisions. 228  Automobile trade-ins are an example; sunk cost
biases influence consumers deciding whether to replace an existing car for a
newer model.229
B. Borrowing Decisions
Modem day consumers do not just purchase household realty, goods,
and services; they purchase them with borrowed funds. They take out
mortgages, home equity loans, and car loans; they borrow from credit unions
and local finance companies; they pay off credit card debt over time,
sometimes making only minimum payments. In the first quarter of 1978,
there was a total of $263,358,830,000 in consumer credit outstanding.230 In
the first quarter of 2005, the total was $2,129,200,000,000-an eightfold
increase, unadjusted for inflation.231 By way of comparison, consumer prices
increased approximately three times, 232 and the United States population
grew by about 30%233 during the same period. Behavioral decision research
supports the suspicion that consumers borrow more than models predict
rational consumer borrowers would have, and provides some explanation for
this propensity.
225. Steven S. Posavac et al., The Brand Positivity Effect: When Evaluation Confers
Preference, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 643, 650 (2004).
226. See, e.g., Carl A. Kogut, Consumer Search Behavior and Sunk Costs, 14 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 381, 389-91 (1990) (highlighting study results demonstrating that study participants did not
fully consider marginal costs and benefits due to the effects of sunk costs).
227. Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 190, at 148-52.
228. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 129 (1985); Chip Heath, Escalation and De-escalation
of Commitment in Response to Sunk Costs: The Role of Budgeting in Mental Accounting, 62
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 38,40 (1995).
229. See Erica Mina Okada, Trade-ins, Mental Accounting, and Product Replacement
Decisions, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 433, 435 (2001) (explaining how the sunk cost effect relates to
and influences replacement purchasing decisions).
230. FED. RESERVE, G.19,supra note 91.
231. Id.
232. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl
(demonstrating that $1.00 in 1978 would have the buying power of $3.03 in 2005).
233. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR
THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (Dec.
22, 2004), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-01 .pdf (containing population
estimates for 2004), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES:
JULY 1, 1900 TO JULY 1, 1999 (June 28, 2000), http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/
1990s/popclockest.txt (including population estimates for 1978).
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The decision to finance household purchases involves complex
comparisons and calculations. Because current expenditures rarely match
current income, individuals may choose to pay for household purchases with
accumulated cash or by incurring debt. Deciding whether to purchase
property or services with cash or borrowed funds complicates the budgeting
process. Consumers must compare the relative costs and benefits of credit
and cash, while simultaneously comparing products and their acquisition
prices. Consumer credit transactions are costly to the borrower because they
add interest charges and other fees to the underlying price of the purchase.
Consumption must be balanced against investing the funds and delaying
consumption to a later period. Each of these costs and benefits requires
consideration of the time value of money, the annual percentage rate
associated with the interest charges, the relative merits of incurring secured
versus unsecured credit, and other complex legal and arithmetic issues.
Needless to say, individuals often miscalculate the cost of debt and the
amount of debt that they can afford.234
Ultimately, a rational consumer-borrower decides both whether she can
afford the item and whether she prefers to finance the purchase over time,
rather than pay with cash or savings. The decision to borrow requires the
debtor to assess at least four sub-issues: 235 (i) How much do I owe already?
(ii) What is the cost of the new credit transaction? (iii) What is the likelihood
that my income will remain constant, increase, or decrease in the next
period? (iv) Which is stronger, my preference for current consumption or my
preference for consumption in the future?
Rational actor models of consumer borrowing purport to provide ready
answers to these questions. They presume that borrowers possess full
information, have the complete ability to assess debt levels and credit costs,
and can make comparisons among various borrowing and savings options.
Moreover, economists presume that individuals' intertemporal choices-their
decisions about tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different
points in time-are a function of only one thing: the discount rate."'Policymakers applying common sense and practical experience have long
234. See Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 190, at 91 (noting that it is "trite to point out that few
consumers are capable of making the present value calculations implicit" in rational actor models of
consumption and savings decisions over time).
235. According to incentive analysts, the decision also involves an assessment of the relative
costs and benefits of a bankruptcy filing.
236. See Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REv. ECON. STUD. 155, 156-
59 (1937) (proposing a discounted-utility model of intertemporal choice); see also Shane Frederick
et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351,
351 (2002) (describing Samuelson's discounted-utility model and concluding that its "central
assumption ... is that all of the disparate motives underlying intertemporal choice can be condensed
into a single parameter-the discount rate").
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questioned the accuracy of these assumptions. Cognitive psychologists
support these suspicions with behavioral decision research.237
1. Cognitive Dissonance in Credit Card Transactions: How Much Have
I Borrowed?-Researchers observe that consumers who use credit cards are
willing to spend more in otherwise identical purchasing situations than those
who use cash or checks, 238 and that those who predominantly use credit cards
spend more overall than those who do not.239  Theorists have developed
various explanations for this propensity. While a number of rational
explanations for credit card use exist 24 0-for instance, convenience and
retailer acceptability 241 , some commentators offer less benign explanations
for consumers' propensity to spend more when using a credit card than when
paying by cash or check.242 For example, some commentators question
consumers' abilities to integrate pending purchasing decisions into past
purchasing practices.
243
237. Although a plethora of experiments confirm the presence of decisional biases when
individuals decide to purchase goods and services, little behavioral decision research sets out to test
the presence and nature of biases in consumers' decisions to borrow. We hope this Article sheds
light on the need for cognitive research on borrowing decisions.
238. See, e.g., Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli: A
Conditioning Interpretation, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 348, 348 (1986) (citing studies where
consumers reported spending greater amounts when purchasing with a credit card); Elizabeth C.
Hirschman, Differences in Consumer Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment System, 6 J.
CONSUMER RES. 58, 64 (1979) (reporting study results indicating that consumers that paid with a
credit card spent more than consumers that paid with cash); Dra~en Prelec & Duncan Simester,
Always Leave Home Without It: A Further Investigation of the Credit-Card Effect on Willingness to
Pay, 12 MARKETING LETTERS 5, 8 (2001) (reporting that study participants were willing to pay
much higher values for sporting tickets if given the opportunity to pay with a credit card).
239. See Dilip Soman, Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior, in MARKETING
AND PUBLIC POLICY CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 12, 12 (Alan Andreasen et al. eds., 1998)
(providing that credit card use reduces memory of individual payments resulting in an
overstatement of available budgets for credit card users); see also Howard Tokunaga, The Use and
Abuse of Consumer Credit: Application of Psychological Theory and Research, 14 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 285, 288-89 (1993) (referring to studies that found that use of credit cards was correlated
to the number of purchases made and the amount spent).
240. Dra~en Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of
Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4 (1998).
241. See Dilip Soman, Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role of
Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 460, 460 (2001) (noting that research
indicates "the choice of a payment mechanism is often ... driven by simple[] considerations like
convenience . .. ,acceptability.. . , accessibility. . . ,and habit").
242. See Feinberg, supra note 238, at 354 (summarizing results of several experiments
indicating that the presence of credit cards acts as a stimulus for spending); Hirschman, supra note
238, at 64 (reporting results of a study that supports the hypothesis that total dollars spent and
average transaction size were higher for credit card transactions).
243. Frederick et al., supra note 236, at 356 ("While integration seems normatively compelling,
it may be too difficult to actually do. A person may not have well-formed plans about future
consumption streams, or be unable (or unwilling) to recompute the new optimal plan every time she
makes an intertemporal choice.").
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Sociologist Ronald Manning describes credit card purchases as creating
cognitive dissonance for consumers.244 With cash, consumers find tangible
limits to their purchasing power-when the currency runs out in my
pocketbook, so does my purchasing power. By contrast, a credit-card-
wielding consumer can incur credit obligations without cash outlays at the
point of purchase. Bills arrive days or weeks later, and even then may not
demand repayment of the entire purchase price. With credit card obligations,
borrowers may be required to make only a minimum payment that covers
very little principal.
Lawrence Ausubel, an economist, agrees that some credit card users
may be confused at the point of purchase about the likely extent of their
borrowing. He hypothesizes that consumers underestimate the extent of their
current and future credit card borrowing,245 and as a result argues that
consumers "make suboptimal decisions regarding the choice and usage of
credit cards. 246 He bases this underestimation hypothesis, in part, on his
finding that nearly three-quarters of active credit card accounts incur finance
charges although survey research indicates that 47% of responding credit
card users report that they "nearly always pay in full," 26% "sometimes pay
in full," and only 27% report "hardly ever paying in full. 247
Experiments support the proposition that cognitive dissonance may
cause credit card users to spend more than those who pay in cash.248
Behavioral research indicates that purchasing decisions differ depending on
the payment mechanism used.249 Experiments indicate that certain means of
payment, especially credit card transactions, lead consumers to underestimate
past expenditures and thus inflate their perceived ability to afford the
244. MANNING, supra note 22, at 292 ("[I]t is clear that bank credit cards have fractured the
culturally conditioned 'cognitive connect' between earnings and consumption. In the process, they
have profoundly changed the determinative role of work in defining one's consumption or even
employment decisions.").
245. Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REv. 50, 70-72 (1991).
246. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 261 (1997).
247. Ausubel, supra note 245, at 71-72. Ausubel also notes that high search and switch costs
might play a part in explaining why consumers remain captive to their credit card companies. Id. at
69. Other studies corroborate the high search and switch costs consumers face. See, e.g., Paul S.
Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85
AM. ECON. REv. 1327, 1333, 1335 (1995) (providing empirical support for the contention that
cardholders face search and switch costs).
248. See Soman, supra note 241, at 472-73 (finding that past payments strongly reduce the
intention to purchase when the payment mechanism requires the consumer to write down the
amount paid and when the consumer's wealth is depleted immediately rather than with delay);
Joydeep Srivastava & Priya Raghubir, Debiasing Using Decomposition: The Case of Memory-
Based Credit Card Expense Estimates, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 253, 254-55 (2002) (developing
a framework for examining how consumers incorporate memory-based and context-based cues in
estimating past and future credit card expenses).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 238-243.
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additional purchase. 250  Some of these experiments suggest that credit card
customers have a more difficult time recalling past purchases than do cash
customers and, as a result, find it difficult to rehearse the consequences of
added credit transactions. 251 By contrast, research shows that cash and check
transactions enjoy an immediacy of payment that permits greater recall.252
Others find that consumers' credit card spending is influenced by credit
limits, which consumers rely on as a signal of their future earnings
potential.253
2. What is the Cost of Credit?-In assessing whether a consumer credit
obligation is affordable, individuals need to be able to assess its costs and
terms. The federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requiring lenders to disclose
the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) and other terms assists consumers in this
process,254 but it is not clear that this sort of disclosure is sufficient to
overcome individuals' bounded rationality.
Disclosure regimes are premised upon consumers' abilities to
comprehend basic arithmetic and financial terms, but empirical studies of
adult literacy skills, including financial literacy, in the United States raise
substantial doubts on this score.255 When thousands of adults from across the
country were given tests of basic math and basic literacy, a significant
portion of the population was unable to make the comparisons necessary to
assess the cost of credit card debt. 6 And while education may assist some
250. See Dilip Soman & Amar Cheema, The Effect of Credit on Spending Decisions: The Role
of Credit Limit and Credibility, 21 MARKETING SCI. 32, 34 (2002) (noting that studies suggest that
overspending by credit card users occurs because credit card purchases are "more easily forgotten
and painless"); Soman, supra note 241, at 463 (reporting findings that the weaker associations with
past purchases displayed by credit card users commonly resulted in miscalculations by those
consumers as to the amount of income actually remaining for additional purchases).
251. Soman, supra note 241, at 463.
252. See id. (describing the results of experiments indicating that, when consumers exiting a
store were asked how much they had just spent, 66.7% of those who used cash or check were able
to recall the actual amount spent, while only 8% of those who used credit were able to do so);
Srivastava & Raghubir, supra note 248, at 254 (observing that for those consumers who pay cash
"there is an 'immediate pain' of paying that provides a natural check for those in danger of
overspending").
253. Soman & Cheema, supra note 250, at 32 (explaining that consumers are often "unable to
correctly value their future incomes" and tend to rely on credit limits to indicate those values).
254. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2000).
255. See, e.g., IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY
IN AMERICA: A FIRST LOOK AT THE FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY, at
xvi-xvii (1993), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=93275 (reporting
findings that some 90 million Americans were unable to perform quantitative calculations beyond
simple addition and subtraction operations). For a discussion of the NALS study and its
implications for consumer bankruptcy policy and fmancial literacy education, see Susan Block-
Lieb, Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Education in H.R. 975, the Bankruptcy
Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 425, 430-40 (2004).
256. See Block-Lieb, supra note 255, at 438-39 (observing that the documented financial
illiteracy of many Americans "ill prepare[s]" them to navigate our increasingly credit-driven
economy).
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consumers in raising the level of their financial literacy skills, 257 financial
literacy training is not widely available today, even for those still in
school.2
Perhaps as a result of the anchoring heuristic, the basic rule of thumb for
borrowing seems to be: "Can I afford the monthly payment?" This requires
minimal calculation, but it also avoids any calculation or awareness of the
cost of credit. It also obscures any comparison between the cost of credit and
the cost of paying for a household purchase out of savings, and any
comparison of competing credit offers. Most importantly, it renders
disclosure of APR and related credit terms interesting but irrelevant.
A variety of credit practices seem designed to obscure the overall cost
of credit and encourage consumers to make borrowing decisions based on the
affordability of the monthly payment. Credit card bills inform consumers
about total outstanding indebtedness, finance charges, and minimum monthly
payments. Consumers then anchor on the minimum monthly payment figure
to conclude that their credit card obligations present affordable credit terms.
They are not likely to perform any more complex calculations regarding the
overall cost of credit and term of the loan. Existing data on consumer
borrowing behavior, although limited, tends to support this hypothesis.
While there is some evidence suggesting that TILA may have increased
consumer borrowers' awareness of some credit terms, such as the annual
percentage rate,259 this "may have been limited to well-educated, affluent
borrowers.,,260 There is also evidence to suggest that borrower awareness of
terms not covered by TILA, like the dollar amount of finance charges in
open-end credit transactions, has fallen since passage of the Act.26'
Many predatory credit schemes are premised upon convincing
borrowers that their high-priced transactions are affordable. These schemes
often couple low monthly payments with hidden or unexpected terms,
including high default rates and other fees, which invite borrowers to ignore
257. Richard L. Wiener et al., Debtor Education, Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy
Legislation, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 347, 363 (2005) (finding that a three-hour long financial literacy
course significantly improved knowledge of bankruptcy debtors).
258. In addition to means-testing access to chapter 7 bankruptcy for individuals whose income
exceeds local median levels, the 2005 Bankruptcy Code amendments require individual debtors to
attend an approved "personal financial management course" as a condition to obtaining a discharge
in either a chapter 7 or chapter 13 case. While we have doubts about the wisdom of mandating
debtors' financial education, see Block-Lieb, supra note 255, at 427-28, and while we are certain
that it will take some time before suitable providers of personal financial courses can be approved in
every federal district, we do agree that the requirement should increase the availability of such
education for debtors in bankruptcy.
259. See, e.g., Lewis Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical
Test of the Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FIN. 1143, 1153 (1971) (finding increased
awareness of interest rates on consumer installment loans after the Truth-in-Lending Act was
passed).




both the high aggregate cost of credit and the risk of a loss of equity in the
collateral.
Additional practical support for the proposition that consumers focus
more on their monthly payments than the overall cost of the transaction can
be found in studies of consumers' decisions to lease rather than finance new
car purchases. The decision to lease versus buy involves a complex calculus
of financial and other considerations. Some commentators wondered
whether consumers preferred lease transactions because they misunderstood
the terms,262 and effective 1997, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated
revisions to Regulation M of the Consumer Leasing Act requiring clearer and
more uniform disclosure of the terms of lease transactions.263 A recent study
that looked at data collected in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
found that "[f]or much of the 1990s, leasing a given vehicle often involved a
smaller upfront payment and lower monthly payment than taking out a
loan.''264  Considering SCF data, the authors found little to support the
contention that less creditworthy households favored leasing transactions, but
did find that, for those in the twenty-fifth to forty-ninth percentiles of income
distribution, "the median ratio of payments to income is now higher for
households with leases than for households with loans. 265 Moreover, they
found strong support for the proposition that "within income groups, values
of vehicles financed by leasing tended to be notably more expensive than
those financed by loans.
266
3. Overconfidence: Will I Have Sufficient Income in the Next Period?-
To rationally determine whether to incur debt in a consumer finance
transaction, a borrower must know what her income and other expenses are
likely to be during the period over which the loan will be repaid. But
consumers have difficulty assessing the likelihood that they will lose their
job, have an additional child, get divorced, or incur a substantial uninsured
262. See Stephen E. Miller, Economics of Automobile Leasing: The Call Option Value, 29 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 199, 213 (1995) (attributing the upswing in automobile leasing in part to
consumers' false belief that leasing is cheaper than buying); Bennie H. Nunnally, Jr. & D. Anthony
Plath, Leasing Versus Borrowing: Evaluating Alternative Forms of Consumer Credit, 23 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 383, 383-84 (1989) (offering several reasons why consumers mistakenly believe
that automobile leasing is cheaper than purchasing).
263. 61 Fed. Reg. 52246-01, 52246 (Oct. 7, 1996). The Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1667-1667e (2000), was enacted in 1976 as an amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000). Id. In 2005, pursuant to its general rulemaking authority, the
Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation M. 12 C.F.R. § 213.1 (2005).
264. Ana Aizcorbe et al., The Replacement Demand for Motor Vehicles: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances 6 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper
No. 2003-44, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200344/
200344pap.pdf.
265. Id. at 8.
266. Id. at 9.
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medical expense. 267 Depending upon whether the individual over- or under-
calculates the risk of income interruptions, she may borrow less or more than
a rational consumer borrower. In the absence of a systematic bias, this
should not affect the overall efficiency of the system. If individuals
overestimate with about the same frequency that they underestimate,
economists are not troubled.
Unfortunately, individual decisionmakers suffer what behaviorists term
an "overconfidence bias"--"the belief that good things are more likely than
average to happen to us and bad things are less likely than average to happen
to us." 2 68  Potential borrowers are more likely to underestimate than
overestimate the risks associated with uncertainty, particularly when they
believe themselves to have control over these events. For example, Lynn
Baker and Robert Emery conducted a survey of Virginia residents applying
for marriage licenses.269 They found that, although most participants knew
that close to half of all marriages end in divorce, none of them predicted that
270their own marriage might end in divorce.
Neil Weinstein corroborated this result more generally. 27' He asked
college students to estimate whether an event was more or less likely to
happen to them than to their classmates, and found that, on the average,
respondents answered that good things (such as the possibility of owning
their own homes or avoiding a hospital stay) were more likely to happen to
them than fellow students and that bad things (such as divorce, job loss, or
debilitating disease) were more likely to happen to others than to
267. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1083 (describing, in the language of rational
choice theory, the uncertainty involved in making decisions where the consumer is unsure of or
unable to ascertain the likelihood of certain alternatives occurring, thereby making it difficult to
make "optimal" choices). Korobkin and Ulen provide the following example of ambiguity
regarding the content of a decision alternative:
Consider, for example, the purchaser of home insurance who must decide whether to
pay an additional annual sum for a rider that would protect him in case of earthquake
damage. If the purchaser could estimate the probability that an earthquake will destroy
his home, he could maximize his utility by comparing the cost of the added insurance
to the expected benefit it would provide. But if the purchaser can neither estimate the
likelihood of earthquake damage nor obtain information that would allow him to do so,
it becomes impossible for him to make the type of optimizing decision that rational
choice theory predicts.
Id. at 1083.
268. Id. at 1091.
269. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440
(1993).
270. See id. at 443 ("Respondents' predictions for the permanence of their own marriages...
were much more optimistic than their perceptions of the likelihood.., of divorce for others. For
example, although their median response was an accurate estimate that 50% of U.S. couples who
marry will divorce, the median response of the marriage license applicants was 0% when assessing
the likelihood that they personally would divorce.").
271. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 818-19 (1980).
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themselves. 272  In addition, Weinstein found that respondents were much
more likely to be overconfident of their chances of avoiding a negative event
when the negative event was perceived as within their control, such as
getting into a car accident.273 More recently, Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike
Malmendier reviewed data from three U.S. health clubs with information on
the contract choices and day-to-day attendance decisions of nearly 8,000
health club members over a three-year period. They compared customer
choices among two flat rate contracts (monthly and annual) and a pay-per-
visit option. They found that members who chose the flat rate option often
chose incorrectly, overestimating their future usage by more than 100
percent.274
Research demonstrating an overconfidence bias suggests that consumer
borrowers will underestimate the likelihood that negative events will create
interruptions in their future income. People who underestimate the
possibility of future reversals will incur more indebtedness than an unbiased,
instrumentally rational consumer would have. Because individuals may be
unable to estimate the probability of job loss or substantial reduction in
income, it is questionable that they will maximize utility when determining
whether and how much to borrow.
Lenders' pricing practices seem designed to take advantage of this
overconfidence bias in consumer credit transactions. A focus on the market-
wide reduction in the annual charges imposed by consumer credit providers,
particularly credit card lenders, since the mid-1990s does not tell the
complete story of the cost of consumer credit. Consumer lenders also started
to offer teaser rates, which last only for a limited time at the initiation of a
new credit card relationship. Moreover, industry experts note the emergence
of differential pricing between prime and subprime borrowers,27 5 and a
growth in the use of transaction triggered fees and charges.276 While lenders
have generally abandoned annual fees, they have increasingly imposed
charges that are triggered by late payments. Industry experts also report the
272. Id. at 813-14. Subsequent work by Weinstein tends to suggest that the overconfidence
bias is not limited to young college-aged students. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community- Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV.
MED. 481, 487-89 (1987).
273. Weinstein, supra note 271, at 814.
274. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Overestimating Self-Control: Evidence from
the Health Club Industry 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10819, 2004),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10819 [hereinafter DellaVigna & Malmendier,
Overestimating]; see also Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-
Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. Econ. 353 (2004) [hereinafter DellaVigna & Malmendier,
Theory and Evidence] (showing that contracts in industries such as health clubs, credit cards, and
mobile phones are designed to take advantage of consumers' overconfidence bias).
275. See Furletti, supra note 92, at 7-8 ("The lowest risk customers, who once paid the same
price as high-risk customers, now enjoy rate discounts .... ).
276. See id. at 10-12 (discussing lenders' increasing reliance on risk-based fees such as "late
fees, over-limit fees, and bounced-check fees").
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imposition of "over-draft" or "over-limit" charges that apply in the event the
card user makes a purchase in excess of the credit card limit. Credit
agreements increasingly include "universal default" clauses, which permit
the imposition of default interest rates, not only where the consumer
borrower defaults to that lender, but also if there is a "cross default" on any
other transaction, even with another lender. They also have included
provisions that allow them to change the terms of the credit card seemingly
"at will"-that is, the lender can increase the rate or change the events that
trigger default, for any reason or for no reason at all.
These techniques are used by more marginal lenders, as well. Experts at
the FDIC report that subprime lenders (at least those under the jurisdiction of
the FDIC) earn considerable amounts from these noninterest charges. a77
Payday lenders are infamous for their effective APRs, between 400 percent
and 900 percent per year, which borrowers encounter when they "roll over" a
short-term loan to subsequent periods.27
Each of these contract terms is made more profitable by consumer
borrowers' overconfidence that they, unlike countless other Americans, will
both remember to pay their bills on time and have sufficient income to do so.
And while we would be the first to admit that these noninterest charges may
have assisted lenders in keeping down the cost of credit for consumers who
religiously pay their bills on time and putting the costs of default squarely on
defaulting consumers, both goals we fully support, we worry that consumers
are unlikely to price the expected cost of these terms at the initiation of the
credit card transaction (even if they were able to negotiate with their credit
card and other consumer credit providers on this basis) precisely because
their overconfidence blinds them to the full potential for these costs. The
fact that neither the TILA nor other disclosure requirements oblige lenders to
reveal all noninterest charges 279 exacerbates consumer borrowers' blind
spots.
4. Current Consumption Versus Delayed Gratification ?-Rational
consumers must choose between present and future consumption. This
intertemporal choice depends on the consistency of the relative weight
attached to prospective well-being as compared to present consumption-the
consumer's discount rate.280 This may not be true. In reality, few individuals
277. Yom, supra note 122, at 35 tbl.2. While net noninterest income does not exceed net
interest income, that result follows only because subprime lenders' interest expenses (i.e., cost of
funds) pale in comparison to their noninterest expenses (i.e., all other costs of subprime lending,
including administration, collection, and charge-offs). Id. at 20.
278. John Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR
THE POOR (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005).
279. See Furletti, supra note 92, at 13-14 (discussing disclosure requirements for various fees
in the credit card industry).
280. Samuelson, supra note 236; see also VARIAN, supra note 41, at 187-89 (describing the
role of inflation in the choices people make between present and future consumption); Frederick et
2006] 1543
Texas Law Review
exercise the self-control that is required for rational delayed gratification.2 8'
The impulse for immediate gratification is often irresistible, notwithstanding
282the long-term consequences of such action.
Behavioral decision research confirms that consumers may have
inconsistent intertemporal preferences.283 Experimental data suggests that
individuals are more likely to finance purchases with debt than delay
consumption until the purchase can be made out of savings, and that
individuals are willing to pay higher rates of interest on small purchases than
big-ticket items. This systematically biased decisionmaking is the result of a
number of behavioral dynamics.
a. Hyperbolic Discounting.-Individuals do not apply a single
discount rate over their lifetime.284 Richard Thaler asked respondents to
specify the amount of money they would require in one month, one year, and
al., supra note 236, at 356 (stating a central assumption in most models of intertemporal choice-
that people evaluate new alternatives by integrating them with existing plans-and suggesting that it
is too difficult to do in most cases).
281. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 61-98 (1930) (describing the role of
"time preference," or "human impatience," in an economic theory of interest); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 4, 222 (1957) (arguing that consumers adjust
consumption based on expected future income, as opposed to current income, and other factors
affecting consumers' desires for current consumption); Samuelson, supra note 236, at 156
(including the assumption that people discount future utility in a model for measuring the marginal
utility of income).
282. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 122 (noting that "people are myopic, at least some of the
time" in that they "overemphasize the short term and care less about the future than conventional
theory would predict").
283. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue summarize the results of this research
succinctly as follows:
Over the last two decades, empirical research on intertemporal choice has documented
various inadequacies of the DU model as a descriptive model of behavior. First,
empirically observed discount rates are not constant over time, but appear to decline-
a pattern often referred to as hyperbolic discounting. Furthermore, even for a given
delay, discount rates vary across different types of intertemporal choices: gains are
discounted more than losses, small amounts more than large amounts, and explicit
sequences of multiple outcomes are discounted differently than outcomes considered
singly.
Frederick et al., supra note 236, at 360.
284. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1120 ("For example, an individual who would prefer
$S10 today to $11 in exactly one year should also prefer $10 five years from now to $11 six years
from now. The interest rate in both cases is 10% per year, and any individual should have a stable
preference for earning that rate of return or enjoying earlier consumption."); see, e.g., Uri Benzion
et al., Discount Rates Inferred From Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGMT. SCI. 270, 282-
83 (1989) (reporting experimental research finding varying discount rates, even when the subjects of
the experiment were financially sophisticated); George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182, 191-92 (1989) ("[R]esearch shows
that depending on the context examined, the implied discount rates of observed behavior can vary
from negative to several hundred percent per year."); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on
Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 205-06 (1981) (presenting experimental research
finding that the subjects' individual discount rates varied depending on various factors).
1544 [Vol. 84:1481
The Myth of the Rational Borrower
ten years to make them indifferent to receiving $15 now. 285 The responses-
$20, $50, and $100 respectively-imply a wildly divergent range of average
implicit annual discount rates-345%, 120%, and 90/o-over the three
periods.286 Other studies report similar "hyperbolic discounting" among
respondents.287 Indeed, after extensively reviewing this literature, Shane
Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue contend that
hyperbolic discounting "is also evident across studies., 288 They argue that
the only remaining question is the precise shape of the inconstant discount
rate,2 89 rather than the fact of its inconstancy.29°
285. Thaler, supra note 284, at 203-04.
286. Id. at 204.
287. See, e.g., Uri Benzion et al., supra note 284, at 282 (finding that the discount rate applied
by subjects declined as the waiting time increased); Gretchen B. Chapman, Temporal Discounting
and Utility for Health and Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, &
COGNITION 771, 787 (1996) (finding that delay influences both health and money discount rates);
Gretchen B. Chapman & Arthur S. Elstein, Valuing the Future: Temporal Discounting of Health
and Money, 15 MED. DECISION MAKING 373, 383-85 (1995) (discussing the impact of temporally
bounded events on discount rates as an explanation as to why discount rates are generally higher for
health than for money); DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 274, at 30 (reporting findings
regarding health club contract choice and usage that "are difficult to reconcile with the standard
assumptions of time-consistent preferences and rational expectations"); John L. Pender, Discount
Rates and Credit Markets: Theory and Evidence from Rural India, 50 J. DEV. EcoN. 257, 285-88
(1996) (attempting to explain why higher discount rates resulted from experiments involving a
shorter time frame and why discount rates were lower in experiments involving larger rewards);
Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel N. Heller, Time Preference in Medical Decision Making and Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis, 13 MED. DECISION MAKING 212, 214-16 (1993) (challenging the
assumption of discount rate constancy with findings of smaller discount rates for more distant time
intervals). Experimenters also observe preference reversals-situations in which respondents
prefer, for example, $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30 days, but also prefer $100 now over $110
tomorrow. See Leonard Green et al., Temporal Discounting and Preference Reversals in Choice
Between Delayed Outcomes, I PSYCHONOMIc BULL. REv. 383, 387 (1994) (finding that increases
of equal amounts of time before the receipt of smaller and larger rewards results in preference
reversals from the smaller award to the larger reward); Kris N. Kirby & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference
Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. ScI. 83, 88 (1995)
(challenging the constancy of discount rates assumed by economic theory with experimental data
showing that subjects consistently reversed their preference from a smaller, earlier reward to a
larger, later reward as the delays to both rewards were decreased by constant amounts of time);
Andrew Millar & Douglas J. Navarick, Self-Control and Choice in Humans: Effects of Video Game
Playing as a Positive Reinforcer, 15 LEARNING & MOTIVATION 203, 215-16 (1984) (finding that
the extension of unequal delays of reinforcement by equal intervals while keeping the amounts of
reinforcement equal decreased the preference for shorter delays); Jay Solnick et al., An
Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control in Humans, 11 LEARNING &
MOTIVATION 61, 74-75 (1980) (discussing evidence of preference reversal in experiments
involving noise termination reinforcement).
288. Frederick et al., supra note 236, at 361.
289. One commentator has proposed a different explanation for the wealth of experimental
results supporting hyperbolic discounting. Daniel Read has suggested that the observed results may
be due to "subadditive time discounting," meaning that the time discounting reported over a delay is
greater when the delay is divided into subintervals. See Daniel Read, Is Time-Discounting
Hyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2001) (presenting results of




This conclusion has obvious implications for consumer credit decisions.
Credit cards create an opportunity for present consumption, in return for
future payments. If one is indifferent between $15 now and $20 in a year,
perhaps one would also be willing to pay $20 in a year for $15 now. If the
implicit discount rate is 345% for a one-year loan, that creates a significant
opportunity for the marketers of payday loans. It suggests a perverse
willingness to pay high interest for short-term loans, and an insistence on
lower interest rates for long-term loans. In short, "people will always
consume more in the present than called for by their previous plans. ''291 To
enable this present consumption, consumers will borrow more than would
maximize utility in the long run.292
b. Other Anomalies in the Discount Rate.-Consumers' implicit
discount rates also vary depending upon the overall size of the benefit or cost
293at issue. Individuals do not equate the choice between $100 today and
$150 in a year with the choice between $10 today and $15 in a year,
implicitly assigning a higher discount rate to smaller-sized transactions.
Studies varying outcome size consistently find that large outcomes are
discounted at lower rates than small ones. 9 They are therefore more likely
290. Frederick et al., supra note 236, at 393 (noting that "there is no reason to expect that
discount rates should be consistent across different choices" due in part to "the diversity of
considerations that are relevant in intertemporal choices").
291. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 190, at 98; see also R.H. Strotz, Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 177-78 (1955)
(recognizing that an individual's present behavior will be inconsistent with past optimal plans).
292. Harris & Laibson, supra note 9; Laibson et al., supra note 9.
293. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1121-22 (arguing that the opportunity costs of
waiting for a small benefit will be foregone consumption whereas the opportunity costs of waiting
for a large benefit will be foregone interest or investment); Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 284,
at 187 (observing that "the cost of waiting for a small windfall may be foregone consumption, while
in contrast, the opportunity cost of waiting for a large windfall is perceived as simply foregone
interest"); Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 190, at 117-18 (arguing that small windfalls are thought of
as current income while larger windfalls are thought of as assets that may produce greater future
value).
294. See, e.g., Benzion et al., supra note 284 (finding that discount rates decrease as cashflow
increases); Green et al., supra note 287, at 385 (finding that subjects elected the larger reward as the
length of time of the smaller reward was lengthened); James H. Holcomb & Paul S. Nelson,
Another Experimental Look at Individual Time Preference, 4 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 199, 212
(1992) (finding that discount rates are diminished as the delay to reward increases); Kris N. Kirby,
Bidding on the Future: Evidence Against Normative Discounting of Delayed Rewards, 126 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 54, 68 (1997) (recognizing that the discounting weight is a
function of the magnitude of the outcome); Kris N. Kirby & Nino N. Marakovi6, Modeling Myopic
Decisions: Evidence for Hyperbolic Delay-Discounting Within Subjects and Amounts, 64 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22, 28-29 (1995) (finding a small decrease in discount rate
as the reward size increased); George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed
Consumption, 97 ECON. J. 666, 677-78 (1987) (recognizing that individuals will defer consumption
for the purpose of "savouring"); Andres Raineri & Howard Rachlin, The Effect of Temporal
Constraints on the Value of Money and Other Commodities, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 77, 92
(1993) (finding that large amounts of money are discounted at smaller rates than small amounts);
Majorie K. Shelley, Outcome Signs, Question Frames and Discount Rates, 39 MGMT. SCI. 806,
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to put off consumption decisions perceived as large (i.e., buying a home), but
engage in lots of incremental borrowing for present consumption in small
amounts (i.e., spending $50 a week at the local drugstore on greeting cards,
cigarettes, and candy bars).
Framing shows up here, as well. Individuals' discount rates vary when
the choice is framed as a decision to consume rather than save. 295 George
Loewenstein and Richard Thaler provided a sample group with vouchers that
could be redeemed at a local record store on several specified future dates,
and asked participants how the value of the certificate would change if they
were asked to agree to wait longer to redeem it.296 Loewenstein and Thaler
found that the participants demanded more than twice as much to delay the
date than they were willing to give up to accelerate the redemption date. In
another article, Loewenstein found that respondents' discount rates differ
depending upon whether the change in delivery time of an outcome is framed
297as acceleration or delay from a temporal reference point. Numerous
studies corroborate this result, finding that respondents discount gains at a
higher rate than losses.298 Moreover, when researchers compare respondents'
preferences to a series of outcomes, they typically find that individuals
strongly prefer improving sequences to declining sequences.299
814 (1993) (finding that the discount rate varies with the magnitude of the outcome); Richard H.
Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS,
supra note 190, at 127, 131 (finding that implicit discount rates fall as size of reward increases).
295. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1122 (observing as an instance of "status quo
bias" the results of a study showing that individuals demand nearly twice as much in value to delay
redeeming a gift certificate over what they would to speed up the redemption).
296. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 284, at 187-88 tbl. 1.
297. George F. Loewenstein, Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice, 34 MGMT. SCI. 200, 212
(1988); see also Benzion et al., supra note 284, at 282-83 (confirming that discount rates decline as
waiting time increases, decrease as size of cashflow increases, and are smaller for losses than for
gains); Shelley, supra note 294, at 814 (suggesting that decisionmakers can adapt to an outcome by
imagining it, and once adapted, they experience a reference point shift that will determine how any
change in the timing of that outcome will be interpreted).
298. See, e.g., Benzion et al., supra note 284, at 282 (finding that discount rates are smaller for
losses than for gains); Loewenstein, supra note 294, at 679-80 (examining the behavioral
consequences that result from the feelings of well-being and despair generated by anticipation);
Walter Mischel et al., Effects of Expected Delay Time on the Subjective Value of Rewards and
Punishments, 11 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 363, 371-72 (1969) (finding that as length of
an anticipated delay for reward increases its subjective value decreases, while any anticipated delay
for punishment affects the punishment's aversiveness for adults); Thaler, supra note 284, at 205-06
(finding discount rates for gains vary inversely with the size of the reward and the length of time to
be waited, and that discount rates are much smaller for losses than for gains); J. Frank Yates &
Royce A. Watts, Preferences for Deferred Losses, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM.
PERFORMANCE 294, 304 (1975) (challenging the hypothesis that people overwhelmingly prefer
aversive consequences be experienced sooner rather than later and arguing that when subjects
perceive the outcome as truly aversive, they will often prefer deferred outcomes to more immediate
ones).
299. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman, Preferences for Improving and Declining Sequences of
Health Outcomes, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 203 (2000) (posing a variety of sequences of
headache pain and finding that the vast majority preferred a decreasing sequence of pain);
Christopher Hsee et al., The Relative Weighting of Position and Velocity in Satisfaction, 2
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In the consumer finance context, the problem of amount-inconsistent
discount rates may explain why consumers are willing to pay large interest
rates on relatively small amounts of money so long as the monthly payment
remains affordable, and so long as they are not forced to focus on the length
of time that it will take them to repay the debt. Payday loans are a classic
example, in that people are willing to pay annualized interest rates of close to
400% or more for small loans with a stated due date of two weeks or so
(though the loans are often rolled and kept outstanding for longer periods).
This may also explain the credit card industry's resistance to measures that
would call attention to the length of time it will take to repay a credit card
balance when only the minimum balance is paid.
C. Post-default Conduct
Default can be instrumentally rational when it is the result of either
strategic borrowers' gamesmanship or unanticipated and unanticipatable
shocks to income that preclude law-abiding borrowers from meeting their
credit obligations on time. Economists would reasonably predict that law-
abiding, rational borrowers would react to shifts in income to minimize
default by downsizing consumption in future periods, as well as by selling
collateral and other assets in order to raise funds to pay off outstanding
obligations. But cognitive psychology contributes an alternative prediction
of consumer borrowers' behavior in a near-default setting. Because of the
cognitive biases detailed above, consumers buy more and borrow more than
rational actors would have; overextended, quasi-rational borrowers will
default more frequently than rational individuals would have. Because they
are more highly leveraged, smaller shifts in income can push these borrowers
into default. Behavioral decision research also suggests that consumer
borrowers will not react to near-default situations as quickly or decisively as
rational borrowers for several reasons.
Consumer borrowers will be slow to reduce consumption from current
levels because of the optimism bias. Because of the endowment effect, they
may hold on to collateral although a rational actor would sell it, pay off the
debt with the proceeds, and buy a cheaper substitute. Finally, because of
their perceived sunk cost, they will be more willing to engage in riskier
behavior to avoid a loss than they would to realize a commensurate gain.
PSYCHOL. SCi. 263 (1991) (finding that an increasing wage profile was rated as highly as a
decreasing sequence that conferred much more money); George Loewenstein & Nachum
Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LABOR ECON. 67 (1991) (finding
that, as relates to otherwise identical jobs, most respondents prefer an increasing wage profile to a
declining or flat one); George F. Loewenstein & Draten Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of
Outcomes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 91 (1993); Carol Varey & Daniel Kahneman, Experiences Extended
Across Time: Evaluation of Moments and Episodes, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 169 (1992)
(finding that subjects strongly preferred sequences involving decreasing discomfort as compared to
increasing discomfort levels, even when overall sum of discomfort was otherwise identical).
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Each of these predictions is supported by empirical and anecdotal evidence
of consumers who have filed for bankruptcy.
1. Shifts from a Reference Point.-Consumers, being human, are slow
to move off the dime. They judge their well-being, not in absolute terms, but
instead in terms of a frame of reference. Based on these insights, Tversky
and Kahneman propose a model of reference-dependent utility called
prospect theory. 300  According to prospect theory, intertemporal choices
depend upon departures from a reference point-past consumption,
expectations, social comparisons, status quo, and so on. And while
individuals are assumed to be risk averse, prospect theory also presumes that
they exhibit a diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses.301
Prospect theory suggests that consumers will be slow to change savings
and borrowing decisions when faced with changes in their income, and this
prediction has been corroborated with experimental results. For example,
David Bowman, Deborah Minehart, and Matthew Rabin offer a model
predicting that individuals will be reluctant to alter their current consumption
in reaction to shocks to income.30 2 Frederick, Lowenstein, and O'Donoghue
agree, arguing that "loss aversion reinforces time discounting," which creates
a "powerful aversion" to reductions of consumption levels.30 3 John Shea
supports this prediction using both aggregate data30 4 and data from unions (in
which union contracts differ by the possibility of workers receiving a change
in wages in a set period).305 He found that consumption growth responds
more strongly to future wage decreases than future wage increases. 30 6 Jeffrey
Fuhrer reaches similar conclusions by modeling consumer decisionmaking in
terms of habit formation.30 7 He argues that habit formation explains
300. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979) (proposing prospect theory as an alternative theory of
decisionmaking under risk); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 217, at 1046-48 (arguing that
individual choice is reference dependent, that individuals are risk averse, and that individuals have
diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses).
301. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 217, at 1046-48.
302. David Bowman et al., Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model, 38 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 155, 156 (1999).
303. Frederick et al., supra note 236, at 380. Loewenstein expands on this thesis in a
subsequent work co-authored with Dra~en Prelec. George Loewenstein & Dralen Prelec,
Anomolies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 Q. J. EcoN. 573 (1992)
(discussing anomalies in intertemporal choice and their implications for borrower behavior).
304. See John Shea, Myopia, Liquidity Constraints, and Aggregate Consumption: A Simple
Test, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 798, 804 (1995) (using aggregate data to show that
"consumption is more sensitive to predictable income declines than to predictable income
increases").
305. John Shea, Union Contracts and the Life-Cycle/Permanent-Income Hypothesis, 85 AM.
ECON. REv. 186, 188-90 (1995).
306. Id. at 196.
307. See Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications for
Monetary-Policy Models, 90 AM. EcoN. REv. 367, 368 (2000) (including data on habit formation to
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"humped-shaped" responses to shifts in income-that is, adjustments to
consumption that are sluggish in the short, but not in the long, run.3°s
2. Sunk Costs.-Another reason consumer borrowers may be slow to
adjust their expenditures to react to a decrease in income is their reluctance to
walk away from sunk costs. Richard Thaler describes this heuristic by
asking who is more likely to attend a basketball game notwithstanding a
snowstorm: A, who paid $40 cash for the ticket, or B, who obtained the ticket
from a colleague for free. 30 9 Consistent with intuitions, behavioral decision
research supports the notion that actors have a "greater tendency to continue
an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made. '" 310
Rent-to-own, home appliance, consumer electronics, and car dealers
capitalize on this heuristic all the time. When a consumer rents a television,
or a room full of furniture, the principal due on the financing (or the implicit
principal if it is a lease) declines much more slowly than the value of the
item. Often, at the time the consumer is faced with default, it would be
cheaper to abandon the large screen television to the lender and purchase a
comparable replacement than to complete the payments on the existing
television. The same thing may happen with car loans and other secured
consumer transactions. In the near default context, sunk costs might
influence consumer borrowers' decisions to hang on to collateral far longer
than a rational actor would.
3. Endowment Effect.-Behavioral science literature demonstrates that
individuals place a higher dollar value on the property that they own than
other people's property-the so-called endowment effect. 311  As a result,
develop a monetary-policy model, which "allows the model to match the response of real spending
to monetary-policy shocks").
308. Id. at 368-69.
309. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39, 47 (1980).
310. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124 (1985). For studies finding sunk costs, see id. at
126-36; Howard Garland & Stephanie Newport, Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the
Decision to Persist with a Course of Action, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 55, 65-67 (1991); John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, Payment Depreciation: The
Behavioral Effects of Temporally Separating Payments from Consumption, 25 J. CONSUMER RES.
160, 160-64 (1998); Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating
Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
27 (1976); Thaler, supra note 309, at 47-50.
311. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-6 (2002) (presenting experimental tests and results finding that the
endowment effect is significantly dampened in the presence of agency relationships); Russell
Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) ("The
much studied 'endowment effect' stands for the principal [sic] that people tend to value goods more
when they own them than when they do not.").
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people tend to place a higher value on losses than equivalent gains,3 12 and
exhibit a preference for avoiding the loss of property that exceeds their desire
to acquire property of an equal value.313
Repeated experiments confirm the existence of this endowment effect in
research settings.3 14  Market data also confirm significant differences
312. Loss aversion is the most widely accepted explanation for the endowment effect. Thaler,
supra note 309, at 44-47. However, alternative theories exist. See, e.g., Brett Inder & Terry
O'Brien, The Endowment Effect and the Role of Uncertainty, 55 BULL. ECON. RES. 289, 290-92
(2003) (theorizing that endowment effects pertain more to uncertainty than to loss aversion);
Korobkin, supra note 311, at 1247-56 (reviewing literature and discussing several potential causes,
including wealth effects, loss aversion, and regret avoidance); Simonson & Drolet, supra note 223,
at 682, 688-89 (testing the relationship between anchoring and endowment effects).
313. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1108.
314. See, e.g., Wiktor L. Adamowicz et al., Experiments on the Difference Between Willingness
to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 69 LAND ECON. 416, 416 (1993) (finding that, although the
existence of a substitute for the good being evaluated reduces the difference between willingness to
pay and willingness to accept, the difference remains significant); Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the
Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 112 Q. J. ECON. 479, 503 (1997) (stating that, in light
of their evidence, "the influence of loss aversion is a robust effect"); R.R. Boyce et al., An
Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the WTA-WTP Disparity, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 1366 (1992) (presenting findings that demonstrate that intrinsic value, property rights,
and moral responsibility play important roles in the endowment effect); Don L. Coursey et al., The
Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measure of Value, 102 Q. J. ECON.
679, 679-80 (1987) (discussing several experiments and surveys confirming the endowment effect,
but presenting data that show that such effects may be overstated); D.W. Harless, More Laboratory
Evidence on the Disparity Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded, 11 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 359, 375-76 (1989) (presenting findings that confirm the existence of an
endowment effect in relation to an auction of lottery tickets); Daniel Kahneman et al., The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195-97 (1993)
(examining the endowment effect in a coffee mug market for Comell undergraduate economics
students); Daniel Kahneman et al., supra note 215, at 1325 (reporting "several experiments that
demonstrate that this 'endowment effect' persists"); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and
Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989) (discussing three
tests that seem to refute the complete reversibility of indifference); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden,
Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demand: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity
in Measure of Value, 99 Q. J. ECoN. 507, 516 (1984) (suggesting that the income effect provides an
incomplete explanation of individual choice preferences, and that the endowment effect accounts for
loss aversion); John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the
Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 616 (2004) (limiting confirmation of the endowment effect
to less experienced consumers and concluding that more experienced consumers behave
consistently with neoclassical predictions); Michal A. Strahilevitz & George Loewenstein, The
Effect of Ownership History on the Valuation of Objects, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 276, 276 (1998)
(presenting four studies extending "prior research on the endowment effect by demonstrating that
object valuation is affected by both past and present ownership status"); Eric van Dijk & Daan van
Knippenberg, Buying and Selling Exchange Goods: Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 517, 522 (1996) (noting the presence of the endowment effect in the trading of
exchange goods when there is uncertainty about future exchange prices); Eric van Dijk & Daan van
Knippenberg, Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Comparability of
Consumer Goods, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 485, 488-94 (1998) (finding support for the endowment
effect in a research experiment where participants expressed reluctance to trade bottles of wine in
their possession for similar bottles in the possession of other participants).
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between actors' willingness to pay for a good and willingness to accept
offers to bu315 even in geographically and culturally distinct markets.316
4. Consumer Bankruptcy, Sunk Costs, and the Endowment Effect.-
Survey and other empirical studies of consumer debtors in bankruptcy
provide sobering reminders of the influence of sunk costs and endowment
effects. Over the past twenty years, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook have
studied thousands of bankruptcy filings in a number of states,317 and found
that, for a "persistent subgroup of Americans... the home itself may be the
debtors' financial ruin, with its relentless demands for mortgage payments,
maintenance, and taxes. For some, the refusal to abandon a home that is no
longer affordable brings them to collapse. 318
They emphasize the force of their empirical findings with an anecdote
from one respondent's questionnaire, a debtor they call "Don Wilson.,
319
When Don filed his bankruptcy petition, he owned a home in Havertown,
Pennsylvania. 32  Despite an income of less than $25,000, Don owed a
whopping $85,000 in mortgage debt on his home.32 Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook note that "[a] financial planner would have told Don not to file
bankruptcy. 322 The financial planner would have advised Don simply to sell
the house for its reported $160,000 value; Don could then pay off his
$85,000 mortgage debt and $5,000 in other secured and unsecured debts,
315. See Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to
Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 255, 264-66 (1994) (noting that incentive-compatible bidding systems
do not eliminate the endowment effect for nonmarket goods). But see Jack L. Knetsch et al., The
Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?, 4
EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 257, 262-65 (2001) (concluding that some Vickrey auctions cause disparity
between WTP and WTA to decrease or even disappear over repeated trials); Jason F. Shogren &
Dermot J. Hayes, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 241, 243 (1997) (affirming that the endowment effect disappears under normal
market circumstances, but may be a factor in thin or nonexistent markets).
316. Steven J. Kachelmeier & Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High
Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 1120, 1132 (1992) (comparing risk preferences in the U.S., Canada, and the People's Republic
of China, and concluding that the effect of "cultural differences, if any, were not strong"); see
generally Melanie Wallendorf & Eric J. Arnould, "My Favorite Things ": A Cross-Cultural Inquiry
into Object Attachment, Possessiveness, and Social Linkage, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 531, 537 (1988)
(comparing data from America and Nigeria, and concluding that in both cultures, certain objects
become "decommodified" as a "web of semiotic and symbolic associations" making that object
priceless for its owner).
317. These states include the following: Illinois; Pennsylvania; Texas; California; and
Tennessee. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at
265. This work builds on their earlier studies. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE, supra note 18. Subsequent work further refines their empirical look at consumer
bankruptcy and its policy implications. E.g., WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 22.
318. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 200.
319. Id. at 202-04.
320. Id. at 202.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 202-03.
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with plenty of money left over to purchase a new home.32 3 The endowment
effect may explain Don's desire to hang on to his home, whatever the cost
and whatever the chances of success-a desire that contradicts a rational
actor model of homeownership.
Empirical studies suggest that the influence of the endowment effect in
consumer bankruptcy cases extends beyond isolated anecdotes like Don
Wilson. Indeed, the influence of the endowment effect upon consumers'
post-default conduct is pervasive. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook show
that "[a]bout half of all the debtors who file for bankruptcy own homes when
they file, 324 and are burdened with a median mortgage debt of $44,000.325
When they compare the income, mortgage debt, and nonmortgage debt for
homeowners in bankruptcy with that of homeowners in the general
population, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook find that homeowners in
bankruptcy "carry similar mortgage debts and higher nonmortgage debts than
their homeowner counterparts in the general population, and they do so on
substantially lower incomes. 326
Their findings also contradict the claims of strategic incentive analysis
that individuals increasingly have filed for bankruptcy in order to take
advantage of the generous federal homestead exemption.327 The median
consumer debtor studied by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook carried
328
mortgages that constituted 87.3% of the value of their homes. Nearly one
quarter of these debtors had no home equity when they filed for
bankruptcy. 329  Their median home equity was only $5,500.3 3 0  These
bankruptcy figures compare unfavorably with those of the general
homeowning population. The Census Bureau reports that in 1991, the year
in which Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook studied bankruptcy files,
Americans' mortgage debts averaged only 57.4% of the value of their
homes 331 and that the national median home equity was an impressive
$43,078.332
Moreover, decisional biases influence more than just consumer debtors'
efforts to save their homes in bankruptcy; they may also influence consumer
debtors' efforts to hang on to their cars and other personal property following
323. Id. at 203.
324. Id. at 204 & n.24.
325. Id. at218.
326. Id. at 219.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 172-178.
328. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 18, at 221.
329. Id. at 221 & n.76.
330. Id. at 221 & n.73.
331. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN
1991, at 124 tbl.3-15 (1993).
332. T.J. ELLER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL BRIEF: HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND




bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code offers chapter 7 debtors several options
relating to the treatment of their collateral: debtors can redeem their secured
property by paying a lump sum amount equal to the value of the collateral;
333
they can reaffirm their security agreement;334 or they can surrender the
collateral to the secured creditor.
335
Reaffirming a security agreement may not be rational.336 The rationality
of the decision turns on a comparison of the cost of the reaffirmed debt and
the cost of a replacement obligation. But data show that many consumer
debtors reaffirm secured debt, whether the affected collateral could have
been replaced for a lesser amount.337 For example, a rational debtor would
not reaffirm a debt securing the purchase price of a car where public
transportation or a cheaper used car was instead available. A rational
consumer might also be unlikely to reaffirm a security agreement where the
reaffirmed debt amount exceeds the collateral value because creditors
generally insist that the debtor reaffirm the entire debt balance regardless of
collateral value. Pre-default payments constitute significant sunk costs,
while ownership of collateral creates a powerful endowment effect, both of
which may push consumer debtors toward reaffirmation of their secured
debt.
Empirical research on reaffirmation agreements in bankruptcy supports
insights from cognitive research.338 In their preliminary study of more than a
thousand chapter 7 cases filed in 1995 in seven judicial circuits located
across the nation, Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White found
secured reaffirmation agreements to exist in surprising numbers.339 They
333. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2000).
334. Id. § 524(c)-(d).
335. Prior to the 2005 bankruptcy amendments, consumers in some circuits were able to retain
their collateral if they were not in default before the case and kept current on their monthly
payments during the case. Compare In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998), with In re Boodrow,
126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997). Recent bankruptcy legislation resolved this circuit split in lenders'
favor. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (amending
11 U.S.C. §§ 362(h), 521(a)(6)).
336. But see Adler et al., supra note 10, at 590 (discussing the argument that reaffirmation
agreements constitute rational behavior).
337. Bankruptcy courts have, from time to time, noted the irrationality of some of the
reaffirmation agreements that debtors have executed. See, e.g., In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 449
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that a debtor would pay an aggregate amount of $3,269.02 under
the reaffirmation agreement, of which $1,469.02 constituted interest and asking, "[Elven if the
debtor could afford to ... , would.., a rational decision-maker have agreed to carry this debt for
seven years... when other credit card issuers charge a far lower actual annual percentage rate...
even to persons who have received a recent discharge in ... bankruptcy").
338. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of
Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999).
339. Culhane and White found several things surprising about the secured reaffirmations they
found. See id. at 712-13 (summarizing the findings of their study). For example, they were
surprised to find that "the claims most often reaffirmed were those secured by household goods,"
rather than by cars or homes. Id. at 713. They found this surprising since "repossession of this type
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report that more than 60% of the reaffirmation agreements they studied were
debts scheduled as secured. Moreover, they report that, in a substantial
portion of the studied reaffirmations, the reaffirmed debt exceeded the value
of the related collateral:
In 38% (49 of 129) of the motor vehicle reaffirmations, the amount
reaffirmed exceeded the stated value of the car. Ten percent of the
motor vehicle reaffirmations were for amounts 200% or more of
scheduled collateral value. In 37% (17 of the 46) of reaffirmations of
debt secured by homes, the debtors reaffirmed an amount greater than
scheduled value .... [A]lmost 40% of the reaffirmations of homes
and cars were at least partly unsecured.340
And these statistics relate to reaffirmations involving high-value collateral.
With agreements to reaffirm debt secured by household goods, Culhane and
White cannot refer to valuations of the collateral in the court records.
Nonetheless, they say, "it seems likely that most of the household goods
reaffirmations are less than fully secured, given the quick depreciation and
low residual value of most such collateral. 341
Culhane and White raise substantial questions about debtors' abilities to
afford their reaffirmed obligations. When they computed reaffirming
debtors' net disposable income available to cover reaffirmation costs, they
found an average monthly deficit of _$80.342 Indeed, 39% of the reaffirming
debtors had no (zero) disposable income available for reaffirmation
payments.343
5. Conclusion.-Economists conclude that default on consumer credit
obligations occurs for one of two reasons: unforeseen (or foreseen but
rationally ignored) events and opportunism resulting from the law's failure to
force debtors to internalize the full consequences of their default. The first
form of default is efficient-a product of rational borrowing decisions and
efficient decisions to breach. The second form of default is problematic, and
should be prevented through legal reform aimed at these opportunistic
of collateral was less likely than for homes or cars," but suggest that debtors reaffirmed "to obtain
postbankruptcy credit." Id.
340. Id. at 730.
341. Id. at 731.
342. Id. at 761.
343. Id. Culhane and White considered the affordability of reaffirmed debt obligations
according to several other indicators. Id. at 758-64. They calculated ratios of reaffirmed debt to
income and of reaffirmation payment to monthly income. Id. at 762-63. They also considered
nondischargeable debt as an additional burden on debtors' fresh start. Id. at 763-64. With each of
these alternative measures for assessing the affordability of the reaffirmed debt they studied,
Culhane and White reached the same conclusions: they did not think that the debtors were




borrowers. Under current legislation, the solution is to limit access to the
bankruptcy discharge.
Behavioralists, by contrast, conclude that there is a third reason for
consumer overborrowing and default: biases in decisionmaking that arise
through predictable and consistent cognitive error. Under this view, the
locus of responsibility shifts from the borrowers themselves to the lenders
who market debt and encourage borrowing that, while profitable, may not be
socially desirable.
We think the shift to a behavioral model of consumer finance
transaction does more than explain increases in nonbusiness bankruptcy
filings and consumer debt loads. We think that the policy prescription differs
greatly depending upon whether the lawmaker applies a strategic incentive or
a behavioral model of consumer borrowing and default. We turn to the
implications of our model in Part IV.
IV. Rational Lenders and Quasi-Rational Consumer Borrowers: A
Behavioral Model of Consumer Credit and Consumer Bankruptcy Law
What implications follow from the conclusion that consumers are not
rational, strategic actors? We note several, albeit briefly. Subpart IV(A)
focuses on the market implications of a behavioral model and concludes that
rational lenders face incentives to exploit these cognitive limitations in a
competitive market for consumer credit. Subpart IV(B) focuses on the
regulatory implications, and looks at the issue from both the lenders' and
borrowers' sides. We raise questions as to the relative importance of
focusing on consumer borrowers' ex ante incentives when addressing the
consequences of ex post default, and conclude that regulation that aims to
alter consumer incentives is unlikely to alter the ex ante biases that lead to
consumer overborrowing. Taking behavioral realities into account suggests
that legislation should focus on the protection of consumer borrowers and the
regulation of lenders' marketing practices. As such, recent bankruptcy
legislation would appear to be entirely wrongheaded. Other forms of
consumer protection regulation are also examined. Finally, subpart IV(C)
considers the research implications of a behavioral model. We note that
experimental research has, to date, concentrated on consumers' purchasing
decisions and suggests that future experiments should consider decisions to
borrow and choices made in the context of a loan default. Beyond
identifying the need for further research, we outline the contours of a
research agenda.
A. Market Implications: Incentives to Exploit Biases in Decisionmaking
Borrowing and lending present complimentary perspectives on the same
transaction. It is senseless to look at consumers' incentives to borrow
without also considering lenders' incentives to extend credit. Thus,
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consumer bankruptcy law (and, indeed, all consumer law) should be crafted
with an understanding of both sides of a consumer finance transaction.344
Behavioral decision research raises questions as to whether rational
actor models should govern both sides of a consumer finance transaction.
We have no doubts about the propriety of applying a rational actor model to
explain lenders' behavior in these markets. To lenders in the consumer
finance industry, the decision to extend consumer credit is a business
decision in a very big and very profitable industry.345 While there may be
lenders with faulty decisionmaking processes, competitive markets punish
these errors. By contrast, those who borrow are individuals, flesh-and-blood
human beings. Behavioral decision research raises substantial questions
about the predictive fit of a rational actor model to describe borrower
behavior, and the data we detailed in Part II do not disconfirm our doubts in
this regard.
Others have noted that troubling market failures result when rational
sellers or lenders market to quasi-rational customers: rational actors face
every incentive in a competitive marketplace to seek to exploit consumer
cognitive biases. Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar first observed the
market incentives implicit in behavioral models of consumer conduct, 346 and
applied their insights to the marketing of cigarettes and other tobacco
products (despite the correlation between smoking and cancer, emphysema,
and other diseases). 347  Recently, Oren Bar-Gill applied the insights of
Hanson and Kysar to describe a similar failure in the market for credit card
credit. He "portrays the credit card contract as a tool designed to exploit
consumers' underestimation bias., 348 Bar-Gill pointed to minimum payment
schedules and teaser rates as the consequences of this market failure.
Similarly, Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier recently studied
thousands of health club transactions and found evidence that health club
owners capitalized on members' time-inconsistent preferences with regard to
exercise (while members do not want to exercise now, they are confident that
they will wish to do so later).34 9 While DellaVigna and Malmendier's
empirical study focused on health clubs, they were quick to note the
344. Because of this interdependence, factors that create incentives for debtors' borrowing
might at the same time create counter-incentives for creditors' lending. Similarly, remedies that
protect borrowers impose costs on lenders, while remedies that protect lenders impose costs on their
borrowers.
345. See supra note 151 (illustrating the recent profitability of credit card banks).
346. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, supra note 36, at 721-44 (outlining
their theory that, under the behavioralist approach, market forces will drive manufacturers to exploit
consumer biases in decision making).
347. Hanson & Kysar, Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 36, at 1467-1552.
348. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1376. Sunstein, too, sees consumers' cognitive biases as
creating an opportunity for exploitation by lenders. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 6. He explores
whether the appropriate response is through strong paternalism (such as usury limits), or weak
paternalism (such as bias correction or notice). Id. at 6-12, 19-22.
349. DellaVigna & Malmendier, Theory and Evidence, supra note 274, at 373-77.
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applicability of their research to cell phone contracts350 and credit card
transactions.351 Like Bar-Gill, DellaVigna and Malmendier point to credit
card issuers' incentives to exploit credit card users' overconfidence about
how little they will borrow.
352
In Part III, we noted other consumer credit contract terms implicated by
this same analysis: not just teaser rates and minimum payment options, but
also high-interest charges for apparently short-term payday loans and high-
noninterest charges triggered by a consumer's default or overlimit
borrowing. We also drew a connection between purchasing and borrowing
to contend that a behavioral model suggests that quasi-rational consumers
will purchase more than rational actors. Thus, quasi-rational consumers who
purchase on credit, especially those using their credit cards, will owe more
than a rational borrower. This leads to welfare losses, because the
overborrowing, coupled with underestimation of interest charges, will
significantly constrain future consumption decisions.
Nor do we think that the implications of a behavioral model of
consumer finance are limited to explaining consumers' purchasing and
borrowing; a behavior model also holds important implications for
explaining consumers' conduct in the event of default. Because quasi-
rational borrowers are unwilling to leave behind sunk costs in the form of
down payments and installment payments, and because quasi-rational debtors
value their collateral more highly than does the marketplace, they may
reaffirm debt they cannot afford, and they may file for bankruptcy rather than
sell their home and pay off debt with the equity. Indeed, the work of
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook shows that debtors will often go to absurd
lengths to hold onto houses that are worth less than the outstanding mortgage
balance. 353 Culhane and White made similar observations about debtors'
seemingly irrational willingness to reaffirm car and mobile home loans, as
well as fully dischargeable credit card debt.3 54
B. Regulatory Implications: Ex Ante Incentives versus Ex Post Effects
Behavioral decision research also holds implications for the shape and
content of consumer bankruptcy and consumer finance law.
Incentive analysts assume that consumer overleverage derives from
strategic behavior, and on this basis support recent bankruptcy amendments
that reduce the benefits of a bankruptcy filing and increase the cost of
350. Id. at 380-81.
351. Id. at 377-79.
352. Id.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 317-332.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 338-343.
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obtaining a bankruptcy discharge.355 They worry that the bankruptcy
discharge creates an incentive for individuals to declare bankruptcy, and
claim that bankruptcy reform will eliminate consumer overleverage by
properly limiting their improper incentives for filing.
Behavioral decision research, by contrast, questions not only whether
proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code are necessary, but also whether
they will have the desired effect on consumer debtors. It suggests that means
testing eligibility for chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy cases will have little
effect on consumers' ex ante borrowing and post-default decision processes.
Because changes in bankruptcy law are not likely to cause consumers to
borrow less, this focus on consumers' ex ante incentives is misguided and
likely to be harmful. Limiting access to the bankruptcy discharge is only
likely to increase the harm suffered as a result of erroneous decisionmaking.
The bankruptcy discharge, in this view, serves a salutary purpose by limiting
the power, and hence the excesses, of consumer lenders.
In a behavioral world, there are no adverse consequences to mercy. If
financial distress is real, unforeseen, and unavoidable, then solely addressing
consumers' ex ante incentives to file a bankruptcy petition cannot prevent it.
To the extent that individual debtors' decisions to borrow are made without
reference to the consequences of default and bankruptcy, the only effect of
the new bankruptcy reform will be to increase the amount of pain suffered
after the fact. If consumer bankruptcy law cannot prevent financial failure, it
should seek to soften the blow. Moreover, softening the blow will not have
the effect of distorting ex ante incentives. This means that consumer
bankruptcy law can address the ex post effects of insolvency on lenders by
fashioning legal rules to resolve creditors' conflicting claims to the debtor's
assets without worry about adverse consequences.356
While the desire of incentive analysts to influence behavior through ex
ante incentives may be laudable, they focus on the wrong actor. Incentive
analysts operate on the assumption that consumers are rational, and that
lenders are rational but labor under an information asymmetry. We have
demonstrated that when post-1978 changes in credit markets and information
technology are linked to a behavioral model of consumer decisionmaking,
the model is flipped on its head. The model that we propose envisions
rational lenders and quasi-rational, or heuristic, borrowers. Under this
model, overleverage results from creditor exploitation of heuristic biases and
regulation should focus on consumer (rather than lender) protection.
355. BAPCPA alters strategic incentives in several ways, by including the following costs:
means-testing; credit counseling; debtor education; attorney liability provisions; heightened
standards for confirmation of chapter 13 plan; and schedule and filing requirements.
356. It should also address the ex post effects of insolvency on consumer debtors through legal
rules that, for example, identify assets that should be free from the reaches of creditors and
prepetition transactions that the debtor can avoid or reaffirm.
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The difficult question that should be the focus of future research and
legislative action is how best to protect consumers from their own biases
(and from lender exploitation of those biases). This regulation might take a
number of forms. It could be disclosure-based or it could focus on debtor
education-two approaches that emphasize improving consumers'
decisionmaking processes. Alternatively, regulation could focus on the
creditors, regulating certain practices as unfair or deceptive or setting limits
on charges such as interest rates, fees, and penalties. We discuss each of
these options briefly below.
1. Disclosure.-Disclosure is often helpful, but behavioral decision
research raises questions as to the efficacy of provisions to enhance
disclosure about the terms of borrowing (before bankruptcy) and reaffirming
(after bankruptcy).357 There is some data to support the notion that disclosure
of credit terms has improved consumer borrowers' knowledge of the APR
that applies to their credit card.358 But because disclosure works best if
consumers are underinformed but otherwise fully rational, disclosure
regulations on their own may be insufficient to overcome decisionmaking
biases. For example, framing and anchoring effects may undermine the
effectiveness of disclosure regulations. 9  More research is needed, but we
suspect that if consumers focus more on the affordability of their monthly
payment than the overall cost of credit, disclosure (and knowledge) of APR
may not influence borrowing behavior. If disclosure is to work, the notices
must be crafted with an express awareness and a desire to overcome
predictable decisionmaking biases.
Moreover, we suspect that disclosure regulations create incentives for
lenders to draft contract terms that evade current disclosure regulation and
continue to obscure the actual contract terms.360 Mark Furletti, a researcher
357. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 33, at 1533-37 (discussing the importance of how the
disclosed information is presented).
358. See Thomas A. Durkin, Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit
Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 201, 206 (2002) ("A question in [a] survey of credit card users in
2000 indicated that consumer awareness of annual percentage rates associated with credit card
accounts ... has increased dramatically in the three decades since the implementation of the [Truth-
in-Lending Act]."). Furletti notes, however, that Durkin's study may apply an overly broad
definition of the word "aware." Furletti, supra note 92, at 3. Indeed, given the number of
noninterest charges and subsequent events that may influence the cost of borrowing with a credit
card, improved awareness should not be equated with actual knowledge of the effective interest rate
being paid or the overall cost of credit.
359. Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic
Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
453, 455-63 (2005) (arguing that psychosocial factors explaining differences among individual
debtors might need to be taken into account before implementing effective changes to consumer
credit disclosure regulations).
360. Cf Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1258 (2002) (discussing the
limitations of current "opt-out" disclosure information and proposing instead a plain-English
disclosure that consumers will be more likely to understand and respond to).
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at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, explains that lenders are required
to disclose some but not all of these terms. 361 He argues that disclosure rules
362should be updated to include these terms within their scope. While we
agree with Furletti that current disclosure requirements may be ineffective,
we fear that expanding the list of required disclosures is not the answer.
First, a laundry list may overload consumers and render the notice
counterproductive. Furthermore, lenders may simply amend contractual
terms to keep one step ahead of regulatory requirements. Thus, prohibition
of egregious terms and practices may be required.
2. Debtor Education.-Another avenue for consumer protection
involves the provision of financial literacy education to consumers.
Education might occur in high schools, prior to obtaining a mortgage or
credit card, in the context of a first or second default, or even as a debtor
embarks on her fresh start in bankruptcy. Critics of a behavioral model
complain that decisional biases provide, at best, a short-term model of
consumer behavior. For example, they argue that even if credit card users
initially underestimate the amount of credit card debt, they will learn over
time from their mistakes.363 We agree that debtor education can be useful in
some instances, but suspect that courses that focus on credit terms and budget
planning may not provide a universal solution. The content and timing of the
course matters. We also question the efficacy of mandatory counseling on
the eve of bankruptcy, as required by the 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code.3 4
3. Other Regulation.-Regulation need not follow the weak paternalism
outlined above. 365 State or federal legislatures or courts could limit or even
prohibit the most egregious practices. Cooling off periods could be
361. See Furletti, supra note 92, at 9, 13-14, 17 (describing the main components of the costs to
consumers for use of credit cards and the associated disclosure requirements).
362. Id. at 18-20.
363. See, e.g., Glenn B. Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Developments in the Pricing of Credit
Card Services, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 652, 665 (1992) (contending that Ausubel's model implies that
households persistently err in predicting credit card use, without learning from past experience);
Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 79, 140-42 (2000) (critiquing
Ausubel's model because it "assumes a remarkable degree of consumer irrationality... month after
month and year after year" and because it assumes that "consumers never become more intelligent
about their options, despite billions spent by credit card companies to inform consumers of the
different product options that are available to them").
364. See supra note 258.
365. See Camerer et al., supra note 37, at 1224 (presenting regulatory programs that balance the
desire to correct decisionmaking errors while trying to prevent costly interference with rational
individuals); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 37, at 1166 (arguing that although paternalism is




366expanded to cover a greater range of transactions. Some contract terms
could be outlawed, or the doctrine of unconscionability revitalized.367 At the
very least, predatory creditor practices, and particularly deceptive marketing
techniques, might be scrutinized or even prohibited. Resuscitation of usury
laws is another option. This sort of strong regulation has the advantage of
discouraging lenders from making loans to those most likely to default. On
the flip side, it may limit credit to those perhaps most in need. The relative
costs and benefits, however, certainly bear further study in light of behavioral
decision research.
C. Research Implications
We commented earlier on the dearth of experimental literature on the
implications of a behavior model on consumers' decisions to borrow, default,
or file for bankruptcy. While the results of laboratory experiments on
decisionmaking present strong implications for the market for consumer
credit, focused research is needed. We lay out these implications as a basis
for future research.
Passage of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments creates natural
opportunities for testing whether a rational actor model or a behavior model
better explains consumers' borrowing and default behavior. Incentive
analysts advocated enactment of the new law on the grounds that it was
needed to reduce the cost of consumer credit-the so-called bankruptcy
tax.368 We suspect that lobbyists sold Congress a bill of goods when they
promised that enactment would result in a rebate of this "bankruptcy tax" on
the cost of consumer credit. Although passage of the new law was touted as
necessary on the grounds that the former law enabled high-risk borrowers to
externalize their bankruptcy costs across the marketplace, we think that legal
and technological changes since 1978 (other than the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act) created a sea change in lenders' abilities to price
discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers. As a result, we suspect
that consumer lenders already provided a rebate of the bankruptcy tax; we
predict there will be no discernible change in the cost of consumer credit that
correlates with the effective date of the 2005 amendments. We also predict
that the rate at which lenders charge off (that is, record on their internal
366. For federal legislation providing a "cooling off' period for certain subprime mortgages,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b)(1) (2000), requiring a three-day cooling off period for certain home
mortgage transactions. Although we mention cooling off periods as a possibility, we suspect they
are less effective than other forms of regulation because they only apply if buyers are
knowledgeable about their existence and a change in intertemporal preferences happens to coincide
with the regulatory period.
367. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1290 (2003) (arguing for a modified unconscionability
doctrine for form contracts).
368. Noticeably absent from the legislative debate was any claim that the new law would
reduce incentives to borrow, a goal contrary to the interests of the consumer finance industry who
financially backed its passage with contributions to key lawmakers.
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records an inability to collect) consumer credit obligations will not be
affected by changes in the Bankruptcy Code.369
As this Article goes to press, it is still too early to tell. The charge-off
and delinquency numbers are only available for the fourth quarter of 2005,
which includes the effective date of the 2005 amendments. The charge-off
rate is up, but this reflects the increased number of bankruptcy filings which
occurred in anticipation of the new law's effective date. Delinquency is
down slightly, but this likely reflects a similar distortion, as loans move from
the delinquent category to the charged off category as a result of hurry-up
filings prior to the October 17 effective date of the Act.37° Judging the effect
of the new bill will take some time, as bankruptcy lawyers, judges, and
debtors internalize its new rules. We predict that its effect on bankruptcy
filing rates may be significant, but that its effect on charge-off and
delinquency (in other words, on the amount of debt that will actually be
repaid) will be minimal.
In our view consumers have increased their debt loads over the past
thirty years because lenders have become more skilled at exploiting the
biases in their decisionmaking, and not because of the details of consumer
bankruptcy law. Accordingly, changes in the law will not affect consumers'
decisions to borrow. Overleverage is here to stay.
We hope that behavioral decision research will shift its gaze from
consumers' purchasing toward consumers' borrowing and default behaviors.
The regulation of consumer credit transactions is premised on a model that
posits rational, but less than perfectly informed, consumer actors; in this
view, regulators need only provide consumers additional information (by
means of disclosure regulations) in order to correct for failures in the
marketplace. A behavioral model of consumer behavior contends that
consumers suffer more than informational asymmetries and on this ground
questions whether disclosure regulations, standing alone, will be sufficient.
Behavioral models contend that consumers face biases in their
decisionmaking that affect their decisions to borrow in predictable ways.
Laboratory experiments suggest the accuracy of a behavioral model, but this
cognitive research should be supplemented with experiments designed to
369. We are not alone in doubting the existence (or at least the magnitude) of the bankruptcy
tax. See Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping
the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 13-20 (explaining the fallacy of the claim that bankruptcy costs
every American family $400 each year); Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 77, 77-80 (2004) (describing the unsubstantiated $400 "tax" as a creation of credit industry
lobbyists, who derived the figure from dubious calculations and employed the $400 "fact" as a
sound-bite to gamer support for bankruptcy reform legislation in Congress); Bruce A. Markell,
Sorting and Sifting Fact From Fiction: Empirical Research and The Face of Bankruptcy, 75 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 145, 152-53 (2001) (book review).
370. Federal Reserve Bank, Charge-off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at
Commercial Banks, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff.
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assess the accuracy of the model as applied to consumers' borrowing
decisions and their decisionmaking in a near-default setting.
One set of experiments could test participants' judgment in the context
of simulated borrowing exercises. For example, experiments could test
whether participants express a greater or lesser willingness to borrow
depending on changes in the financial terms and other information disclosed
in the experimental setting. Experiments should also assess decisions made
in near-default settings. How willing would borrowers be to change their
spending habits in the face of changes in income? How willing would they
be to sell assets? Another experiment could compare the decisionmaking
processes followed by consumer debtors who recently filed for bankruptcy to
that of consumers who have not. Do those who did not file for bankruptcy
engage in systematic decisionmaking, while those who filed for bankruptcy
make choices based on heuristics? Experiments might also be designed to
test whether biases in decisionmaking are affected if disclosure information
or a financial literacy course is provided. If consumers can learn to ignore
their decisional biases, regulation should focus on providing education and
notice. If learning is unhelpful, stronger regulation may be the only way to
correct the inefficiencies occurring in markets where decisionmaking biases
infect consumer behavior.
V. Conclusion
The logic of strategic incentive analysis is intuitively appealing.
Whether we are lawyers, economists, or neither, all of us want to believe that
the law influences individuals and entities in predictable ways. Where
penalties attach, we hope that the law deters improper conduct. Where
benefits are offered, we think incentives will prompt action that merits
reward. And where lawmakers somehow get it wrong and unintentionally
encourage undesirable conduct, we believe that lawmakers should return to
craft a legal rule that better accomplishes the intended result.
Notwithstanding its intuitive appeal, strategic incentive analysis should
not dictate consumer bankruptcy policymaking. The conclusion that
individuals strategically act on incentives follows from a school of law and
economics that views all market participants as rational actors who weigh the
cost of compliance against the benefits of a breach of contract. This view of
"law as price" may have merit in some commercial contexts, but it is
particularly strained when used to describe the economic actions of
consumers.
Empirical tests of human behavior conducted by cognitive psychologists
and behavioral economists contradict the notion that decisionmaking is
guided solely by this sort of cost-benefit analysis. Behavioral decision
research instead suggests a behavioral model of consumer decisionmaking-
a model in which individuals make decisions based on shortcuts that lead
them astray in predictable ways.
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A behavioral model of consumer bankruptcy law provides an alternate
explanation for consumer debt levels and nonbusiness bankruptcy filings. It
suggests that consumers will purchase and borrow more than rational
consumers would have, and that they will be slower to react to a default
situation. It also suggests that rational lenders face market incentives to
design consumer finance products and contract terms to exploit these
decisional biases. Legal and technological changes since 1978 have allowed
lenders to implement market incentives for exploitation on a scale
unimaginable in earlier periods. The demise of usury laws and the
development of national credit reporting and credit scoring systems and mass
marketing techniques permitted lenders to create a national market for
consumer credit available to even the least credit-worthy members of
society-at a price. Until recently, the harm caused by overborrowing has
been offset to some extent by the ability of overleveraged consumer
borrowers to find relief from their debts by filing for bankruptcy. But
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 severely limits consumer access to the bankruptcy lifeboat, and, in
effect, rewards consumer lenders for taking advantage of consumer
limitations.
We find the reform's focus on incentivizing rational consumer
borrowers to be particularly wrongheaded. To the extent that rationality and
opportunism exist in consumer credit transactions, they both appear to exist
on the lender, not the borrower, side of the equation. Those who would seek
to reduce the bankruptcy filing rate should focus there as well.
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